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Abstract 
 
The thesis sets out to examine the debate on national identity and 
immigration in Italy. It analyses whether Italy, in reacting to 
immigration, is following any classic model of integration of 
foreign citizens following the example of countries such as Britain 
and France, or whether it has developed an alternative long-term 
strategy more adequate to its own situation. It also questions 
whether the debate on immigration has triggered a discussion on 
the renegotiation of the meaning of national identity, in order to 
make it more inclusive of minority identities within the country.  
The thesis traces the debate as it emerges in the public sphere. It 
identifies the main actors involved, and analyses the rhetoric used 
by the leading voices to put forward their respective views and 
claims. It aims at providing a picture of the discussion within each 
group as well as investigating the relationship between different 
actors, their alliances and the dissent they express. 
The role of three main actors taking part in the discussion is 
explored in detail, namely Italian intellectuals, the Catholic Church 
and the Northern League. It addresses their role in shaping public 
opinion and influencing the state policy-making on immigration. 
Through the final analysis of Italian legislation, the thesis 
concludes that Italy is moving towards the construction of a highly 
exclusive identity, where the idea of integration does not feature.   
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Introduction 
1. From a country of emigration to a country of immigration 
Since the end of WWII, the phenomenon of immigration and the 
presence of refugees and asylum seekers have begun to acquire 
relevance in the political and social life of Western European 
countries. The unprecedented waves of migration were 
characterised by a South-North movement, which originated 
mainly from Northern  Mediterranean countries and were directed 
towards Northern Europe, particularly  Belgium, Britain, France, 
Germany and Sweden. The colonial legacy of some of these 
Northern European countries represented a further pull factor 
which attracted a considerable number of non-European nationals 
from the British, French and Dutch ex-colonies, who were granted 
special rights and preferential access to employment and 
citizenship. In times of reconstruction and economic development, 
the receiving countries often not only encouraged immigration but 
actively recruited a labour force through national companies and 
industries and through bilateral agreements with the sending 
countries (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2007: 1). 
   Scholars and historians of migration movements tend to agree in 
indicating 1973 and the oil crisis as the watershed that marks the 
era in which Southern European nations, such as Spain, Greece and 
Italy, turned from countries of emigration into countries of 
immigration, final destinations for those seeking better living and 
working conditions. This was due to international events as well as 
to the reaction of Northern European countries to the economic 
stagnation and rising unemployment which affected the whole of 
Western Europe, when they stopped recruiting workers abroad and 
in fact decided to close their doors and aim at a „zero immigration 
policy‟ (Schain, 2008; Hollifield, 1992). Moreover, since 1989, the 
end of the Cold War, the Albanian crisis and the war in former 
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Yugoslavia contributed to opening new migration routes from the 
East to the West of Europe, making immigration increasingly 
visible in neighbouring countries such as Italy.  
   By that time the first countries of immigration had developed 
long-term strategies aimed at integrating a foreign presence which 
had become permanent or semi-permanent. Such models of 
integration resulted from both theoretical approaches to integration 
of difference as well as from more practical ideas of the state and 
its role in granting its citizens civil and political rights. The 
different strategies adopted by different countries were also based 
on specific definitions of the nation-state resulting from their 
individual history and traditions. Each of these first-wave 
immigration countries witnessed a debate on the nature of the state, 
on whether it had to be considered as an empty box, neutral 
towards different ideas of the good life, in which all should be 
granted freedom of expression, or rather had to be interpreted as 
carrying a certain set of values and moral standards traditionally 
derived from a shared culture and seen as indispensable for the 
reaffirmation of a shared national identity. In the receiving 
countries, the construction of coherent responses to immigration 
also triggered a public discussion on national identity and its 
transformation or evolution in coming to terms with new internal 
characteristics, as will be shown later in the analysis of the 
dominant models of integration. 
   Italy is among those countries that in the early 1970s started to 
receive more people than they were sending abroad and therefore 
became countries of immigration. Traditionally considered as the 
starting point of many diasporas, between the end of the 19
th
 
century and the early 1920s, almost 15 million Italians left their 
country for Northern Europe, the United States, Latin America, 
Canada and Australia (Biggieri, 2005:1). Italian culture has always 
been pervaded with a shared memory of the experiences of the 
„emigranti‟, which is reflected in popular culture, cinema, music 
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and which contributed to create the myth of the „Italiani all‟estero‟ 
as part of the national identity (Fortier, 2000; Gabaccia, 2000). The 
theme of the „patria‟ as „madre‟ and that of the journey by boat, the 
images of Italians disembarking in Ellis Island and of little Italies 
around the world, have become part of a narrative that has 
contributed to creating or reinforcing a common feeling of national 
belonging (Krase, 2004; Patriarca, 2001). The transition that 
brought Italy to the status of a receiving country went unnoticed for 
decades, neglected by the political world and irrelevant for public 
opinion, at least until the early 1990s, when it exploded, 
unexpectedly and suddenly. 
   Italy, today the fourth country of immigration after Britain, 
France and Germany, is characterised by a „polycentric migration 
population‟, by which is meant a population consisting of many 
nationalities from different parts of the world, with no one 
nationality or group of nationalities emerging as dominant. Indeed 
in 2000 the three top nationalities (Moroccans, Albanians and 
Filipinos) represented only a quarter of the total immigrant 
population, whereas for instance in Germany the three main foreign 
nationalities (Turks, Yugoslavs and Italians) made up 40 per cent of 
the immigrant population (King, 2002: 4; Caritas-Migrantes, 2000). 
Until recently, immigrants in Italy (2,670,514 in 2005) accounted 
for 2.5 per cent of the total population, a proportion that remained 
below the average of most European countries. Since 2008, 
however, foreign citizens residing in the country have risen to 
almost 4.5 million (6.7 per cent), which is  slightly higher than the 
European average, albeit still far from the numbers registered in 
Germany (8.2). In terms of arrivals concentrated in single years, 
2008 and 2009 have been the first two years in which Italy has 
overcome countries such as Britain, whose immigrants amount to 
6.3 per cent. In terms of nationalities most represented, today the 
first group is that of Romanians, who represent 20.5 per cent of the 
total immigrant population, followed by Albanians (11.3) and 
Moroccans (10.4) (Caritas Migrantes, 2010: 5). Half of the foreign 
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population (50.8 per cent) is composed of women not only 
migrating to accompany male migrants but mainly as independent 
labour migrants employed in the domestic sector. The number of 
migrants is evenly distributed across the peninsula with areas of 
concentration in big cities, particularly Rome and Milan, as well as 
the most populated provinces of the centre-north. This population is 
characterised by a low average age, with two thirds of immigrants 
aged 19 to 40; while older people remain significantly under-
represented, it is difficult to get a picture of the number of children, 
which is clearly increasing but becomes noticeable only when 
looking at school enrolment data, as they do not appear in the 
statistics since they do not have individual permits (Ibid.).        
   Given its new position as a country of immigration, Italy is today 
facing the same challenges that traditional receiving countries 
encountered decades earlier. However, the fact that it joined other 
countries of immigration late and that the level of its foreign 
population remained below the European average for decades, has 
heavily influenced the debate on immigration as well as the nature 
of migration policies put forward by different governments. In 
addition, the sudden and unexpected transformation of Italy into a 
final destination for migrants, has determined a difficulty on the 
part of public opinion in evaluating impartially the phenomenon 
and its consequences. This has determined a radicalisation of 
perceptions and assessments of the immigrant presence which has 
not contributed to a full understanding of the complex and dynamic 
reality of immigration and its various effects. On the political side, 
there was and to a certain extent there still is today a tendency to 
polarise the discussion between those generally in favour and those 
against immigration, which has prevented a coherent discussion on 
more pragmatic but also long-term solutions to deal with this new 
trend (Biggeri, 2005: 8-9).  
   The main aim of this thesis is that of investigating whether, in 
reacting to the growing number of arrivals, Italy has followed any 
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of the models adopted by other European countries. Three 
hypotheses are formulated here: the first hypothesis is that Italy is 
following one of the classic models embraced by other European 
countries, whether assimilation or multiculturalism or a mixture of 
the two, a sort of hybrid adapted to its own situation. The second 
hypothesis is that Italy is instead developing an original model in 
order to deal with immigration, according to its own cultural, 
historical and constitutional traditions. Finally, the third possibility 
is that Italy is not constructing any coherent long-term strategy nor 
is it opening an intellectual and political debate on the subject, but 
it is rather coping with the phenomenon by relying on ad hoc 
measures aimed at dealing with individual „unforeseen‟ emergency 
situations. The analysis of the Italian reaction towards a 
phenomenon which has clearly proved not to be temporary or 
contingent also raises the question of whether immigration has 
triggered a public reflection, as in other countries, on the meaning 
of national identity and has contributed to the construction of a new 
and more inclusive sense of belonging in order to integrate the 
newly arrived. This work will start with an overview of the 
concepts of identity and otherness as presented in the literature and 
the dominant models of integration developed by individual 
countries according to their political and historical traditions, which 
will be presented in this introduction. The first three chapters will 
then explore the Italian debate on national identity and 
immigration, analysing the positions of, and the dialogue between, 
those Italian political and social actors which, for their role in the 
public sphere, can be expected to have an important voice in such a 
discussion. More precisely, the first chapter will focus on the role 
of Italian intellectuals and opinion makers in the debate on national 
identity and immigration, while the second chapter will take into 
account the position of, and model of integration proposed by, the 
Catholic Church on the same matters and the third chapter will 
concentrate on the model of integration developed by the Northern 
League. Finally, the fourth chapter will analyse the Italian 
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legislation on immigration in order to establish whether it has been 
informed by any specific model and whether any of the actors 
mentioned above has influenced or shaped the state‟s response to 
immigration. 
   Given the scope of this thesis, the methodological approach 
chosen is one that brings to light and explains the different 
interpretations of the phenomenon and the models of integration 
put forward by single actors as well as by the state. The research 
method applied here is that of discourse analysis, and more 
precisely discourse theory as it has been conceptualised by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: „Issues of identity formation, the 
production of novel ideologies, the logic of social movements and 
the structuring of societies by a plurality of social imaginaries are 
central objects of investigation for discourse theory‟ (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 2). Laclau and Mouffe argue that the only 
scientific method to define social groups/classes is that of not 
attributing to them characteristics that they do not exhibit in 
society, in concrete situations. The critique of social, economic and 
historical determinism is conducted starting from the general 
assumption that meanings are not fixed (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  
„Discourse theory sees all social phenomena as discursive 
constructions, and assumes that all social phenomena can be 
studied by discourse analysis. It is in this sense that discourse 
theory turns social phenomena into language, and language into an 
object for discourse analysis‟ (Pedersen, 2009: 5). Laclau and 
Mouffe‟s interpretation of discourse analysis results from 
deconstructing other theories: from structuralist linguistics they 
take the principle that the smallest unit in language is the sign and 
that discourse is a system of signs where every sign is different 
from the others. Following post-structuralism, they establish that 
the content of signs (signified) is always contingent and never 
fixed. Finally, Neo-Marxism inspires their belief that the 
„articulation‟, which infuses a meaning into the signs, is embedded 
in a political process. If the discourse is a system of signs whose 
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meaning comes from the articulation, this latter has to be intended 
as a conflict between subjects aiming at achieving a political status 
by imposing a specific idea of the world, taken for granted and 
presented as a-problematic (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 140-142). 
According to them, discourse analysis can therefore be used to map 
this conflictual process as a political process, which involves 
finding the nodal points which give the signs their meaning as well 
as bringing to light the process of allocation of meanings. A nodal 
point is a central concept, for instance that of democracy, around 
which conflict takes place. Discourse theory assumes that all 
discourses are ideological precisely because they are presented as 
objective and therefore contribute to creating alternative realities 
and that meaning is created through politics and by politics. In this 
sense, institutions do not exist independently from discourse: on 
the contrary, they are purely discursive constructions without any 
extra-discursive status (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130; Pedersen, 
2009: 5-6): 
 
     The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse 
has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, 
or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the 
falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it 
occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their 
specificity as objects is constructed in terms of „natural 
phenomena‟ or „expression of the wrath of God‟ depends upon the 
structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such 
objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion 
that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any 
discursive condition of emergence‟ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
108). 
 
To summarise, it can be said that discourse theory interprets as 
discourse any organised system of meanings; the elements of such 
a system do not exist on their own, outside the system, as they do 
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not have fixed and pre-existent meanings; therefore institutions or 
social/political groups do not have an a priori identity but as single 
elements of the system they acquire meaning only in relation to one 
another, when they form a regular configuration which turns them 
into „signs‟. As a result, meaning is relational and human actions 
acquire it through a regularly performed series of actions. If the 
meaning of each element is determined by its relation and 
interaction with the other elements in the system, then when a new 
signifier is added to the picture, it can only acquire meaning by 
establishing a relation with the other signs. In acquiring its 
meaning, the new signifier creates disruption in the order it finds 
when it first appears and therefore determines a change in the 
general meaning of the system as well as in that of each sign: this 
process is described by discourse theory as „conflict‟ or antagonism 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 159-171).    
   Such a methodological approach becomes particularly helpful 
when applied to the research presented here, as it provides a 
theoretical framework to explain how the relations between single 
actors articulate and evolve. Applying discourse theory to the 
Italian discussion on national identity and immigration contributes 
to explaining how the different actors involved in the debate, be 
they intellectuals, the Church or the Northern League, articulate 
their own specific rhetoric in order to provide a coherent definition 
of the situation and alternative interpretations presented as „true‟, 
„objective‟ and a-problematic. Moreover, it allows us to expose the 
relations between these various systems of signs carrying 
antagonistic meanings, as well as the processes according to which 
they influence each other and re-negotiate through conflicts their 
own positioning and the general meaning of the system of 
meanings they contribute to form. In this sense, it allows us to 
deconstruct the tensions within each group of actors, for instance 
by bringing to light the internal contradictions and antagonistic 
positions of the Catholic hierarchy. Moreover, while putting the 
claimed objectivity of alternative realities into perspective (in their 
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being relative precisely because they all claim to be objective) it 
also allows us to understand how reality is performative, that is to 
say, how discourse reproduces reality while informing it. 
   Applying this concept to the Italian case and the debate on 
immigration also contributes to explain how the interpretations of 
the immigration phenomenon presented by the League and the 
Church as objective have contributed to influence public perception 
of the issue. Hence the adopted methodological approach helps to 
explain how the discourse on immigration, seemingly resulting 
from an analysis of a „real‟ situation (number of arrivals, issues 
linked to law and order, etc.), contributes to shape such reality, not 
least by turning public fears of immigration and perceptions of 
migrants as a threat into something more „real‟ than any statistics. 
By focusing on the influence of discourse on social reality and vice 
versa, discourse analysis brings to light the mutual dependence of 
rhetoric and legislation, where the former shapes the latter, while 
the latter stimulates the creation of a new rhetoric inclusive of 
revised meanings. Finally, the choice to adopt an approach that 
privileges the analysis of the interaction between discourse and 
policies justifies the decision to take into account the development 
of the debate as it appears in the public sphere and therefore also 
the choice not to carry out a systematic analysis of the media. 
   The public sphere, according to the definition given by Habermas 
(1989a), is not encompassed by the state and therefore does not 
coincide with it: rather, it is a theatre where mediation and dialogue 
between the private sphere and the authoritative state  take place. 
The public sphere is „a realm of social life in which public opinion 
can be formed‟ (Habermas, 1989a: 30) „a kind of social 
intercourse‟, which allows and encourages relations between 
heterogeneous, multiple, overlapping and opposing views (Ibid: 
36). The expression „public opinion‟ refers to „the task of criticism 
and control which a public body of citizens informally – and, in 
periodic elections, formally as well – practices vis-à-vis the ruling 
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structure organized in the form of a state‟ (Ibid: 146). This 
interpretation justifies the choice to base this research on the debate 
as it emerged in the public sphere, taking the latter as the focus, 
rather than the media through which the debate developed. When a 
systematic analysis of the media has been carried out, as in the case 
of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of articles and editorials 
published in the Northern League‟s newspaper La Padania, this 
was due to the relevance that the views expressed there had 
acquired in the public debate on immigration. This also explains 
why the position of political philosophers who have engaged with 
issues of integration and representation of minorities will only be 
mentioned in the chapter on intellectuals, as their voices are 
confined to a debate internal to their particular academic field and 
cannot be considered as widely relevant for the shaping of public 
awareness and state responses. In the same way, the position of 
specific individuals who are part of the collective actors taken into 
account will not be further investigated, for instance through 
interviews, since the aim of this work is not that of establishing 
whether their attitudes towards immigration are genuine or where 
they originate from. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to assess the 
ideas that until now have been presented in the public sphere and to 
analyse their impact and their consequences. In other words, what 
matters here is reconstructing the (contrasting) narratives on 
immigration and national identity in order to provide a better 
understanding of the state of the debate in Italy as well as  to 
expose the conflicts, alliances and interests underpinning the public 
and political debate and assess their impact on the Italian 
legislation on immigration.  
  The analysis of the debate on national belonging and the 
immigrant presence within the country addresses the main question 
of whether Italy is following a specific model of integration, 
whether elaborated from within or imported from other countries, 
or is instead proceeding on an ad hoc basis. If a specific model has 
indeed been elaborated and is being applied in national legislation, 
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the question to be asked is whether the development of such a 
model has triggered a discussion on the need to re-define 
„Italianness‟, in order to make it a more pluralist concept and one 
that is more inclusive of minorities. 
   Before moving to the analysis of the Italian case, it is necessary 
to look briefly at the theoretical and ethical debate on identity, 
rights and justice and how it has informed the responses to 
immigration in countries such as France and Britain. The following 
section will provide an overview of the main issues related to the 
representation of minority groups as they have been addressed in 
the complex and articulated dialogue between liberals and 
communitarians. It will address the main positions of, as well as 
criticism, directed at these two strands of thought, as well as the 
models they inform: assimilation and multiculturalism. It is of 
central importance to define these models, as they will be used as a 
useful paradigm to assess the Italian position(s) on the issue. Thus 
the wider debate on individual and collective identity and the role 
of the state in promoting justice and equal opportunities is relevant 
as it will represent a term of comparison and will contribute to 
highlight, as we shall see in the course of this thesis, both the 
absence of a similar debate in Italy and its occasional appearance, 
generally in highly critical and dismissive terms, in the discourse of 
some actors, notably the Church and the Northern League. 
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2. The debate on identity and justice: liberalism v. 
communitarianism 
The second half of the twentieth century has been characterised by 
an increasing presence, in the political scene of western 
democracies, of organisations and movements representing the 
claims of disadvantaged groups, such as African – American and 
Native Indians and other ethnic, cultural and religious minorities as 
well as social groups such as women, gays and lesbians. The 
demands and the ideologies of these social movements and 
minority groups have triggered a systematic  debate on the concept 
of identity, its origin, nature and meaning, as well as the different 
issues linked to and derived from it, such as the current and future 
status of the particular identities being claimed and defended by 
these groups. The politics of identity put forward by contemporary 
democracies is strictly connected to the ideas of oppression and 
discrimination which presuppose the vulnerability of the minority 
group in the face of cultural imperialism as well as its experience of 
stereotyping, 'violence, exploitation, marginalization and 
powerlessness' (Young, 1990: 39). In demanding access to civil 
rights and acquiring visibility in the public sphere, members of 
minority groups went through a process of consolidation of group 
identities, increasing identification with social and cultural 
categories and thus reinforcing self-sameness. Claims for 
protection and representation indeed required a strong sense of 
belonging to an organised group sharing ethnic or cultural traits, 
which could act in a unitary manner in the struggle to achieve 
public recognition. This resulted in the representation of identities 
alternative to the mainstream ones and also „fixed‟, exhibiting 
predictable and unchangeable common characteristics. In this 
sense, being gay, lesbian, black or women became a stereotyped 
and monolithic identity, characterised by immutable traits 
(Calhoun, 1995: 193-199). To a certain extent, identification with a 
close community was the price minority groups had to pay in order 
to be recognised as such and granted access to rights and resources, 
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and in this sense the simplification of representation was accepted 
by marginalised communities as transitory and functional to the 
achievement of immediate goals (Moller Okin, 1989; Young 1990). 
This contributes to explaining how, for decades, the constitution of 
identities has been presented as a harmonious process resulting in 
„stable and minimally changing identity‟ (Calhoun, 1995: 218). As 
a result, the struggle and the tensions involved in the forging of 
identities and the fact that identities are fragmented was 
underestimated until relatively recently. However, more recent 
approaches have converged towards a systematic deconstruction of 
essentialist interpretations of social, ethical and religious groups, 
stressing the importance of multiple, conflicting or complementary 
identities and their respective and often conflicting demands (Ibid.).  
   Since the 1970s, the debate on identity and participation has been 
polarised between two main interpretations aimed at finding a 
solution to issues of recognition, integration and participation in the 
public sphere. On the one hand, the liberal perspective, traditionally 
linked to the ideas of philosophers such as John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) and Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) and further developed 
by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971) interprets identity 
as individual and universal. On the other hand, the communitarian 
interpretation of identity, articulated as a critique of the liberal 
approach, and formulated by philosophers such as Michael Sandel, 
Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Alasdair McIntyre, views 
belonging as local, relative and collective. These two approaches 
reflect and inform different models of citizenship and integration 
put forward by Western democracies to foster inclusion and 
participation in the public sphere, to grant rights and access to 
resources as well as create a shared feeling of belonging. Before 
addressing the models resulting from liberal and communitarian 
interpretations of belonging, and particularly assimilation in France 
and multiculturalism in Britain, it is worth looking at the specific 
contents of these two perspectives.   
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   In trying to identify the process according to which rights can be 
claimed by different individuals, Rawls developed a theory of 
justice based on the idea of „the original position‟, according to 
which citizens have to imagine themselves as being in the position 
of equal and free persons who agree on general principles of social 
and political justice. The main characteristic of the original position 
is that „a veil of ignorance‟ prevents participants from being 
allocated specific social and historical circumstances, which they 
ignore when making choices on fairness and desirable forms of 
participation. The role of the veil of ignorance is that of allowing   
impartiality of judgments when the subjects in the original position 
are demanded to choose between different ideas of justice that best 
represent and serve their interests. According to Rawls, the most 
effective and rational choices are achievable when taking into 
account two principles of justice. The first guarantees citizens equal 
basic rights and liberties necessary to pursue their different 
conception of the good life. The second provides equality of 
educational and employment opportunities while granting all of 
them minimum income and wealth to pursue their interests and to 
maintain their self-respect. When „blind‟ citizens, unaware of their 
specific cultural, ethnic and religious circumstances, make choices 
on the allocation of resources and the type of participation they 
judge best, they will tend to include as many groups of people as 
possible among those who will be given access to rights, since they 
do not know in which situation they will have to live.  
  Rawls argues that the principles of fair justice can be identified 
through rational individual choices. In this respect his theory of 
justice is somewhat close to the utilitarian approach to justice and 
representation, based on the idea of granting the highest level of 
happiness to the highest number of people (Bentham, 1781). This 
liberal theory of justice originates from the concept of an ideal 
autonomous subject who „successfully and rationally extricates 
himself from the entanglements of history and the characteristics 
and values that come with the entanglement‟ (Bell, 1993: 29). The 
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idea of a subject or citizen as a self-sufficient agent who chooses a 
life-plan and employs his/her will to pursue it, rests on the 
assumption that life is a result of individual rational decisions. In 
this sense, liberal theory does not take into account collective 
identities: rights are given to individuals on the basis of their 
choices, their demand for participation and the acknowledgement 
of their presence in the public sphere as individuals.  
  An inherent aspect of liberalism is that the state is presented as 
indifferent to any set of values or specific backgrounds that 
characterise the single citizens, neutral towards different 
interpretations of the good life, which liberalism defines as a life 
that is worth living. Criticism of this interpretation of the role of the 
state as purely procedural comes from within liberalism itself as 
perfectionist liberals admit that the state should not be an empty 
box but should rather provide a minimum common denominator in 
terms of values which allows citizens to develop a sense of 
belonging and loyalty. However, both strands of liberalism still 
consider the individual as the only beneficiary of rights (Galeotti, 
1994; Kymlicka, 1995). Liberal utilitarianism has been criticised 
for not being applicable, as the idea of achieving the highest 
happiness for the majority of people has proved to be lacking 
rationality. Indeed, it can justify intolerant and cruel practices, as in 
the example of a community of twelve people where ten members 
link their happiness to torturing the other two. In this case, torture 
would be the utilitarian response to the popular will (Bell, 1993: 
78). 
   Neutralist liberalism and Rawls‟ theory of justice have been 
criticised by communitarians for their atomistic and abstract 
conception of the individual as a rational agent. Firstly, 
communitarians have argued that the idea of an abstract good life 
lacks substance, which explains why liberals do not provide 
examples of what they mean by it; secondly, making choices 
implies a judgment of different alternatives, which can only be 
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made according to some sort of moral orientation. The possibility 
of choosing is only given when the subject has already learned a 
specific idea of the good, a framework which defines the type of 
life s/he aims to live. It is then the social worlds in which human 
beings are immersed that offer the moral horizon which determines 
what is worth achieving or being (Taylor, 1989, pt.2). This is the 
reason why „we cannot make sense of our moral experience unless 
we situate ourselves within this given moral space‟ (Bell, 1993: 
37). Communitarians‟ critique of liberalism is based on the idea 
that human beings are ultimately social creatures, political animals, 
as they define them using Aristotle‟s definition (Barnes, 1984). 
Moreover, they reject the idea that human beings use rationality in 
order to decide what values matter most and consequently plan 
their lives. According to them, the highest attachment of 
individuals goes to their community, which can range from the 
family to a religious group, and does not require a rational choice, 
but rather assumes a „pre-conscious‟ modus operandi, which is 
further influenced by the specific social and historical 
characteristics of the particular time and environment in which the 
subject lives. Rational choice intervenes only when the unreflective 
routine of everyday life is interrupted by an unusual event that 
creates a conflict between different pre-conscious values 
(Heidegger, 1927: 213; Bell, 1993: 33). 
   Communitarians believe that different groups based on ethnic, 
religious or sub-national shared identities should be given 
recognition as such in the public sphere and therefore the state 
should not be neutral towards their demands. Moreover, according 
to them, the state can never be really neutral as, in demanding 
citizens to leave all differences (such as religion, sexual 
orientations, ethnic background) out of the public sphere so that 
they do not interfere with the process of decision making, it proves 
to privilege mainstream groups, namely, in Western democracies, 
the so-called WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant and mainly 
male citizens). These inner characteristics do not need to be left out 
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of the public sphere as they are shared by the majority of the 
population and therefore are not perceived as different, whereas 
black, Muslim or gay citizens would be allowed to enter the public 
sphere not in the name of their identities but despite them (Galeotti, 
1994). Communitarians have been accused of essentialism by 
feminists and post-structuralists, who argue that, in identifying 
human beings mainly as members of specific groups, they do not 
take into account that oppression often comes from within the 
community, when members are marginalised or not allowed to 
leave when they come to a rejection of the communities‟ values 
(for instance in a patriarchal family or in ethnic groups where 
dissent is considered as betrayal) (Young, 1990; Moller Okin, 1989; 
Kymlicka, 1995). In responding to this charge, communitarians 
argued that participation in one group does not exclude 
simultaneously belonging to other groups since loyalty stretches to 
more than one community and attachment to the family does not 
conflict with attachment to a religious group, a region or a nation 
(Sandel, 1982: 150; Anzaldùa, 1999).  However, at the same time 
they define the breaking of ties with the community as a „self-
defeating‟ experience (Bell, 1993: 100-103), diagnosing those who 
lose this identification and commitment to the group as going 
through „a painful and frightening experience‟ (Taylor, 1989: 26-7). 
   Finally, communitarians have been criticised for their inability to 
give a positive definition of the concept of community. This gap 
was filled by a central work for communitarian thought:  Martin 
Bell‟s Communitarianism and its Critics (1993), in which the 
author identifies three types of communities: communities of 
memory, communities of place and psychological communities. 
Communities of memory, such as the nation, are based on their 
history, their common past, but also the future: „beside tying us to 
the past, such communities turn us towards the future as 
communities of hope‟ (Bell, 1993: 125). Members aim at realising 
the ideals and the projects embedded in the past of such 
communities as a contribution to the common good (Bellah et al., 
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1985: 153). Communities of place are characterised by proximity 
and locality and usually by a common language, whereas 
psychological communities do not require geographical boundaries 
or shared memories but are rather based on personal interactions in 
small groups such as the family, church groups, civic associations 
and work units (Bell, 1993: 172). Once again, however, the idea of 
constitutive communities has been criticised by gay/lesbian groups 
as it represents a limit in the definition of groups that should be 
recognised in the public sphere, by presenting other belongings of 
affiliation as „interests groups‟, groups based on a single aim or 
interest and whose members do not share a deep common identity 
(Young, 1990). Finally, the communitarian interpretation of 
collective identity has been dismissed as relativistic in its 
attributing equal value to a broad range of groups. If liberals argue 
that rational choice is good per se, communitarians believe that 
difference in itself is a value: both positions have been perceived as 
dogmatic (Kymlicka, 1993). To conclude, communitarians think 
that rather than taking the 'original position' as the only condition to 
make rational and therefore fair decisions on representation and 
participation, we should instead judge what identity is by using the 
„final position‟. The citizen in the final position, which is the 
deathbed, can look back at his/her life and only then, after s/he has 
lived that specific life in a particular place and historical time, can 
decide what really mattered, what s/he was really attached to or, in 
other words, what constituted his/her identity as a social being 
(Bell, 1993: 187). 
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3. Assimilation and multiculturalism 
„Tolerance‟ of religious, ethnic and inter-personal behavioural 
differences is the leitmotif of Western societies and their attempt to 
accommodate difference. Yet „despite this reputation for liberalism 
there can be little doubt that, in the past decade or so within 
Western countries, there has been an increasing awareness of, and a 
hardening of attitudes towards people who are “different” and, in 
particular, towards immigrants‟ (Borooah and Mangan, 2009: 34). 
Since the aftermath of World War II, traditional European receiving 
countries have adopted different long-term strategies to react to the 
growing number of arrivals resulting from their colonial legacy as 
well as their active recruitment of labour force (Fernando, 2009: 
379). The presence of foreign nationals triggered a debate on 
integration and coexistence as well as on the role of the state and 
whether it should demand immigrants to adapt to the culture of the 
country of arrival or whether it should encourage them to retain 
their specific characteristics and grant them recognition as 
members of minority groups (Entzinger and Biexeveld, 2003). This 
section will provide a brief overview of the two main Western 
European models of integration, assimilation in France and 
multiculturalism in Britain, while highlighting how the liberal and 
communitarian perspectives on citizenship described above inform 
them. 
   Assimilation requires the absorption of minority cultures into the 
mainstream culture and is aimed at maintaining an ideally mono-
cultural and mono-faith society, an approach that implies the loss of 
the main characteristics of the absorbed group. Legally all citizens 
are recognised as French citizens as opposed for instance to French 
Arabs (Borooah and Mangan, 2009: 34-36). When addressing the 
concept of assimilation, scholars tend to agree on the need to 
distinguish between structural assimilation and cultural 
assimilation. Structural assimilation measures the level of 
participation of individuals or groups in national institutions, 
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assessing for instance their voting behaviour, whereas cultural 
assimilation looks at values and cultural orientation and the 
acquisition of a sense of belonging on the part of immigrants. 
Structural assimilation and cultural assimilation do not necessarily 
go hand in hand, as foreign nationals can take part in the 
institutional life of the country while maintaining a separate moral 
and cultural attachment to a specific minority group or to the 
country of origin (Gordon, 1964). The French conception of 
citizenship stems from a historical and constitutional tradition 
based on the myth of the Republic, which implies the possession of 
a rich legacy of memories and values that presupposes „a past and 
present-day consent and desire to live together‟ (Renan, 1990:19). 
The nation is characterised by its ambition to transcend particular 
minority identities, such as affiliation to historical, ethnic, religious, 
economic and social groups. Such an abstraction is pursued through 
citizenship intended as individual and universal at the same time.  
This does not mean that rational modern citizenship does not have 
to confront pre-existing national features linked to a specific 
history and culture. The French idea of citizenship is both 
contractual and cultural, a dual nature that is not only abstract 
(Schnapper, 1994:49). 
   Historically, assimilation originates from the pre-revolutionary 
ancien regime, when the Kingdom of France was unified and the 
inhabitants of the various regions and counties were integrated into 
the French state (Sahlins, 1989). French national identity is also 
based on the values of equality, freedom and fraternity as well as 
on laicité, the separation between the state and the Church, 
implemented in the Third Republic (1870-1940) when a rigid 
distinction between individual culture and religion, confined to the 
private sphere, and the secular state was introduced (Weil and 
Crowley, 1994: 112). The same values have inspired the French 
Empire, its colonial expansion during the Third Republic and its 
civilisation mission, which predicated the intrinsic superiority of 
French culture and justified its imposition onto „less civilised‟ 
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cultures (Conklin, 1997). As Haddad and Balz explain, „while 
mission civilicatrice no longer explicitly figures in French political 
discourse, the idea that French culture is inherently superior to the 
culture of immigrants remains a key element of French policy‟ 
(Haddad and Balz, 2006: 25). Immigrants, the majority of whom 
come from the ex colonies, are expected to fully assimilate into 
French society as quickly as possible by actively giving up their 
former identities and voluntarily embracing a „single, exclusively 
French identity‟ (Ibid.). Indeed, the Republican model of 
integration does not contemplate the possibility of hyphenated 
identities: it assumes that multiculturalism has fostered racism and 
segregation in those countries which adopted it and particularly in 
Britain. The fact that there are „no immigrants or aristocrats but 
only French men' is based on the idea that the Republic is one and 
indivisible as stated in the 1958 Constitution (Ibid.). 
   The same strictly assimilationist perspective informs immigration 
policies and nationality laws, which in France have traditionally 
been characterised by a combination of jus sanguinis and jus solis, 
where the first grants citizenship to the children of citizens, 
regardless of where they were born and the second extends it to all 
persons born in the national territory (Brubaker, 1992). According 
to some scholars, the liberal Republican rhetoric and the policies 
regulating nationality, citizenship and immigration have recently 
moved towards a more culturally and racially essentialist position 
(Fassin 2006). This was due to the emergence of right-wing 
political parties such as the Front National, founded in 1972 by  
Jean-Marie Le Pen, and to the increasingly strong differentiation 
between „commensurably different‟ and „incommensurably 
different‟ immigrants and particularly Muslim immigrants 
(Silverstein 2004). With an increasing tendency towards a 
racialisation of its citizenship (Blanchard and al., 2005), the 
Republican project of individual and rational citizenship had 
discovered the limits of its „universal promise‟ (Fernando, 2009: 
385), as showed by the heated debate on the headscarf and the 2005 
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riots in peripheries of French cities (Haddad and Balz, 2006). 
Globalisation, it appears, has determined what Balibar (2004) calls 
„the impotence of the omnipotent‟.  
   When defining multiculturalism, scholars distinguish between 
„soft multiculturalism‟ and „hard multiculturalism‟: the former is 
commonly defined as „a natural extension of democratic values 
such as tolerance and respect for diversity‟, whereas the latter is 
characterised by the emphasis it places on collective identities, the 
dimension of group belonging and the supremacy of the 
community over the individual (Borooah and Mangan, 2009: 35; 
Barry, 1999). Finally, a „middle view‟ sees multiculturalism, 
intended as acknowledgment and toleration of differences and 
cultural expressions, as the only feasible response to the increasing 
mass migration and to the presence of ethnic minorities within the 
borders. Britain, perceived as the multiculturalist country par 
excellence, follows an interpretation of multiculturalism based on 
the extension of rights and legal recognition and even special 
protection  to minority groups and individuals by virtue of their 
belonging to those groups (Borooah and Mangan, 2009: 35). 
Historical tradition and national myths play a lesser role in Britain: 
multiculturalism is not necessarily seen as deeply linked to a still 
much debated „Britishness‟, although British multi-layered national 
identity is to a certain extent also based on an anti-racism resulting 
from a tradition of toleration and accommodation of difference.  
Thus negotiations on race relations and the rejection, at least in 
principle, of racism have been promoted as a distinctive British 
model of citizenship (Weil and Crowley, 1994: 112; Lewis, 1988).  
The fact that in Britain the construction of the nation-state did not 
develop in relation to the integration of immigrants as it did in 
France and the fact that the nation „as a geographical and cultural 
entity‟ was unrelated to the construction of the nation as a political 
entity, does not mean the British model was created „in a vacuum‟ 
(Weil and Crowley, 1994: 113). British traditional attention to 
„accommodation‟ of difference, shown in centuries of political 
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compromise to solve religious conflict, is combined on the one 
hand with a pragmatic agenda which privileges „community –based 
solutions [over] minority issues and, on the other hand, with the 
liberal idea of keeping racism and race-based controversies out of 
the political sphere as much as possible' (Ibid.). 
   Albeit partially informed by the liberal idea of equality of 
citizens, British multiculturalism seems more concerned with the 
communitarian idea that members of minority groups should be 
given visibility and space in the public sphere in the name of their 
belonging to disadvantaged or under-represented ethnic or religious 
affiliations. In this sense, the conflict outlined in the USA on 
whether the first Amendment of the Constitution, which advocates 
freedom of speech, should prevail over the fourteenth, which 
protects the right to equal treatment, is solved by the British 
approach in favour of the second principle (Favell, 1998: 263). The 
main criticism addressed to multiculturalism has been that of being 
based on a dangerous relativism which inevitably leads to the 
alienation of minorities and to their ghettoisation (Betts, 2002: 9). 
Moreover, according to its detractors, multiculturalism endangers 
the unity of society (Rex and Singh, 2003:4), a concern seemingly 
shared by British „public sentiment‟ (Borooah and Mangan, 2009). 
Recent debate on the failure of multiculturalism has indeed brought 
to light a growing concern resulting in a visible change in official 
policies, as shown by the fact, for instance, that the 2000 
multicultural Commission of Multi-Ethnic Britain „was quickly 
tempered by the calls for building cohesive communities and a 
quest for “Britishness”‟ (Singh, 2003: 53). Some scholars and 
political scientists argue that, even if multiculturalism and 
assimilation are often considered as irreducibly opposed to each 
other, France and Britain are actually moving towards a similar 
approach to inclusion. On the one hand, the French state, following 
the riots in the banlieue and the claims put forward by its Muslim 
citizens, has started recognising the need to acknowledge 
difference, while, on the other hand, British multiculturalism is 
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seemingly moving away from a system that, when applied, ran the 
risk of creating segregation towards a system where  difference has 
to be confined to the public sphere (Kymlicka, 1993). However, 
others think that „there is no need for convergence‟ and that indeed 
France and Britain will retain their antagonistic models based on a 
liberal and anti-communitarian ideological approach and on a 
communitarian short-term pragmatism respectively (Weil and 
Crowley, 1994: 124). 
   As mentioned earlier, this overview on the origins of the main 
models of integration as they have been developed in traditional 
countries of immigration is meant to provide a general term of 
comparison for the analysis of the Italian approach to the same 
issues. It thus represents a starting point and a premise necessary in 
order to answer the main research questions of this thesis: what 
model, if any, is Italy following in responding to immigration? Is it 
following one of the models presented above, a combination of the 
two or is it putting forward an alternative model? And finally, to 
what extent did the Italian approach to the growing number of 
arrivals include opening and promoting a debate on the need to re-
negotiate national identity and make it more inclusive? The 
following four chapters will try to answer these questions. 
   Chapter I focuses on the role of Italian intellectuals in the public 
debate. It establishes that intellectuals have been unable and/or 
uninterested in elaborating a possible model of integration or even 
in putting forward coherent interpretations of the phenomenon of 
immigration. It also addresses the seeming paradox that Italian 
writers, journalists and opinion makers, despite representing a 
leading voice in the discussion on the need for a renewed sense of 
„Italianness‟, indispensable in their view in order to reconcile 
conflicting memories, do not interpret immigration as relevant in 
their reflection on national belonging. The chapter explores the 
reasons behind this attitude. Chapter II looks at the Catholic 
Church and its position on immigration as well as the most recent 
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changes in its representatives‟ attitudes towards the newly arrived. 
It brings to light and explains the shift from a traditionally 
welcoming approach derived from Catholic doctrine, according to 
which all immigrants have to be loved and helped as much as 
possible, to a new interpretation based on selective solidarity, 
according to which inclusion depends on the acceptance of 
Christian values. The chapter analyses the position the Church has 
adopted since 2000 in order to establish whether, in participating in 
the debate, it is putting forward a specific and original model of 
integration, and, if so, what the nature of such a model is. Chapter 
III addresses the Northern League‟s discourse on national identity 
in relation to immigration and analyses how this position evolved 
from the early days, when the party was still struggling to gain 
national visibility, to what it is today. The model the party put 
forward more recently cannot be considered a model of integration 
as such, but it is rather defined here as a model of „institutionalised 
exclusion‟. Through the analysis of the League‟s rhetoric on 
immigration as it emerges from the articles and editorials published 
in La Padania in the last three years, the chapter examines the 
principles this long-term strategy is based on, as well as the 
possible consequences of its implementation. Finally, Chapter IV 
focuses on Italian legislation on immigration. It aims at unveiling 
the processes according to which the actors analysed in the 
previous chapters have influenced the conceptualisation, approval 
and implementation of norms and laws that deal, directly or 
indirectly, with immigration and with the recognition of minorities‟ 
rights. It assesses whether the responses of the Italian state 
represent a coherent model of integration or whether it is not 
possible to identify in the legislation an ideologically oriented long-
term strategy. In order to establish whether it is possible to talk 
about an Italian „model‟, it will assess the influence of the actors 
involved in the debate on the legislative process and the conflicts 
which surrounded the approval of the various measures. 
 
 26 
Chapter I 
Italian intellectuals and the debate on national identity 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of World War II and until very recently, there have 
been only sporadic discussions on Italian identity and all have been 
characterised by a general weakness of arguments and lack of 
consistency (Cartocci, 1994; Galli della Loggia, 1996). According 
to Galli della Loggia, a prominent Italian intellectual who writes 
regularly for the Corriere della Sera, the neglect of the themes of 
the nation and its culture had reached extraordinary proportions by 
the 1980s, to the extent that the issue of the relation between the 
nation and the state as well as the political system had been almost 
completely sidelined by historians (Galli della Loggia, 1996).  
This chapter aims to investigate the causes behind the general lack 
of interest on the part of Italian intellectuals in these issues during 
the past years as well as to analyse the current state of the debate on 
the significance and content of a specifically Italian „national 
identity‟. It will start with the attempt to identify the circumstances 
which caused a revival of the discussion among Italian intellectuals 
(Cartocci, 1994; Melotti, 2004). It will then consider why a shared 
feeling of Italianness has been judged to be going through a deep 
crisis.  
   More precisely, this thesis intends to focus on the relation 
between national identity and immigration and on the debate on 
whether and to what extent the arrival of immigrants in the country 
has determined, or is seen as in need of determining, a re-
negotiation of the concept of national identity, in order to make its 
content and meaning more inclusive of the different ethnic groups 
and cultures. It will try to prove that the debate on the influence of 
immigration on Italianness has been and still is quite meagre, 
arising out of occasional diatribes as well as causing bitter 
controversies, rather than engaging systematically with issues of 
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integration and inclusion (Melotti, 2004). In order to find the 
reasons for such a lack of interest on the part of intellectuals, the 
analysis will examine the different perspectives from which the 
issue of national identity has been approached in recent years. The 
intention of this investigation is to show how the discussion on 
certain themes, such as the legacy of the Resistance and the role of 
political parties in post–war Italy, determined a shift of focus 
toward inward-looking perspectives. This prevented the analysis of 
the impact of immigration from taking centre stage in the debate on 
the need for a renewed sense of nationhood. In this context, there 
have been hardly any arguments in favour of a departure from old 
understandings and uses of the concept of national identity.     
   This chapter will hence be organised into two separate sections 
which will examine quite different historical and political issues, 
which, nonetheless, share the common trait of having triggered 
various debates on Italianness in the last two decades. The first 
section will address historical events such as the different 
interpretations of the Resistance, the military capability of the 
Italian army during World War II, the role of political parties in 
post-war Italy and particularly the relationship between the Italian 
Communist Party with Yugoslavia after the war. The second 
section will focus on relatively recent internal political issues and 
will take into account the rise of political actors, such as the 
Northern League, the long-standing divide between the North and 
the South of the country, the importance of family belonging, the 
resilience of political subcultures. A third section will finally focus 
specifically on the (largely missing) link between immigration and 
national identity while outlining the unfolding development of the 
discussion between Italian intellectuals. This section will assess the 
contributions made by academics, journalists and philosophers 
respectively to this debate, and will argue that, rather than engaging 
in a dialogue, they have put forward mainly individual and 
unrelated views and proposals. There are certainly journalists and 
academics who are discussing the theme of immigration, as for 
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instance journalist Magdi Allam in the daily Corriere della Sera. 
Nevertheless the discussion on the likely impact that this relatively 
new phenomenon is going to have on the shared meaning of 
nationality and national belonging is weaker than could be 
expected and does not seem to aspire to become exhaustive or 
systematic. Rather, it is characterised by occasional and episodic 
polemics arising out of specific events. Moreover, Italian 
intellectuals are not seemingly reflecting on the weakness of the 
debate itself nor are they trying to account for the neglect of the 
subject.  
   This work will attempt to fill the gap in the missing relation 
between immigration and current debates on national identity by 
explaining why Italianness is taken as an unproblematic concept 
which runs the risk of alienating new groups of citizens or proving 
unable to integrate them. It will try to identify several answers to 
the question as to why Italian identity is not being discussed 
systematically or being put in relation with the phenomenon of 
immigration. The discussion of the internal factors mentioned 
above and their influence on the (re-)construction of an Italian 
identity contribute to keeping the focus of the debate on internal 
factors and do not leave space to consider other elements, in this 
case seemingly external elements such as immigration, which are 
nevertheless affecting the concepts of Italianness, patriotism and 
citizenship. Political parties also play a central role in evading the 
issue of the influence of immigration on national cohesion, 
solidarity and ultimately identity, since they attempt to 
instrumentalise immigration by putting it into interpretative 
categories which respond to their electoral needs.  
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2. The role and crisis of the intellectual 
Before going into the question of Italian intellectuals and their role 
in the debate on national identity and immigration, it is necessary to 
reflect albeit briefly on the meaning of the term intellectual, in 
order to make clearer what category of individuals this chapter is 
going to refer to.  
   Despite the many attempts to define the nature of intellectuals, 
the use and meaning of the term today remain controversial and 
certainly not univocal. That of intellectual represents a concept in 
permanent evolution and still under scrutiny, as proved by the 
broad literature on the theme. Originally used as an adjective to 
contrast intellectual and manual work, the term is tightly linked 
with the Dreyfus Affair in France, where for the first time it is 
defined in its modern meaning as an expression referring to an 
individual or a particular category of individuals. Even though the 
word had already been used, in Britain for instance to describe the 
poet Byron in 1813 (Williams, 1988: 169), in the Western world of 
the nineteenth century it took a different connotation. As a 
consequence, according to some scholars, such as Jennings and 
Kemp-Welch, it is not possible to talk about Medieval or Victorian 
intellectuals in a retrospective way.  It is with the Dreyfus Affair 
that the necessary condition to be an intellectual includes for the 
first time a call for action – in that case it was the action of writers 
such as Emile Zola, Andrè Gide and Marcel Proust, who took the 
responsibility to intervene publicly in political matters (Jennings 
and Kemp-Welch, 1997:7). 
   Scholars tend to agree that the main reference point in the debate 
on intellectuals is represented by the interpretations of the concept 
provided by Julian Benda and Antonio Gramsci in 1927 and 
between 1926 and 1937 respectively (Said, 1994; Jennings and 
Kemp-Welch, 1997). In his La trahison des clercs (1926) – „The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals‟ Benda delineates the true intellectuals 
in almost religious terms as not belonging to this world, safe from 
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any involvement in material advantages and practical aims and 
looking at scientific and metaphysical thought as the only worthy 
activities. In this Platonic interpretation, intellectuals, among whom 
the author locates philosophers such as Spinoza (1632 – 1677) and 
Voltaire (1694 – 1778), are independent individuals who set the 
standards of superior truths and who never compromise with 
political power. In this respect they can be considered as „a tiny 
band of super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher-Kings who 
constitute the conscience of mankind‟ (Benda, 1980:43). However, 
despite the lack of attachment to practical goals and political 
diatribes, Benda‟s intellectual is not an „ivory-towered individual 
[…] devoted to abstruse and obscure subjects‟ but rather a man 
(Benda never mentions women as members of the category) driven 
by his metaphysical passion for truth and justice toward action, 
which involves defending the weakest in society, criticising 
established power and fighting unjust authority (Benda, 1980: 52). 
Only a very limited number of people can be included in the 
category of intellectuals since not many are ready to speak the truth 
in the face of power, being isolated and set apart in order to 
accomplish courageously the mission they are called to, which is in 
constant opposition to the status quo (Ibid.). 
   The definition of intellectuals outlined by Gramsci stands in 
direct opposition to the one formulated by Benda. The Sardinian 
philosopher‟s idea of intellectual is much more entwined with the 
real world and the specific political situation of a particular 
historical time. The first difference with the previous definition 
consists in the fact that, according to Gramsci, all men are 
intellectuals, but not all men have in society the function of 
intellectuals (Gramsci, 1975: 1516). Following Gramsci, one has to 
recognise his/her own place in society and can contribute to its 
development in his/her role of intellectual only as an insider, an 
„organic‟ part of a social group at a particular time, from which the 
expression „organic intellectual‟ is derived (Gramsci, 1975). In this 
sense, Gramsci‟s definition and his faith in the working class is 
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close to Brzozoswki‟s idea of intellectuals (Brzozoswki, 1910; 
Walicki, 1989: 176-98). 
   According to Montefiore, the common trait of the definitions 
considered until this point is that, in order to recognise someone as 
an intellectual, they all set as criteria two specific characteristics: 
the need to be autonomous and willing to act, where act stands for 
criticising (power), supporting (the victims of injustice), fighting 
(the status quo) and protecting (the values of justice and truth). In 
other words an intellectual is „an incorrigibly independent soul 
answering to no one‟, „anyone who takes a committed interest in 
the validity and truth of ideas for their own sake‟ (Montefiore, 
1990: 201). As Mannheim puts it, individuals belonging to this 
category have to be „free-floating‟, „unanchored‟ and „unattached‟ 
(Mannheim, 1993: 69-80). But if all intellectuals have to be 
independent and willing to act, they also are characterised by a self-
awareness and a full understanding of their role within society as 
required by their duty to „assimilate [the] point of view and 
conception of the whole‟ escaping from personal interests and 
material aims (Jacoby, 1987: 219-220). The intellectual has to be 
conscious of his/her place in society in order to become „an 
individual endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, 
articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion 
to, as well as for, a public‟, as well as an individual committed to 
raising embarrassing questions and to fighting against dogmas 
rather than producing them (Said, 1994: 8). His/her independence 
from the state comes from his/her duty to represent issues and 
people who are „routinely forgotten‟ (Said, 1994: 9). S/he does so 
motivated by universal principles such as respect for human rights 
and love for freedom and justice but his/her action is always 
influenced by the person s/he is, his/her experiences and 
background as well as his/her personal sensibilities. Therefore, Said 
argues, there is not such a thing as a private intellectual, since 
writing and publishing are actions which gain immediately public 
relevance and have practical consequences (Ibid.).  
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   Scholars tend to identify in the lack of one of the above 
mentioned fundamental characteristics of the intellectual the failure 
of their „vocational mission‟ and therefore the start of a crisis 
which today is unanimously recognised as the dilemma of 
contemporary intellectuals. This can be expressed in the question 
formulated, among others, by Jennings and Kemp-Welch: „Are we 
witnessing the disappearance of the intellectual?‟ (Jennings and 
Kemp-Welch, 1997: 12) or, to quote the title of Frank Furedi‟s 
recent work: „Where have all the intellectuals gone?‟ (Furedi, 
2004). But why are intellectuals considered as going through a 
crisis which questions their role in contemporary Western 
societies? In what sense can they be seen as failing to accomplish 
what Said calls their mission? 
   Nowadays there are new challenges that intellectuals have to 
face, primarily owing to the specialisation of their work, what Said 
calls „professionalism‟, the dramatic cultural changes occurred 
within the academic world and the role played by the media. 
Gouldner (1979), following Gramsci‟s definition, argues that the 
old property class has been replaced by „managers‟. In this scenario 
intellectuals have lost their ability to talk to a broad public and are 
now trapped in a very specialised language which can only be 
understood by people working in the same field: „they are experts 
addressing other experts in a sort of „lingua franca‟ (Gouldner, 
1979: 28-43). Foucault‟s claim that the traditional universal 
intellectual has had his place taken by a specialist who works in a 
specific discipline but is also able to use his expertise in other more 
general fields, stands in opposition to Furedi‟s perspective on the 
matter (Foucault, 1981; Said, 1994: 8). Indeed Furedi blames the 
transformation of the academic system for the phenomenon of 
specialisation, which he believes represents the end of the 
traditional intellectual class. According to him, this involves a 
growing relativism, mirrored by the modern methods of teaching 
which place different cultures on the same level, following a post-
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modern attitude of refusing to recognise the existence of Truth 
(Furedi, 2004).  
   Following this deconstructive methodology, there are many truths 
and all of equal dignity, an approach which, according to Furedi, 
justifies the need to focus on very specialised subjects and is unable 
to provide a coherent general idea of the world. Rather, it is aimed 
at fragmenting any encompassing interpretations and at 
constructing and reproducing a myriad of microworlds that become 
the only horizon for each intellectual. In this sense the latter 
becomes the absolute expert in a specific field and can feel safe 
from the challenge of addressing anything different from his/her 
narrow field of knowledge (Furedi, 2004). The main consequence 
of this development is that „what we have now is a missing 
generation which has been replaced by buttoned up, impossible to 
understand classroom technicians [… ] anxious to please various 
patrons and agencies […] not to promote debate but to establish 
reputations and intimidate non-experts‟ (Said, 1994: 54; Jacoby, 
1987). 
   According to Jacoby (1987), since the 1940s to be intellectuals 
has meant to be professors, as intellectuals, lost in the universities, 
started to become interested in tenured employment and therefore 
governed by bureaucracy. As Jennings and Kemp-Welch put it, 
„the result has been conformity and mediocrity‟. What has thereby 
been destroyed is not just the „incorrigibly independent soul 
answering to no one‟ but also „a commitment not simply to a 
professional or private domain but to a public world‟ (Jennings and 
Kemp-Welch, 1997: 14).             
   Said agrees with these scholars in identifying specialisation as 
one of the failure of intellectuals, although he believes that they are 
exposed also to more dangerous risks, the first of which is what he 
calls „professionalism‟. With this term the author refers to „thinking 
of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, 
between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and 
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another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional 
behaviour […] making yourself marketable and above all 
presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and “objective”‟ 
(Said, 1994: 55). Following Said, the second risk that one runs as 
an intellectual is political correctness which forces humanists to 
think according to norms which „are supposed to be very sensitive 
to racism, sexism, and the like, instead of allowing people to debate 
in what is supposed to be an „open manner”‟ (Said, 1994: 58).   
   Finally, the media play a central role in reinforcing this system, 
as mass media rely on personality and have the power to decide 
which voices have to be heard. Journalists and media magnates 
hold today the power to set as a new value „the ability to speak 
brilliantly on a subject about which one knows absolutely nothing‟. 
In order to survive and be visible the intellectual has therefore to 
adapt to the situation and reason no longer in terms of 
independence but rather in terms of being part of a mechanism, 
which means having his/her own newspaper columns or appear as 
much as possible in TV programmes. (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 
1997: 14; Debray, 1981).     
   Since the early 1960s, Jurgen Habermas has written extensively 
on the role of intellectuals in the public sphere and on 
„visibility‟and „criticism‟ as characteristics they need in order to 
shape the reaction of the public they address. Through the analysis 
of the media and their role in influencing public discussion on 
issues of general interest, the philosopher reflected on the 
globalisation and fragmentation of information and how they 
affected participation in the public sphere, and argued in favour of 
a new understanding of the role of intellectuals in opposition to the 
reiterated idea of the decline of such public characters. Habermas 
agrees on the challenges faced by contemporary intellectuals and 
particularly the revolution in communication strategies triggered by 
new media such as the Internet. However, albeit seemingly not 
anymore much different from „clever journalists‟, intellectuals 
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maintain their role in a public sphere where horizontal 
communication allows a broader participation. They are still 
different from media stars and politicians as they are not interested 
in turning their „influence‟ into power and are still characterised by 
„the sense of what is lacking and could be otherwise‟, „a spark of 
imagination in conceiving alternatives‟ and „a modicum of the 
courage required for polarising, provoking, and pamphleteering‟ 
(Habermas, www.publicsphere.ssrc.org).  
   In general it could be said that with the term „intellectuals‟ this 
thesis refers to individuals who, as a result of their work in a 
particular field, have gained a sort of recognised moral authority 
which comes both from their knowledge of certain issues and a 
capacity to apply that knowledge to a broader analysis of 
contemporary society. This is a moral authority usually 
untrammelled by economic and political power or at least not 
primarily arising from and justified by either. The common 
characteristic of these intellectuals is their potential ability to 
influence public opinion on certain themes they choose to debate 
and their awareness of their power to this effect. This does not 
mean that all of them intend or manage to reach a broad audience 
since, as this thesis will try to prove, often their opinions are out of 
touch with the majority of the public for reasons linked both to the 
style they adopt, which can be too specialised or obscure for an 
average audience, and to their attitude of keeping certain debates 
within a narrow circle of specialists. In this context, historians, 
sociologists, philosophers and journalists will be considered as 
intellectuals as far as they seem to have the authority to influence 
public opinion and the government on certain issues. In this sense it 
is possible to look at them more as opinion-makers than pure and 
hardly definable true intellectuals. 
   Having clarified what exactly this work refers to when addressing 
intellectuals, it is now possible to enter the question of to what 
extent and how Italian intellectuals are debating issues such as that 
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of national identity and the impact that immigration is going to 
have on the re-definition of this concept.  
 
3. The revival of the discussion on Italianness 
Italian intellectuals‟ awareness of a supposed crisis of the ideas of 
the nation and of national identity is a very recent phenomenon. 
According to Galli della Loggia, national identity has indeed been 
neglected by historians for decades, as can be proved for instance 
by an analysis of Federico Chabod‟s lectures held in Paris in 1950 
on the theme of contemporary Italy (Chabod, 1961). In these 
lectures the crisis of the nation triggered by the war is never 
mentioned, probably, as Galli della Loggia argues, because the 
author looks at the question from the perspective of a supporter of 
the Resistance, which was the most common position during those 
years, and therefore chooses not to provide a conflicting 
interpretation of the civil war nature of this event (Galli dalla 
Loggia, 1996: 19-20). Chabod‟s attitude, polemically recalled by 
Galli della Loggia, was shared by the most prominent historians 
and intellectuals at that time. According to the scholar, they seemed 
to have removed the question of national identity from public 
debate and to have ignored it for almost fifty years despite the 
broadness and depth of a crisis of the idea of nation which led 
many to think „di non essere più una nazione, o di non esserlo mai 
stati, o di non essere stati capaci di esserlo quando solo e per 
davvero contava‟, that is during the war (Galli della Loggia, 1996: 
18). 
   The revival of the discussion on Italianness dates back to the 
early 1990s and is due to different concerns. A group of historians, 
journalists and sociologists, including Renzo De Felice, Ernesto 
Galli della Loggia, Norberto Bobbio, Gian Enrico Rusconi and 
Pietro Scoppola, started a debate on the influence of historical 
events and particularly of the Resistance on the dominant 
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understanding of Italian identity in the early 1990s. Other scholars, 
especially Giorgio Bocca, Ilvo Diamanti, Mauro Magatti and 
Roberto Cartocci, focused on the Northern League and how the 
political party led by Umberto Bossi might influence the shaping of 
a new feeling of national belonging in direct opposition to 
Italianness. 
   In order to explain the renewed interest in themes such as that of 
the Resistance and the rise to power of new political parties, it is 
necessary to locate this discussion in the wider context of Italian 
history and society at the time of the revival of concerns around the 
idea of national identity. According to Francesca Forno, „Authors 
have spoken of the 1990s as the “revolutionary years”, referring to 
the deep crisis that simultaneously involved the political parties, the 
political class, the institutions and the state‟ (Forno, 2003: 1). This 
crisis, investigated by scholars such as Ilvo Diamanti, Leonardo 
Morlino, Roberto Biorcio and Gianfranco Pasquino, involved a 
political, historical and social revolution caused by both external 
and internal factors. At an international level, the main events 
which contributed to shaking public opinion and reintroducing the 
until then neglected concepts of national belonging and nationalism 
were mainly represented by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the 
war in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the decade and the advent of 
a united Europe under the increasing pressure of globalisation. As 
Silvana Patriarca states, „The interest in national identity comes 
after a period – in fact almost the whole duration of the Cold War – 
when the language of national identity and nationalism in Italy 
were more or less the discursive monopoly of the extreme right. 
Scholarship ignored the issue, and popular culture developed other 
interests‟ (Patriarca, 2001: 21-22). Looking at popular music as a 
mirror of Italian society, Patriarca recalls, the most recurring theme 
in the 1990s becomes that of „la mamma‟, which replaced that of 
„patria‟ (Ibid.:22).  
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The end of the Cold War put an end to the long-standing opposition 
between Right and Left based on the perception of the political 
adversary as absolute evil and triggered changes in the two political 
actors which most influenced Italian identity since the end of 
World War II: Communism and Catholicism. The consequences on 
a national level of the fall of the Berlin wall included the necessity 
for the Italian Communist Party (PCI) to rethink its own identity, 
which led to a change of its name into PDS, Partito Democratico 
della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left) in 1991, a shift which 
saw the most extreme wing of the political movement reassert the 
communist legacy and join minor Left-wing movements such a 
Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy) in order to form a 
new party: PRC, Partito della Rifondazione Comunista 
(Communist Refoundation Party) under the leadership of Fausto 
Bertinotti. The war in Yugoslavia contributed to increasing fears 
for a possible dissolution of the Italian nation-state and to 
developing a general revival among intellectuals of the idea of 
patria also linked to the myth of the partisan war. Looking at the 
collapse of its neighbouring country, Italy started developing a new 
rhetoric of nationalism, while „most Italian intellectuals took the 
side of the nation-state and rediscovered the value of a “good” 
patriotism‟ (Patriarca, 2001: 23). Finally, the increasing 
globalization and the advent of a united Europe contributed „to the 
urgency of reflecting on the consequences of the waning of national 
sovereignity as it has been known so far‟ (Ibid: 21).  
   Some intellectuals and scholars, such as Giorgio Bocca and 
Saverio Vertone, believed that Europe represented the only chance 
Italy had to overcome its problems and particularly the antagonism 
between the North and the South of the country and that only a 
European citizenship could succeed in what the national state had 
failed: providing citizens with a common and shared sense of 
belonging (Bocca, 1990, Vertone, 1994). Others have argued that 
Italy‟s weak sense of national identity might represent an 
advantage in order to integrate into a super-national and more 
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inclusive belonging, suggesting the idea that Italy‟s history and 
traditions which contributed to turning the country into a natural 
„crogiolo‟ (crucible) of cultures will give it a central role in Europe 
(Melotti, 2004).   
   After having briefly mentioned the different external factors 
which influenced the revival of the debate on national identity, it is 
also necessary to focus on the internal phenomena that have 
influenced the discussion in the past two decades. The first and 
main factor is represented by the scandal of „mani pulite‟, literally 
„clean hands‟, a police investigation into political corruption held in 
the 1990s, following the scandal of the collapse of Banco 
Ambrosiano in 1982. The scandal implicated the mafia, the Vatican 
Bank IOR and the Masonic lodge P2 and led to the demise of the 
so-called First Republic, resulting in the disappearance of many 
parties and a paralysis of the political system. The feeling of loss 
and confusion derived from the collapse of the traditional political 
parties and their related subcultures will be dealt with later in this 
chapter. Looking at the political consequences of such a downfall, 
the emergence of new political actors which followed can be seen 
as a reaction to a situation of widespread instability and 
uncertainty. This particular political conjuncture was exploited by 
new parties such as Umberto Bossi‟s Northern League and Silvio 
Berlusconi‟s „Forza Italia‟, to break into the national political 
scene.   
   It is not easy to date precisely the start of the revival of the 
debate. Italian intellectuals themselves seem to have slightly 
divergent opinions on when the theme of national identity was 
rediscovered after a long period of time during which it had been 
neglected or undervalued. According to Cartocci, the beginning of 
the 1990s represents the starting point of a new interest in the 
subject. Indeed, as he states, „Una lunga stagione di rimozioni, di 
inadempienze e di imprevidenze è definitivamente tramontata con 
la fine degli anni 80‟ (Cartocci, 1994: 9). He dates the first 
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intervention in the debate back to the contributions made by Gian 
Enrico Rusconi, Pietro Scoppola and Angelo Panebianco to the 
academic journal Il Mulino in 1991. Cartocci believes the reflection 
on Italian national belonging has to start from their three articles 
entitled respectively: „Se l‟identità italiana non è più motivo di 
solidarismo‟, „Una incerta cittadinanza italiana‟, and 
„Representation without Taxation‟ (Cartocci, 1994). Rusconi, on 
the contrary, argues that the national question already became more 
acute in public debates in every European country during the 1980s 
and that this phenomenon was due to the rise of regionalist 
movements as well as other factors which vary from country to 
country. In France, for instance, according to Rusconi, Le Pen 
managed to utilise various issues linked to immigration in order to 
promote what he called „la priorità della scelta nazionale‟ (Rusconi, 
1993: 9). In Germany the theme of immigration promoted a 
discussion on German identity, which led to xenophobic behaviour 
ideologically supported by nationalism. As Rusconi underlines, the 
main factor which determined the revival of the discussion on 
national identities was the difficulty of building a politically united 
Europe (Rusconi, 1993).  
   In Italy, too, during the first half of the 1980s there seemed to be 
increased interest in the theme of national identity, marked by the 
publication of a few books on the subject written by intellectuals 
such as academic Giulio Bollati (1983), writer and journalist 
Marcello Veneziani (1983) and Einaudi publisher Silvio Lanaro 
(1988). Nevertheless, as Rusconi recalls, these publications did not 
contribute to opening up a positive and productive debate on the 
issue but rather had their limit in the fact that they only remarked 
upon the difficulties of approaching the matter (Rusconi, 1993). 
This debate was shortlived: „tutto però è finito [...] tra la fine degli 
anni ottanta e i primi novanta‟ (Rusconi, 1993: 10). This premature 
end of the discussion was due, according to Rusconi, to the 
economic slump and the financial scandals of those years, as 
indeed that of „mani pulite‟. Under those circumstances, the so-
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called  „nationalism made in Italy‟, as Rusconi defined the 
nationalist pride felt at the time, which had been facilitated by a 
positive political and cultural conjuncture under the first socialist 
government, had very few chances to survive (Ibid.). According to 
sociologist Melotti (2004), the current Italian political and 
ideological discourse on the impact of immigration on Italian 
identity started instead in the early 1980s when some intellectuals 
engaged in the debate on immigration. Melotti is referring to 
sociologist and politician Laura Balbo, member of the PCI (Italian 
Communist Party) and later of „Sinistra Indipendente‟ and former 
„ministro delle pari opportunità‟ and sociologist Luigi Manconi, 
also politically active within the Left and close to the Catholic 
association Azione Cattolica, of which he is a prominent 
representative.  Balbo and Manconi, co-founders of the association 
„Italia-razzismo‟, were among the first to open a discussion on 
immigration, suggesting as a solution to the - at that time new  
phenomenon - an alternative model of society based on what they 
defined as „social integration‟, which involved the protection of the 
cultural identity of immigrants (Balbo and  Manconi, 1990; 
Melotti, 2004: 162). 
   Despite the diversity of opinions concerning the timing of the 
new debate on national identity in Italy, intellectuals and academics 
tend to agree that the neglect of the concept of nationality and a 
general feeling of detachment from the idea of national belonging 
lasted from the Second World war until the 1980s, although 
different scholars attribute greater or lesser importance to the 
different factors which determined these attitudes. 
   „Noi che vi siamo nati, preferiamo da tempo non parlarne più. 
Un‟ostinata volontà di rimuovere, e poi troppa cattiva retorica, 
seguita da un eccesso del suo contrario – abitudini coltivate con 
eguale talento – hanno creato una specie di blocco mentale: quasi 
una lesione permanente nella rappresentazione di noi stessi‟ 
(Schiavone, 1998: 3). With these words Schiavone opens his work 
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Italiani senza Italia and describes the feeling of impotence and 
detachment from the idea of national belonging experienced by 
Italian citizens. He pictures them as a people who share a deep 
sense of mistrust and dissatisfaction, which determines a lack of 
enthusiasm and perspectives for the future (Schiavone, 1998). This 
feeling of detachment and alienation from national belonging can 
be explained with, and at the same time can be a symptom of, the 
phenomenon that Galli dalla Loggia calls „morte della patria‟ (Galli 
dalla Loggia, 1996). What does „morte della patria‟ mean? What 
can justify the death of the homeland? Or, in other words, how can 
the patria die? As Rusconi states in „Se cessiamo di essere una 
nazione‟, „Una nazione può cessare d‟esserlo‟ (Rusconi, 1993: 7). 
For him, a nation is not a fixed and indestructible structure, but 
rather a fragile social construction made up of shared culture and 
myths, based on open consensus and reciprocity between citizens. 
These ties of citizenship, which have to be supported by loyalty and 
shared experiences and views, represent the institutional structure 
of „a nation of citizens‟ (Ibid.).  The death of the homeland, as Satta 
wrote in De Profundis and Galli della Loggia recalls in his La 
morte della patria, is doubtless the most important event that can 
occur in the life of individuals (Satta, 1948: 16; Galli della Loggia, 
1996: 3). This is, in their view, what happened to Italy after World 
War II. A deep feeling of death of the homeland is what anyone 
who had preserved an idea of the existence of an Italian nation 
experienced at that time. But what did determine this „death of the 
homeland‟ and the subsequent disregard of the feeling of national 
belonging on the part of both intellectuals and ordinary people?  
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                                     4. Military defeat and the Resistance: the end of a shared   
                                     memory                  
Historians Aldo Schiavone, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, Renzo De 
Felice and Pietro Scoppola, philosopher Norberto Bobbio and 
political scientist Gian Enrico Rusconi agree, despite their different 
points of view, on the need to analyse the historical events in which 
Italy has been involved since World War II in order to understand 
how the sense of national belonging had developed or rather had 
been inhibited in the past and how this past still contributes to 
shaping Italian identity. The discussion on the different 
interpretations of the Resistance, in particular, nowadays represents 
a point of reference that cannot be disregarded since it constitutes 
the main focus of intellectuals‟ speculations. The theme is indeed 
still very strongly debated and many of the issues which are 
currently discussed in Italy are linked more or less directly to the 
question of national identity as it has been shaped by the different 
approaches to the Resistance. 
   The debate on the Resistance and consequently that on Italianness 
followed three main strands of thoughts: intellectuals close to the 
Right focus on the negative aspects of this historical event that, in 
their view, was a civil war which damaged the sense of national 
belonging rather than providing the nation with a shared narrative 
of a common history. These scholars include Galli della Loggia, a 
historian close to the Left at the beginning of his career, who 
moved towards the right of the political spectrum becoming very 
critical of Communism and its legacy. Mussolini‟s biographer 
Renzo De Felice (1929-1996), a former student of Federico 
Chabod, also contributed to the discussion on the Resistance and 
his views were met by heated reactions on the part of scholars who 
accused him of analysing the dictatorship from the perspective of a 
supporter. The main opponent of De Felice‟s positions was 
Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), a philosopher, historian and 
political scientist whose role as an intellectual has been 
 44 
acknowledged nationally and internationally. Bobbio, a member of 
the Partito d‟Azione and traditionally close to anti-fascist 
movements, is among those who gave an interpretation of the 
Resistance diametrically opposed to that put forward by De Felice. 
Bobbio, indeed, believed that the struggle against Mussolini 
represented a central moment in the creation of a national identity. 
The two scholars also engaged in a dialogue on the theme, that later 
became a book, as this chapter will explain. Finally, the third strand 
of thought according to which national identity has been discussed 
has, among its proponents, scholars and intellectuals whose 
contribution cannot be framed within the two previous categories: 
among them are Pietro Scoppola and Gian Enrico Rusconi. The 
approach of the two scholars towards the debate is characterised by 
less polemical intents: in the case of the latter this is probably 
justified by the need to look at the issue from an academic and 
scientific perspective. Scoppola (1926-2007), an academic and 
politician elected to parliament in 1983 in the list of the 
Democrazia Cristiana, the Italian Christian democratic party, 
seemed more interested in finding a compromise between the two 
opposing interpretations of the events linked to the dictatorship and 
to the war, as will emerge from the following analysis. 
   All the intellectuals mentioned above contributed to the revival of 
the discussion on national identity in the early 1990s, publishing in 
national newspapers close to both the Left and the Right as well as 
in more academic journals such as Il Mulino and Limes. They can 
be considered as intellectuals for their participation in a public 
debate which they contributed to creating and shaping, also by 
echoing the position of other academics less visible in the public 
sphere, whose voices were confined to academic exchanges.  
   According to Galli della Loggia (1996), it is necessary to go back 
to the political and military crisis that Italy faced during the war 
and which led to the defeat of the state to find a plausible 
explanation for the Italians‟ feelings of inadequacy and inferiority 
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which determined the progressive failure of a shared sense of 
national belonging. It is this period of Italian history these scholars 
look at in order to provide a reason for the so-called „disfattismo 
italiano‟, which represents an historical explanation for what they 
consider as the main Italian characteristics and behaviour such as a 
widespread mistrust towards the state and a tendency to react to 
any critical situation with passive resignation (Galli della Loggia, 
1996: 8).  
   As this chapter will show later on, defeatism represents a key-
element in explaining the progressive decline of a shared sense of 
national belonging. This decline is caused by many interconnected 
factors such as the attachment to the family rather than to the 
community/nation as well as the power of the Catholic Church, 
which has always been stronger in the South of the country where 
„disfattismo‟ is also deeply-rooted. The Italians‟ tendency to give 
priority to the local dimension and particularly to the family rather 
than to the more general institution of the nation recently emerged 
in a series of surveys commissioned by the journal of geopolitical 
affairs Limes in preparation for a special issue on Italian identity 
planned for the 150
th
 anniversary of Unification. The first, 
published in La Republica on 3
 
March 2009, shows that when 
asked what values are characteristic of Italianness 34.7 per cent of 
Italian citizens chose the answer „attaccamento alla famiglia‟ and 
18.6 per cent said „la tradizione cattolica‟, while only 6.4 per cent 
identified Italian identity with „attaccamento alla democrazia‟ and 
4.7 per cent with „senso civico, fiducia nello stato‟, 2.2 per cent 
responded that „gli italiani non sono un popolo; i popoli sono i 
veneti, i siciliani, etc.‟ (www.uaar.it/news; 
www.temi.repubblica.it/limes). These data were confirmed by a 
following survey conducted by Demos in November 2009, 
according to which 51 per cent of interviewees claimed they did 
not feel any pride in their national identity, while 25 per cent 
responded that they were ashamed of being Italian (Diamanti, 
2010).     
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   Going back to the Resistance and its conflicting interpretations, 
scholars are still involved in exacerbated polemics as to the date on 
which the homeland died. Different dates, indeed, involve a 
different explanation of why the concept of homeland came to an 
end. Intellectuals involved in the discussion agree on the 
impossibility for Italians of having as a point of reference shared 
memories and a common perception of their past (Rusconi, 1991; 
1993; Galli della Loggia, 1996; Bobbio et al., 1996). Nevertheless, 
the fact that they attribute this outcome to different factors is 
representative of their deeply divergent points of view on the 
reasons why Italians cannot share an unambiguous past.  
  Galli della Loggia thinks that the homeland died at the beginning 
of the war, when, as he explains through the words of writer 
Corrado Alvaro, „Gran parte d‟Italia si augurò dal primo giorno 
della guerra la disfatta. [...] La solidarietà e il patriottismo e il senso 
della responsabilità individuale, andavano disperse e uccise‟ 
(Alvaro, 1986: 34-36; Galli della Loggia, 1996: 7-8). He believes 
that the crisis of the state and its institutions resulted from the 
military defeat during the war and cannot be directly ascribed to 
Fascism.  What happened in those years was that the political and 
ethical weakness and inadequacy of the state became suddenly 
evident and led to an unstoppable loss of the cohesion of the nation. 
The defeat raised questions about the value of a homeland which 
was not ready to fight and morally not strong enough to shake off 
its passivity until the end. As Galli della Loggia argues, ever since 
Machiavelli the lack of experience and worth of the Italian army 
has been the main reasons for the lack of development in the 
country of a strong national state (Galli della Loggia, 1996). He 
quotes Giacomo Leopardi too, who in his Discorso sopra lo stato 
presente dei costumi degli italiani (1824) argued that a military 
defeat always triggers a moral crisis which puts into questions 
values of pride and freedom and therefore determines a downfall in 
self-esteem and faith in the homeland (Leopardi, ed.1991: 129; 
Galli della Loggia, 1996: 88). According to Galli della Loggia and 
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even more so according to De Felice, this is why the 8
th
 of 
September should be considered the day on which the homeland 
died (Galli dalla Loggia, 1996; De Felice in Bobbio at al., 1996). 
„Non parto dal 25 Aprile, ma dall‟8 Settembre, il giorno in cui 
Eisenhower annunciò l‟armistizio con gli italiani. Data tragica della 
nazione italiana: quel giorno è l‟idea di patria che muore‟ (Bobbio 
et al., 1996: 16). With these words De Felice refers to the feelings 
of frustration and weariness as well as to the desire for peace on the 
part of a country where most of the people had believed in the 
„fascist‟ war (Ibid.). Galli della Loggia and De Felice, nonetheless, 
disagree on the importance of that day, in the sense that, according 
to Galli della Loggia, it determined a collapse in national pride and 
therefore the death of the nation whereas De Felice thinks that it 
only contributed to highlighting a moral and ethical crisis which 
most Italians and the nation as a whole had already experienced for 
years (Galli della Loggia, 1996; De Felice in Bobbio et al., 1996).  
   As Pavone states, „ancora oggi considerare l‟8 Settembre come 
una mera tragedia o come l‟inizio di un processo di liberazione è 
una linea che distingue le interpretazioni di opposte sponde‟ 
(Pavone, 1991: 36; Galli della Loggia, 1996: 24). Both Galli della 
Loggia and De Felice belong to a strand of revisionist historians 
who think that the 8
th
 of September represented a tragedy for the 
country. De Felice‟s work, as well as Galli dalla Loggia‟s, aims to 
show that the Resistance was nothing more than an elitist 
movement lead by small and unorganised groups of people who 
were perceived by the rest of Italians as „pazzi‟, fools who wanted 
to start fighting again when the war was just over (De Felice in 
Bobbio et al., 1996: 16). De Felice, in particular, argues that the 
majority of Italians distanced themselves from the partisan 
movement after the armistice with the Allies, and aims to 
demonstrate the existence of a widespread disapproval of it. Other 
intellectuals refer to attitudes of indifference, rather than hostility, 
towards the Resistance.  
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   The portrait of the Resistance as a civil war is another contentious 
issue. First put forward by the leftist historian Claudio Pavone 
(1991), this interpretation is supported by Galli della Loggia and to 
a certain extent by Rusconi as well. Galli della Loggia claims that it 
was even worse than a „normal‟ civil war since in that situation 
there is usually a national winner whereas in Italy the only winners 
were foreigners. According to him, the war between fascism and 
the Resistance movement, which was ultimately won by the Allies, 
did not involve the majority of the population who remained in a 
so-called grey zone of inactivity and resignation and who suffered 
fascism, the war and the Resistance as they would have suffered an 
earthquake (Galli della Loggia, 1996: 87; Rusconi, 1993). 
   A completely different interpretation of the Resistance is 
provided by left-leaning philosopher Bobbio, who considers the 
25th of April 1945, the day of the liberation, as „una data 
fondamentale non solo per l‟Italia ma per l‟umanità‟ (Bobbio, 
1996: 19). As it emerges clearly from the exchange between him 
and De Felice, which in 1996 became a book entitled Italiani, 
amici nemici and which also includes a contribution by Rusconi, 
both intellectuals agree that a lack of shared memory is what makes 
Italy an anomalous country (Bobbio et al., 1996). Nevertheless, 
Bobbio is of the opinion that, as in other European countries such 
as France or Denmark, the importance of celebrating the liberation 
should be seen as unproblematic and should not have been 
questioned in Italy (Bobbio et al., 1996: 16). Bobbio recalls that the 
elitist nature of the Italian Risorgimento did not prevent it from 
being celebrated for a century: in the same way the fact that the 
Resistance had been carried out by a minority of citizens does not 
make it a less important landmark in the history of the country 
(Ibid.).  
   The philosopher singles out the 10th of June, the first day of war 
for Italy, as opposed to the 8th of September, as a tragic date for the 
nation which determined the death of a shared feeling of national 
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identity. If De Felice argues that the homeland died the day the 
armistice was announced and that Italians had wavering opinions 
on the war depending on which battles were lost or won, Bobbio 
claims that „Noi, una minoranza, eravamo pienamente convinti che 
l‟Italia dovesse perdere ma gli Italiani nel loro complesso non 
erano certamente favorevoli all‟entrata in guerra‟. Moreover, 
„Eccetto per qualche fascista non c‟è stato nessun consenso 
popolare per la guerra‟ (Bobbio, 1996: 19). The different views in 
establishing to what extent the Italians took part in the Resistance 
or  opposed it, these opposing interpretations of historical events, 
have determined the perceived difficulty for Italy to become a 
„normal‟ country, with a normal political right and political left, 
which is what both intellectuals claim to wish for future 
generations (Bobbio et al., 1996). The achievement of this „dream‟ 
of a normal Italy, according to these scholars, depends on the 
ability and the will of historians to consider all the nuances and 
differences within such a complex event as the Resistance and the 
necessity of avoiding univocal interpretations of this phenomenon. 
According to De Felice, indeed, „il nocciolo della questione sta 
tutto qui: come mai l‟Italia non è riuscita a fondare una nuova 
coscienza nazionale, invece che su verità di comodo e su dogmi 
ideologici, su quello che gli italiani nel bene e nel male sono stati?‟ 
(De Felice, 1996).  
   Nevertheless, as Rusconi argued, despite the fact that Bobbio and 
De Felice agree on the need to look at the Resistance from a more 
neutral perspective, the dialogue between them turned out to be 
„piuttosto deludente [...] A meno di non prendere proprio questo 
risultato e le difficoltà di comunicazione tra i due studiosi come il 
dato interessante su cui riflettere e da cui prendere avvio‟ (Rusconi, 
1996: 71). Even though they both find it necessary to take into 
account all the many different interpretations of that historical 
period, they do not move from their original positions. Bobbio 
indeed, writing about revisionism, sarcastically stated: „mi sto 
rafforzando nella convinzione che – nel giudizio su fascismo e 
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antifascismo – se parli male del fascismo sei un moralista, se parli 
male dell‟antifascismo sei, invece, un bravo storico, anzi uno 
storico “normale”‟ (Bobbio, 1996). 
   On the other hand, the so-called revisionists and some journalists 
close to the right insisted that the impossibility of a shared memory 
based on an unambiguous interpretation of the Resistance was due 
to the left‟s attempt to claim a monopoly on the concept of 
Italianness. Indeed, according to Galli della Loggia, this was 
nothing different from what fascism had already attempted to do: 
„Questo aveva reclamato per sé […] il privilegio di rappresentare 
l‟idea di nazione […] la patria fascista era obbligatoriamente la 
patria dei veri italiani. […] L‟antifascismo credette di non avere 
altra scelta che imitare il suo avversario, soltanto reclamando per sé 
il privilegio‟ (Galli della Loggia, 1996: 32). As a result, such a 
dichotomy in Italian history, which involved the coexistence of two 
separate and irreconcilable nations, was totally incompatible with 
the idea of a unitary feeling of national belonging. Moreover, the 
most unexpected result of this „contradiction‟, as Galli della Loggia 
defines it,  was that antifascism claimed after the war the right to 
represent the country as a whole „sostenendo che l‟antifascismo era 
tout court l‟Italia, e l‟Italia era l‟antifascismo‟ (Galli della Loggia, 
1996: 36). In the author‟s perspective, the development of a divided 
nation and of a dual idea of national identity could not have been 
prevented or avoided in the past nor could the conflict be solved 
now (in the 1990s), despite many intellectuals such as Scoppola 
believing this to be necessary in the national interest (Scoppola, 
1995). According to him, indeed, this result was implicit in the 
nature of the Italian Resistance: to really overcome fascism and 
develop a new national awareness the Resistance should have been 
a stronger movement, whereas Italian partisans did not achieve any 
real victory against fascism, something which was instead achieved 
by the Allies (Galli della Loggia, 1996). Galli della Loggia believes 
that, among several reasons which prevented the Resistance from 
embodying national mythology, a major role was played by internal 
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contrasts between its different groups on decisive political aspects 
and its lack of a nationalist ideology. The kind of national identity 
that emerged after the war was hence not an inclusive identity nor 
the result of a national struggle for liberation, but rather an elitist 
belonging linked to a political and moral judgment of what had 
been right or wrong during those years. In this context, as Rusconi, 
together with many others, recalls, a majority of people were 
„attendisti‟ and passively waited for the end of the war without 
taking a clear position on it (Rusconi, 1993: 63).  
   As mentioned above, some intellectuals, such as Rusconi and 
Scoppola, seek to overcome all the perceived obstacles in 
constructing a national identity out of an ambiguous and contested 
meaning of the Resistance, by arguing that those difficulties are 
part of the past and that, despite them, today it is possible to 
attribute to the legacy of the Resistance that national and political 
value it should have had at that time. The Resistance could still 
provide Italians with a shared memory and a strong and common 
feeling of national identity (Galli della Loggia, 1996: 86; Scoppola, 
1995: 52-54).  However, Rusconi does not agree with the contents 
of the common narrative suggested by Scoppola. According to the 
scholar, Scoppola‟s justification following which all Italians, even 
though fighting on different fronts or simply waiting for the end of 
the war, suffered the same events and shared the same „volontà di 
resistere e vivere‟ seems to privilege a sociological analysis over a 
historical investigation and to be too generous in equating 
„legittime strategie di sopravvivenza della popolazione‟ with an 
active struggle for freedom (Rusconi, 1996: 81-82). This positive 
judgement, Rusconi claims, is attributed too easily by scholars such 
as Scoppola, to the behaviour of the Catholic hierarchy, which was 
actually ambiguous in its stance or merely aimed at its own 
survival (Ibid). Scoppola‟s point of view is entwined with a 
Catholic ethics according to which „le disgrazie renderebbero gli 
uomini migliori‟ (Scoppola, 1995; Galli della Loggia, 1996: 89). 
Galli della Loggia agrees with Rusconi and underlines that, 
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actually, the common experience suffered as individuals of losing a 
war and having the country occupied by foreigners does not 
necessarily involve any particular moral harmony and shared 
understanding (Galli della Loggia, 1996). Nonetheless, Rusconi 
also polemises with Galli della Loggia and his rejection of the 
value and the inheritance of the Resistance due to its internal 
contradiction and lack of nationalistic ideology. He believes that it 
is indeed possible to find a common past in those events but only in 
the solidarity which characterized Italians at that time, rather than 
the fact that regardless of the side they took, all of them went 
through the same difficult times (Rusconi in Bobbio et al., 1996).  
 
5. The ambiguity of political parties after the war  
Scoppola‟s attempt to reconcile divergent experiences and different 
attitudes to the Resistance into a shared Italian identity does not 
take into account the fact that the Resistance was not the only 
factor which contributed to creating what many intellectuals 
consider an unbridgeable rift between contrasting interpretations of 
the meaning of Italianness. Among the other historical events 
which, according to some intellectuals, determined the 
impossibility of constructing a shared feeling of national belonging 
after the war is the manner in which the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) dealt with the cession of Venezia Giulia to Tito‟s 
Yugoslavia.  In his La morte della patria, Galli della Loggia, 
having explained the Resistance movement‟s aim to claim for itself 
the right to represent the whole country, focuses on the role that the 
PCI had in this controversial issue and on its attempt to build a 
nation by trying to alienate a part of it. The author reacts to those 
intellectuals who advocate the need for a lowest common 
denominator which can heal the wound of a divided memory and 
provide Italians with a powerful and convincing narrative of shared 
history and national belonging, by underlining the many factors 
that contributed to the division, among them the fact that the PCI 
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did not oppose but rather facilitated Tito‟s claims on Istria and the 
region of Venezia Giulia, the city of Trieste included (Galli della 
Loggia, 1996). He finds the reasons for such an attitude in the myth 
of Yugoslavian partisan war and in the attraction the PCI felt 
towards a country on which Stalin‟s influence was great, as well as 
in its own internationalist ideology and rejection of nationalism as a 
concept linked to fascism. This section of this chapter does not 
intend to investigate in any detail the matter of the relationship 
between the PCI and Yugoslavia, as this has been investigated by 
many scholars and more recently by Roberto Gualtieri (2006). It 
rather aims to underline the central role which the Italian 
Communist Party played, in the eyes of many intellectuals, in the 
fragmentation of Italian identity after World War II. In taking 
position on matters of international interest the party always stood 
on the side of the foreigners, as long as they had a communist 
tradition, and often promoted solutions which were deeply „anti-
Italian‟ and against the Italian interest (Galli della Loggia, 1996: 
61). The fact that the PCI decided to stand for Yugoslavia in the 
dispute about the Venezia Giulia clearly created a tension between 
the party and the local non-communist resistance movements. 
   Moreover, the fact that the PCI usually supported other countries, 
such as the Soviet Union, more than Italy because ideologically 
dependent on them, contributed to developing a sense of inferiority 
and subalternity, which seems to remain a trait of the Italian 
character. This attitude, this ideological and moral dependence on 
foreign countries, contributed to developing among Italians a deep 
feeling of „transformism‟ and servility (Galli della Loggia, 1996). 
This situation weakened the already weak sense of national pride as 
well as that of national will and determined the spread of a general 
attitude of indifference and resignation, particularly in the South of 
the country, where people lost all sense of dignity and abandoned 
themselves to a general anarchy and servility. Writing in 1945, 
Guglielmo Giannini (founder of the „Movimento dell‟Uomo 
Qualunque‟) tried to foresee the consequences that the 
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renunciation, for instance of Veneto, would have had and how it 
could have affected the „Folla‟ (masses). His answer to the question 
„Cosa accadrebbe per la folla?‟ is „Nulla‟, this meaning that they 
would have been indifferent. Therefore he can conclude that if 
there is something mortal in this world, that is the idea of homeland 
(Giannini, ed.2002: 12; Galli della Loggia, 1996: 112).     
   According to authors such as Schiavone and Galli, the end of 
strong political ideologies was a further cause for people‟s 
detachment from a shared sense of national identity (Schiavone, 
1998). Until then, indeed, political parties had provided Italians 
with a strong sense of belonging, and despite the fact that this 
belonging was based on the mutual exclusion and alienation of 
opposing interpretations of Italianness, it was not questioned by its 
members who tended to consider that belonging as the only 
possible national identity. Schiavone, rather than focusing on the 
fact that political parties created antagonistic perceptions and 
experiences of the same country, prefers to argue that the Italian 
Republic was based on highly influential political parties, which in 
turn represented a condition and not a consequence for the 
formation of the nation-state. Therefore, as soon as the crisis of 
political parties broke out, especially in the early 1990s with the 
involvement of the Judiciary and the end of the DC‟s supremacy, 
its most immediate consequence was widespread feelings of 
bewilderment among the citizens, and of a loss of identification 
with specific political and ideological subcultures, namely the 
Catholic and Communist ones. Schiavone seems to believe that a 
common identity based on political belonging, even though 
involving the exclusion and the denial of a considerable part of the 
country which embraces an opposing membership, was 
nevertheless a valid means to participation in an Italian identity 
(Schiavone, 1998).  
   This overview of intellectual interventions on the contribution of 
historical factors to shaping a sense of national belonging becomes 
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of interest in the context of a wider analysis of national identity and 
immigration as it explains what issues have been discussed in order 
to investigate the „construction‟ (or deconstruction) of Italianness. 
Understanding the importance of the debate on the Resistance and 
the role of the Italian army during the war from this perspective 
allows us to infer that Italian intellectuals have identified in these 
historical events the main factors which account for a (weak) 
feeling of national belonging. Immigration does not feature among 
the „challenges‟ calling for a re-definition of such a belonging, 
presumably for two reasons. Firstly, because at the time when the 
revival of the debate on identity started, immigration had not begun 
to matter in the public sphere and was still perceived by the state 
and by public opinion as temporary and manageable, as Chapter IV 
will explain in more detail. Secondly, because the discussion on 
national pride is today still much linked to the dichotomy between 
the Right and the Left and has been used to de-legitimate political 
opponents, as an analysis of the terms „communist‟ and „fascist‟ 
used in political debates as derogatory appellatives would show. 
What matters here is that Italian intellectuals have been taking part 
in a public debate on issues linked to identity and therefore it can 
be said that the gap in the discussion on immigration in relation to 
national identity has to be attributed to a lack of interest on the part 
of intellectuals rather than in a general lack of power or 
participation on their part in the public sphere.  
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6. The influence of political factors on the Italian debate on 
national identity  
Among the several political factors which contributed to the revival 
of the discussion on Italian national identity, the rise of the 
Northern League doubtlessly represents the most influential one. 
During the 1990s, sociologists, political scientists and journalists, 
such as Ilvo Diamanti, Roberto Biorcio, Renato Mannheimer, 
Mauro Magatti and Roberto Cartocci, urged by spreading concerns 
about the rise to power of this new political actor, started a debate 
on the theme with the intent of outlining the reasons, the geography 
and the consequences of the electoral success of this party founded 
in 1991 as a result of the coalition of different autonomist 
movements. This chapter does not have as its focus a detailed 
analysis of the origin of the Northern League or an exhaustive 
account of the party‟s position on national identity and 
immigration. It rather aims to provide a brief overview of the 
influence this party has had through its ideology upon the idea of 
Italian national belonging and how its appearance on the political 
arena has opened a debate on alternative identities. A more in depth 
analysis of its role in shaping a much more exclusionary 
understanding of „national identity‟ and citizenship at the time 
when immigration started to gather pace will be carried out in 
Chapter III.  
   The Northern League seemed to outline a completely novel 
definition of Italian identity, whereas the post-war parties tended to 
support traditional even though „partial‟ interpretations of national 
belonging. This section will attempt to argue that Italian 
intellectuals identify a close connection between the crisis of the 
feeling of attachment to the nation discussed above and the success 
of the alternative construction of national community developed 
and popularised by the Northern League. As a result, they adopted 
inward-looking perspectives which involved, once again, revisiting 
historical events and „failures‟ considered as crucial fault-lines. In 
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this way, intellectuals failed to counteract the exclusionary identity 
constructed by the Northern League with an inclusionary 
redefinition of what constitutes „Italianness‟ by fully taking into 
account the implication of the immigration phenomenon. 
   Intellectuals‟ analyses of the factors which led to the electoral 
success of the Northern League in 1992 started from a shared 
acknowledgement of the deep crisis Italy had experienced since the 
1980s. This crisis, among other things, triggered a questioning of 
the legitimacy and the efficiency of the institutions and of a 
renewed polarisation between the North and the South of the 
country: „Si è così cominciato a interrogarsi con maggiore 
sistematicità rispetto al passato sulle insufficienze della nostra 
cultura democratica, sulle origini di queste debolezze e persino sul 
senso della nostra identità nazionale‟ (Cartocci, 1994: 9). Cartocci 
then develops an investigation into the lack of identification with 
the state and the nation which aims to show that the cultural crisis 
acknowledged by most scholars has its roots in the history of the 
country (Cartocci, 1994).  
   According to other scholars, the increasing number of autonomist 
movements, affecting not only Italy but many other countries such 
as Scotland, Belgium, the ex-Yugoslavia, Spain and Canada, 
represents a general trend of the 1990s. This has resulted from 
social tensions which all around the world have triggered a debate 
on „the ethnic question‟ after years in which historical nationalisms 
had provided many countries with strong homogeneous collective 
identities (Melucci and Diani, 1992; Magatti, 1998). According to 
Magatti, traditional belongings based on ethnic „archaic‟ identities 
can be rediscovered today in developed countries for two different 
reasons.  On the one hand, this tendency can be motivated by the 
fact that, when the values and the institutions of a civic national 
culture begin to be questioned for different reasons, not least 
globalisation, national solidarity finds an antagonist in primordial 
groups based on blood ties or on an unconditioned adhesion to 
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values, which weaken the loyalty toward the nation-state (Magatti, 
1998: 16). On the other hand, this „ethnic revival‟ can be justified 
as a mechanism, typical of modern societies, which aims to recreate 
a new sense of collective identity and a feeling of common 
belonging rather than to rediscover traditional cultural points of 
reference. It answers people‟s need to feel part of a whole and to 
create a relatively safe environment which can contribute to 
controlling the growing anxiety caused by globalization and global 
integration (Ibid.): „In questa visione non contano tanto gli elementi 
oggettivi e l‟essere o no membro di un gruppo etnico diventa in 
ultima istanza un‟opzione volontaria‟ (Magatti, 1998: 17). Magatti, 
recalling Gellner, argues that the ethnic revival does not necessarily 
involve a new awareness of one‟s own identity: often it rather 
invents identities where they do not exist. The so-called „imagined 
communities‟ become real following a process of social 
construction (Magatti, 1998: 17). Despite differing interpretations 
of the ethnic revival, the two theories described above concur that 
the emergence of a feeling of belonging in order to build a new 
ethnic identity is a social, cultural and political process (Ibid.). 
Beside a process of re-invention of „old‟ identities, the ethnic 
revival also created a considerable number of completely new ones 
(Rusconi, 1993; Magatti, 1998). These new identities become the 
vehicle of social conflict: ethnic identity then turns into a means for 
political mobilisation which polemically emphasizes 
differentiation, contraposition, antagonism and discrimination 
(Magatti, 1998: 21; Bell, 1993). The self-attribution of an ethnic 
identity turns out to be „una risorsa strategica per ottenere qualcosa 
o per negare qualcosa a qualcun altro‟ (Magatti, 1998: 20).  
   The rise of the Northern League, therefore, led various 
intellectuals to revisit the issue of a weak national identity in terms 
of the internal divide between North and South, which required in 
their view a new emphasis upon a common past and shared 
narratives. They became concerned with identifying the actors who 
should develop and tell the country a convincing story of a 
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common past. Rusconi admits that it is not easy to say who should 
have the responsibility to tell „una storia di comunanza fatta non 
solo di letteratura, di armi e di sangue, ma di lavoro e fatiche 
comuni, di migrazione e rimescolamenti interni da cui si sono 
prodotti legami che non possono essere spezzati senza ferire 
l‟identità storica di tutti gli italiani del nord come del sud‟ 
(Rusconi, 1993: 14). According to the scholar, it is not possible, in 
Italy as elsewhere, to achieve a civic feeling of belonging without 
rebuilding „a shared memory, at the same time critical and united‟ 
(Ibid.). Rusconi also questions how far back in national history it is 
necessary to go in order to tell this story and decides it has to start 
from Fascism and the Resistance, which is an opinion shared by 
many other scholars, as has already been discussed.  
 
7. The role of political sub-cultures in the Northern League’s 
rise to power 
The intellectuals‟ search for the underlying causes of the rise and 
success of a secessionist party such as the Northern League led 
them to focus on the role of political subcultures in promoting and 
codifying internal barriers to shared values and a common identity.  
   The concept of „political subculture‟ indicates the power and 
antagonism against the liberal state of socialist and Catholic 
movements (Pizzorno, 1966; Sivini, 1971). The so-called red and 
white subcultures are characterised by their influence on electoral 
behaviour, in the case of Italy since the second half of the XX 
century. Traditionally defined in relation to their geographical 
distribution (Caciagli, 1998), political subcultures express the 
complex elements of a local political system and the relation 
between this political system, culture and economic development 
(Trigilia, 1981): „Culture is not only opinion and attitudes, but 
ideas and values, symbols and norms, myths and rites, real and 
repeated and, finally, structures and institutions operating in a 
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geographical environment and in a historical context‟ 
(Caciagli,1998). While scholars such as Messina (2001) view the 
red and white subcultures as actors putting forward different and 
opposing interpretations of politics, others such as Trigilia see them 
as variants of the same model (Trigilia, 1981). The crisis of the 
Italian political system in the early 1990s was mirrored if not 
anticipated by a decline of both political subcultures due to 
globalisation and industrial expansion as well as the downfall of the 
Communist and Christian democratic parties, which marked the 
end of the narratives and myths that had made possible an 
identification with one of the subcultures and its territory (Caciagli, 
1995). The weakening of traditional subcultures left space for the 
emerging of new territorial identities put forward by the so-called 
„leagues‟, the autonomous movements which in the late 1980s 
merged into the Northern League (Ibid.).  
   The scholars involved in the debate on the Northern League, such 
as Roberto Cartocci, Mauro Magatti and especially Roberto Biorcio 
and Ilvo Diamanti have investigated the reasons why the party‟s 
presence is concentrated in specific areas of northern Italy 
(Cartocci, 1994; Magatti, 1998; Biorcio, 1997; Diamanti, 1996). In 
this view, historical political parties, such as the PCI, the Italian 
Communist Party, and the DC, the Christian Democratic Party, 
played a central role in supplying citizens with a sense of 
identification: they indeed always worked as narrators of those 
tales which have been defined as fundamental for the formation of 
a national identity based on common views and shared memories 
(Rusconi, 1991). They provided citizens with a strong sense of 
belonging based on well defined ideologies and symbols, which 
facilitated a complete and unquestioning identification and 
integration within well defined political subcultures as well as 
unquestioning trust expressed through the „voto di appartenenza‟, a 
vote based on shared values and views rather than on the rational 
consideration of a balance between benefits and costs. This is why, 
according to authors such as Schiavone, the downfall of traditional 
 61 
political parties represented for Italians a loss which undermined 
their feelings of national belonging and left them utterly bewildered 
(Schiavone, 1998). The crisis of the DC, due to the scandals linked 
with the era of „mani pulite‟ and the transformation undertaken by 
Italian society since the 1980s, described by Cartocci and Magatti 
as secularised and individualised, made it possible for the Northern 
League to dominate an area that had traditionally been governed by 
political and social actors close to the Catholic Church and 
embedded in the „white‟ sub-culture (Cartocci, 1994; Diamanti, 
1996; Magatti, 1998).  
   However, the interpretation of political subcultures as positive 
vehicles of identification was questioned by authors such as Galli 
della Loggia, Cartocci and Magatti, who argued rather that they 
provided alternative interpretations of the idea of the „good life‟, 
contributing to delegitimising shared identities (Galli della Loggia, 
1996; Cartocci, 1994, Magatti, 1998). As already underlined in the 
section on the influence of historical factors in the debate on 
national identity, Galli della Loggia actually accused the PCI of 
attempting to alienate identities different from the communist one 
by postulating that the communist identity was tantamount to 
Italian identity (Galli della Loggia, 1996). Cartocci also argued that 
political subcultures did not necessarily represent an opportunity 
for a common belonging but rather often represented an obstacle 
for the achievement of such a sense of belonging as they narrowed 
and limited the horizons of a more inclusive identification 
(Cartocci, 1994: 68). The author took as an example the opposing 
interpretations of the Resistance. These antagonistic points of view 
on past events prevented Italy from being founded on unitary and 
shared values and from turning feelings of trust and loyalty toward 
the state and the nation itself into a civil religion, as Rousseau had 
defined it (Cartocci, 1994). On the contrary, the failure of Italian 
institutions to create a cult of the state or at least a widespread 
attitude of respect and trust towards it made the Italian nation more 
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vulnerable to charges of illegitimacy, motivated by the attempt of 
one of the „nations‟ within the nation to alienate the others.  
   According to Cartocci and Magatti, political subcultures had 
therefore contributed to underlining the division within the country 
and were not able to overcome internal conflicts and particularly 
the one between the North and the South, since the value of 
solidarity has always been seen as internal to each sub-culture 
rather than transversal and cross-cutting (Cartocci, 1994; Magatti, 
1996). As a result of the opposing identities they supported, 
traditional subcultures inspired an exasperated version of 
„localism‟, which made it easier for the Northern League to find its 
space in the political arena. The same authors also recognised that 
the Catholic subculture can be seen, to a certain extent, as 
supportive of a unitary identity. Nonetheless, the Catholic Church‟s 
stance for national unity was carried out through the use of a 
„rhetoric of solidarity‟ that, according to Cartocci, relies on the idea 
of Catholic moral duty, rather than on the construction of common 
narratives and memories. This mechanism also applies to the 
Church‟s attitude towards immigration and immigrants, and will be 
analysed in more detail in Chapter II, which will focus specifically 
on the role of the Catholic Church in the debate on Italian identity 
and citizenship. At this point it is important to highlight how, 
according to intellectuals, the rise of the Northern League is quite 
closely linked with the Italian state‟s inability to tell its citizens a 
common narrative in order to promote and sustain a strong feeling 
of belonging. 
   The debate on the Northern League is particularly complex and 
still in progress, which is why it is necessary to specify that the 
analysis carried out in this chapter does not represent a systematic 
or an exhaustive investigation, but rather a general outline of the 
perspectives from which the phenomenon has been analysed. It is 
also intended to provide a further explanation of the perceived 
difficulty that Italy has always had and still has in building a strong 
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sense of belonging based on a common past and a shared memory, 
as well as to show that intellectuals are attempting to counteract the 
identity construction work carried out by the Northern League with 
a strong emphasis on the need for a new national narrative which is 
able to strengthen territorial ties and North-South solidarity. In this 
way some intellectuals and opinion makers openly acknowledge 
the need to revisit current narratives of Italianness, constructing 
powerful stories of internal unity and solidarity which stretch back 
to the past and forward into the future. Yet these same intellectuals 
do not appear to include solidarity with immigrants in their vision 
of a renewed sense of national identity. It is precisely the absence 
of the issue of immigration from recent and current debates upon, 
and need for, a strong Italian national identity which will be 
examined in the next sections.  
 
8. The debate on the influence of immigration on Italian 
identity 
The analysis of the and political factors which have influenced the 
discussion on Italian identity carried out until this point aimed to 
show which topics and issues Italian intellectuals have been 
debating and popularising. To a certain extent, it also represents the 
main explanation for the lack of interest on the part of intellectuals 
in a different side of the same debate, which focuses on the 
influence of immigration on the definition of Italianess. The 
weakness of this debate can be partially accounted for by 
intellectuals‟ inclination to privilege other cultural and political 
matters linked with the concept of identity such as the 
interpretations of the Resistance and the rise of the Northern 
League previously analysed. This explains why the debate on 
immigration has never developed or became systematic and 
coherent. Indeed, it is rather constituted by separate individual 
interventions which rarely engage in a dialogue and which seem to 
be occasional and polemical in nature. Since the interest of Italian 
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intellectuals has been stimulated and raised mainly by internal 
factors, both historical and political ones, not much attention has 
been and is being paid to seemingly external phenomena, such as 
immigration, which nevertheless constitute an important challenge 
for the future of the country and particularly for a redefinition of 
the meaning of national identity. 
   The need to look at immigration comes from a rational 
consideration of the fact that various statistical surveys identify 
Italy as the third or fourth country of immigration after France, 
Germany and Britain and that the same statistics present the arrival 
of immigrants in Italy as a rapidly growing trend, as already stated 
in the Introduction to this thesis (Melotti, 2004). This section will 
provide a general introduction to the more recent discussion on 
immigration and national identity as addressed by Umberto 
Melotti, who appears to be the only intellectual to reflect on the 
chronology of the discussion and to take stock of the debate in 
progress.  
   According to sociologist Melotti, the current Italian political and 
ideological discourse on the impact of immigration is characterised 
by exacerbated tones and heated polemics. During the early 1980s, 
some intellectuals engaged in the debate on immigration and 
suggested ways to address this – at that time new – phenomenon -  
a new model of society based on what they defined as „integrazione 
sociale‟, which involved „la salvaguardia dell‟identità degli 
immigrati‟ (Melotti, 2004: 162). This solution was soon replaced 
by what the author refers to a naive and questionable idea of 
multicultural society, which was supposed to solve every problem 
all of a sudden according to intellectuals such as Ferrarotti, 
Ghirelli, Macioti, who formulated it and advocated that the main 
result of promoting such a society would consist of an 
„arricchimento culturale‟ (Ibid.). As some journalists such as Bocca 
and Lerner state, many other scholars closed their eyes in the face 
of a complex situation and attributed all the problems linked to 
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immigration to the supposed racism of Italians (Bocca, 1998; 
Lerner, 1989; Melotti, 2004:162). Melotti thinks that, although 
serious episodes of racism have happened in Italy, analysing 
Italians‟ xenophobic behaviour as some authors such as Balbo and 
Manconi do, does not help to build a strong debate on the impact of 
the massive arrivals of people with different cultural and ethnic 
origins in the country. Moreover, he argues that these academics, in 
focusing on the Italians‟ presumed racism, did nothing more than 
apply French key-concepts of racism to the Italian case. 
Explanations which were suited to the French situation have been 
„slavishly repeated‟ by these intellectuals whereas, according to 
Melotti, these models of interpretation are not only questionable, 
but can even be misleading if applied to the Italian context 
(Melotti, 2004: 163).  
   Clearly, Melotti‟s polemical account of the debate shows that he 
does not agree with the idea that multiculturalism can solve the 
issues raised by immigration. However, despite his criticism of 
such a position and although he considers this discussion as 
unhelpful in addressing the phenomenon of immigration, he does 
not engage with other perspectives nor does he add anything new to 
the debate. Melotti also focuses on Italian identity and its perceived 
weakness, attributing it to numerous and strongly interconnected 
reasons. The first reason he mentions is related to an internal factor: 
the role of political subcultures. According to him, Italy has long 
suffered from the influence of two dominant subcultures, the 
Catholic and the Communist, which have fostered a sense of 
mistrust in, and even rejection of, the state (Melotti, 2004: 169). 
The second reason is linked with immigration, but rather than 
engaging with the challenges that it poses to Italian society today, 
Melotti embarks on a long digression on the origins of Italians‟ 
suspicion towards foreigners, going as far as listing the attempt of 
the Turkish Agca to kill the Pope in 1981 and the song of the river 
Piave with its verse „Va fuori d‟italia, va fuori straniero‟ (Melotti, 
2004: 172).   
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   Even though Melotti‟s analysis has ambitious intents, its limit is 
that it focuses very much on the concept of racism, despite its 
criticism of the same attitude in other authors, as well as in being as 
inward-looking as the other perspectives previously examined. 
Moreover, he focuses on the justification of racist or exclusionary 
attitudes that date back to WWII, rather than addressing the new 
issues raised by the foreign presence within the country. Finally 
and more importantly, despite the fact that he reflects on both 
national identity and immigration, he never links the two and does 
not reflect on the influence that the latter has or might have on the 
re-definition of Italianness. Nevertheless, Melotti‟s work does 
provide a general overview, even if it is not exhaustive, of the 
manner in which intellectuals have participated in the debate on 
national identity and immigration, and supplies a number of valid 
reasons for the weakness of this debate. 
   Rusconi‟s analysis of immigration is fairly isolated. As we saw, 
this is not the case when he discusses the Northern League or the 
interpretations of the Resistance in order to explain the weakness of 
Italian identity, since these topics gave rise to a well-publicised 
discussion with the other authors previously mentioned in this 
work. Rusconi starts his examination of immigration and 
citizenship by stating that one of the most important consequences 
of the nation–state is the creation of an equivalence between 
citizenship and nationality as part of contemporary culture. As he 
argues, asking a foreigner what nationality s/he belongs to and of 
which country s/he is a citizen is not something spontaneous, since 
it is not so evident that the two things - nationality and citizenship - 
are different and separate concepts. The nation-state attributes to its 
citizens political rights granted by citizenship, at the same moment 
that it provides them with a nationality. Nevertheless, the concept 
of nationality also works as a limit which, for instance, prevents the 
automatic granting of the same rights to citizens belonging to 
another nation, even if the latter is an ally and the relationship 
between the two nations is particularly good (Rusconi, 1993). 
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According to Rusconi, the relatively new necessity to distinguish 
between and keep separate the idea of nation and that of citizenship 
comes from two different and recent phenomena. The first was 
attributed to the imminent (at the time of Rusconi‟s writing) 
introduction of European citizenship. The second phenomenon was 
the presence of immigrants „che godono o aspirano a godere alcuni 
diritti civili, sociali e persino politici di cittadinanza del paese di 
insediamento pur mantenendo (volontariamente o coattivamente) 
una nazionalità straniera‟ (Rusconi, 1993: 167).  
   Rusconi bases his ideas on a primarily structural difference 
between immigration in Europe in the past compared to today. The 
first significant aspect is that, in the past, immigrants have been 
invited to some European countries in order to satisfy the need for a 
workforce during a period of economic boom, whereas 
immigration has been officially discouraged in Europe since the 
1970s. The second is that in the past immigrants tended to arrive 
almost entirely from other European countries, whereas since  the 
second half of the 1960s they have started coming from outside 
Europe, and especially from Africa and Asia, which meant that 
they are defined by „culture, stili di vita e “colore” palesemente 
“diversi”‟ (Rusconi, 1993: 168). Rusconi states: „A questo punto la 
percezione collettiva dell‟intero fenomeno migratorio non poteva 
non assumere in Europa toni di allarme sociale, con la 
mobilitazione di paure profonde che ha portato a veri e propri 
comportamenti xenofobi e violenze razziste [...] La maggior parte 
della popolazione europea non ha le idee chiare sulle conseguenze 
economiche della immigrazione: gli immigrati creano 
disoccupazione oppure coprono posti abbandonati dagli autoctoni?‟ 
(Rusconi, 1993: 168-169). This type of worry has been used as a 
means for justifying xenophobic intolerance. Nonetheless, the 
author suspects these anxieties to be mere instruments for giving 
already existing prejudice and fears a rational basis, instead of 
being the cause of these prejudices. For the first time in European 
history, a considerable part of citizens have come into contact with 
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populations of different ethnic origins and cultures. Racism in its 
traditional form, that until the 1940s was culturally accepted and 
even encouraged, has now been rejected. Nonetheless, the idea that 
immigration contributes to the degeneration of society and the 
environment, which citizens try to protect, is presented as an 
undeniable fact. „Non è un caso che nell‟immagine pubblica 
l‟immigrazione è catalogata (e vissuta) come una nuova specie di 
patologia sociale, da accostare alla disoccupazione, alla criminalità 
organizzata o all‟inquinamento (quando addirittura non è vista 
come somma di queste patologie)‟ (Rusconi, 1993: 169).       
   According to Rusconi, this last interpretation of immigration very 
frequently represents the ground on which political parties compete 
with each other: from Le Pen‟s France to Austria and Germany, it 
contributes to reinforcing xenophobic movements, as well as 
political actors such as the Northern League in Italy, which 
transform latent racist feelings and anxieties into political claims. 
The result of these irrational worries as well as the action of 
political parties such as the Northern League is that the focus of the 
discourse on immigration is no longer on how to deal with this 
trend but rather on how to make the boundaries impenetrable. 
While all European countries agree on the urgency of finding 
adequate means to stop irregular immigration, they do not seem to 
have a common strategy on anything else as, for instance, the 
granting of civil rights or free circulation within Europe for regular 
immigrants. Different governments react in different ways to 
immigrants‟ requests and produce distinct laws on citizenship, 
education, work, religion, to the extent that these strictly national 
responses to immigration could represent one of the issues which 
the (future) European Union (will) find more difficult to face in a 
unitary way (Rusconi, 1993: 168-173). 
   Although the premises of Rusconi‟s analysis are the denunciation 
of the lack of discussion on the impact of immigration on national 
identity and the critique of the position that intellectuals are 
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assuming within the debate and the weakness of their arguments, 
he does not focus upon the meaning of „Italianness‟ that 
immigration will inevitably put into question, as it has done in 
other European countries. On the other hand, he takes into account 
the issue from the perspective of the immigrants themselves. 
Indeed, he examines how this relatively new phenomenon – the 
arrival of immigrants in European countries - will influence the 
responses to their particular claims and the definition of a new 
citizenship, which for the first time, in his view, has to be 
unattached and independent from the concept of nationality. Even 
though he does not go further in discussing how Italianness might 
(or indeed ought to) change, other than becoming detached from 
the idea of citizenship, Rusconi represents one of the few voices in 
the Italian debate on the subject of national identity in connection 
with immigration and his analysis attempts to provide definitions of 
concepts such as solidarity, rational choice versus spontaneous 
belonging, and indeed the difference between nationality and 
citizenship. 
 
9. Italian journalists and the debate on immigration 
Currently there are very few journalists taking part in a debate 
characterised, as we saw, by isolated positions and occasional 
polemical exchanges. The only journalist who has systematically 
discussed immigration and its impact on Italian society and culture 
is Magdi Allam. Allam,  a moderate Muslim intellectual who writes 
for Corriere della Sera, recently found himself at the centre of a 
heated debate when he converted to Catholicism and chose a new 
middle name (Cristiano), which he uses to sign his editorials 
against radical Islam. Allam focuses almost exclusively on Muslim 
immigration and mainly advocates the necessity of regulating the 
dialogue between Muslim leaders and the Italian government. He 
believes, indeed, that the most extremist Muslim representatives 
should not be allowed to take part in any dialogue with Italian 
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institutions. He also thinks that Italians should value and recognise 
their historical origins as Catholics, which should never be 
neglected. Catholicism has to be considered a secularised religion 
today but, nevertheless, the journalist argues, it is vital not to 
undervalue the importance of this religion in order to understand 
who Italians are today and how the state and citizens should react 
to Muslim claims. Allam has also written about the crisis of the 
multicultural model adopted by the Netherlands which, according 
to him, has recently proved to be an inadequate means to address 
problems posed by immigration, especially since the assassination 
of film director Theo Van Gogh (Allam, 2004). The journalist 
believes that the only way that Muslims can live in Italy is by 
accepting the rules of the state and recognising the values shared by 
the citizens which underpin their national identity (Allam, 
28/04/2005).  
   Allam warns of the dangers of dual identities and different 
systems of education and argues, for instance, that  Muslim schools 
should not be allowed in Italy, as they do not contribute to the 
integration of immigrants but instead create obstacles to this 
(Allam, 2006a; Allam, 2006b). He believes that fundamentalism 
must not be given a place in Italian society and that the state should 
not enter into dialogue with any fundamentalist Muslim leaders. 
Although Allam focuses on immigration and its impact on identity, 
he, as well as many others, proceeds in his analysis to consider how 
the identity of immigrants has to change in order for them to 
assimilate, or integrate into Italian society. He does not focus on 
how the collective understanding of Italian identity might need to 
change and become more pluralist under the influence of, in this 
case, Muslim immigration. On the contrary, Allam offers constant 
warnings on the risk of Italians being Islamised by the most 
extremist part of the Muslim community, which, according to him, 
is planning to replace the state‟s laws with its own rules based on 
religion. This concern is shared by many representatives of the 
Catholic Church, as will be seen later on in this thesis, as well as by 
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other intellectuals, for instance Oriana Fallaci. Indeed the journalist 
and writer immediately after 9/11expressed her opinion in less 
politically correct terms and with „a rage and a pride‟ which did not 
contribute to open a dialogue on the theme but rather have the 
opposite effect. Allam is therefore one of the very few who have 
provided a link between immigration and the meaning of identity, 
yet he has done so by advocating not a more pluralist and 
inclusionary understanding of national belonging, but rather the 
revival of an organic and exclusionary sense of community.  
   One of the very rare occasions in which intellectuals have been 
involved in a public discussion on immigration in the national 
newspapers is when, on 29 September 2001, the editor of Corriere 
della Sera, Ferruccio de Bortoli, published Oriana Fallaci‟s article 
entitled „La rabbia e l‟orgoglio‟, which later became the first in a 
series of books about Muslim immigration in Italy. Fallaci‟s 
intervention cannot be considered a contribution to an intellectual 
debate since it was conceived primarily as an uncompromising 
statement of her strong personal position on what she calls „la 
conquista dell‟Italia da parte dei Mussulmani‟ and not as the start 
of an open debate, as proved by the fact that Fallaci was not 
interested in addressing the controversy that her article raised. 
Moreover, the reactions to Fallaci‟s article and book cannot be 
considered part of a „serious‟ debate on immigration either, since, 
despite showing strong opposition to Fallaci‟s views, they were 
quite similar in  style and register. Despite its huge impact on 
national public opinion and the fact that some intellectuals, such as 
Giovanni Sartori and the writer Dacia Maraini, tried to analyse 
what Fallaci had expressed in her article from a serious perspective, 
most of the reactions aimed at undermining Fallaci by accusing her 
of being out of her mind, as well as old and ill, rather than 
attempting to refute her radical ideas. Intellectuals and journalists 
did not consider this episode an incentive to open a serious 
discussion on immigration but instead ignored it. Even Maraini and 
Sartori fell into the trap of not being able to steer the discussion 
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away from Fallaci‟s populist and offensive register (Maraini, 2001; 
Sartori, 2001). 
 
10. Italian philosophers: unheard voices 
The weakness of the participation of intellectuals in the debate on 
immigration, and thus consequently of the debate itself, does not 
concern only intellectuals in the form of academics, journalists and 
writers but also Italian philosophers. The latter have not focused on 
„Italianness‟ either, although many of them are, or have been, 
working on subjects such as tolerance and the relation between 
equality and freedom. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, for instance, has 
examined the idea of toleration and its different meanings from 
both a perfectionist liberal and a neutralist liberal perspective 
(Galeotti, 1994). As a case study, she discussed the controversy 
which developed as a result of two Muslim students wearing the 
chador in France, but her analysis of concepts such as identity and 
autonomy did not lead her to examine Italian identity or its relation 
to immigration. Similarly, in her book Tolleranza, Maria Laura 
Lanzillo addresses the notion of toleration and the interpretation of 
the concept provided by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, 
Hume and Voltaire without analysing the meaning that toleration 
has today or the development of multiculturalism in contemporary 
democracies (Lanzillo, 2001). Norberto Bobbio too focused on the 
relation between equality and freedom as premises for a democratic 
society as well as on the concept of citizenship, but despite this 
analysis, he considered globalisation and technological change as 
the challenges that the nation-state and national identity have to 
face, to a larger extent than immigration (Bobbio, 1995). Moreover, 
the philosopher has always been more interested in the influence 
that the different interpretations of the Resistance have had on 
Italian identity, which have been discussed in the first section of 
this chapter, rather than in the role of immigration in a renewed 
construction of Italianness. 
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   A philosopher who has worked on identity in a context that can 
be applied to the concept of difference with reference to 
multicultural societies, and who advocates the necessity of finding 
harmony in the coexistence of difference is Ermanno Bencivenga. 
His work, Oltre la tolleranza, examines the different definitions of 
the concept that philosophers have developed in the past, and 
elaborates a new idea of the ego being capable of facing the 
challenges posed by difference in contemporary Western societies 
(Bencivenga, 1992). Bencivenga argues that modern societies seem 
to deal with political issues in an irrational manner. Their 
irrationality consists in devising solutions to new problems and 
challenges, which are limited and short-termist, as they do not look 
to the future and do not take into consideration their long-term 
consequences. Following Bencivenga, the concept of toleration 
implies a political ontology according to which a community is 
made up of individuals intended as non-divisible and non-
analysable substances. Each of these individuals is a spontaneous 
source of projects and needs. From a political perspective, the will 
and desires of individuals are pure and simple logical atoms and the 
only politically legitimate behaviour towards them, is to tolerate 
them. The individual indeed becomes an arbitrary source of 
categorical requests: his/her interest in other individuals, and 
acknowledgement of the equality of others, is left to generic chance 
and good will. In Bencivenga`s opinion, what is needed is a new 
type of individual who has a closer relationship with the „other‟ and 
whose will is something more than an arbitrary potentiality. The 
deconstruction of the subject can be achieved only through 
dialogue, a kind of dialogue in which different positions face each 
other and in which the interlocutors are aware of the impossibility 
of finding a final answer, but nevertheless keep asking and 
answering in order to find it. In this dialogue, the speaker goes into 
a crisis and causes a crisis for the other questioners. This forces 
every interlocutor to develop his/her ideas and him/herself. The 
interlocutors do not constitute the subjects; rather, the dialogue 
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itself is the subject. Bencivenga refuses the traditional concepts of 
exclusion and assimilation of difference. We need the other, the 
difference, we need it to be what we are. Our plural and divided 
subject would be annihilated if it did not have interlocutors to 
dialogue with. The only way to guarantee this dialogue is to 
promote education, intended as a long-term project. Education is an 
infinite project: it cannot be interrupted without destroying all the 
results it has already produced. If society stops asking questions, 
finding answers and adding new details and positions, the role 
played by education will lose its meaning and value. In such a 
society toleration is just a contingent and inadequate solution to the 
coexistence of differences within a liberal democracy. What the 
author thinks a plural society needs in order to find agreement 
within the coexistence of differences is a process of education to 
infinite dialogue, rather than in a passive toleration of otherness 
(Bencivenga, 1992). 
   When Bencivenga refers to education, he does not intend it in its 
traditional meaning or as something depending on the state. In his 
perspective, education has to be individual and internal to the 
subject and consists in the acknowledgement that one constantly 
needs difference in order to engage in a dialogue and develop 
himself/herself.  
   In dealing with the idea of „otherness‟, Italian philosophers seem 
to focus on a concept of toleration, that is already problematic as it 
implies the superiority of a group over another which has to be 
„tolerated‟, whereas the idea of „inclusion‟ does not feature in their 
works. This is clearly not the only or the main reason for their lack 
of interest in the debate on national identity and immigration. 
Indeed, not only have they not engaged in a dialogue, an attitude 
that they share with the other intellectuals considered in this 
chapter, but they also have to face the difficulty of applying their 
theoretical framework to the specific Italian situation. Moreover, as 
already highlighted when referring to the role of intellectuals in 
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general, Italian philosophers suffer from a state of alienation which 
is due to their „specialisation‟ and the language they use to address 
specific issues, that „lingua franca‟ typical of academics which 
contributes to isolate them and prevents their voices from being 
heard in the public sphere. Finally, their exclusion is also 
reinforced by the media system, which as stated earlier „relies on 
personality‟ and addresses a general public of non-specialists. In 
this sense, an obscure language as well as a limited audience and 
the absence from the media, all contribute to create a filter, which 
keeps the philosophers‟ voices away from the public sphere and 
therefore makes them irrelevant in the already weak debate 
described above.  
 
11. Conclusions 
One of the aims of this chapter was to provide an overview of the 
role that Italian intellectuals have played in the debate on national 
identity and particularly on the influence immigration has and is 
likely to have on the process of (re)-construction of this identity, as 
advocated by many of them. The chapter started with an 
acknowledgement of a general lack of interest and participation on 
the part of academics, journalists and philosophers in the discussion 
on the issue. It recalled that, according to many scholars, the 
concept of national belonging has been recently  widely discussed 
again, after fifty years during which it has been almost entirely 
neglected.  In order to understand the reasons for the absence of the 
issue of immigration in the debate among intellectuals, this chapter 
has taken into account the different contexts in which national 
identity has been considered in the recent past and is still being 
debated today in Italy. This analysis of the current discussions 
which intellectuals have engaged in, particularly the one on the 
legacy of the Resistance and the one on the Northern League, 
provides a partial explanation for their lack of participation in the 
debate on immigration. Indeed, as this chapter tried to show, the 
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fact that intellectuals‟ attention has focused on internal historical 
and political factors and their influence on Italianness has pushed to 
the margins a relatively new phenomenon – immigration – which is 
deeply linked with the transformations that the concept of national 
identity is likely to go through in the imminent future.  
   Intellectuals who have been taking part in the different but related 
debates analysed in this chapter tend to identify in the lack of 
shared and authoritative „narratives‟ the reason for a failure in 
building an unambiguous and strong Italian identity. This is a 
failure which they seem to attribute unanimously to the state and its 
institutions. As the first section of this chapter has shown, 
historians and academics, who have discussed the Resistance and 
its responsibility in making a unitary identity impossible for the 
country, can be grouped under two categories. One the one hand, 
there are the so-called revisionists, among them particularly Galli 
della Loggia, who believe it is impossible to find a remedy to 
Italy‟s divided memory. On the other hand, other intellectuals, such 
as Scoppola, think that a common memory of the Resistance can 
still be constructed today. Despite the fact that the majority of 
intellectuals agree that Italy lacks common symbols and values 
indispensable for a feeling of solidarity capable to keep the nation 
together, and despite their agreeing on attributing this failure to the 
state, none of them identifies the actors who nowadays should be 
telling this common story. They do believe that someone should 
have the responsibility to do so but, as Rusconi puts it, it is hard to 
say who should or could play this role. Interestingly, none of them 
even mentions the possibility of attributing this responsibility to 
his/her own category or to individuals who are part of that 
category. The only exception in this sense is the dialogue between 
Bobbio and De Felice, who agree on the necessity to revisit 
historical events in all their nuances and to turn Italy into a „normal 
country‟ by reconciling its divided memories, even though their 
exchange exposes all the difficulties in achieving this aim. 
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   The fact that intellectuals seemingly do not invest themselves 
with this responsibility of story-telling could imply that their role 
within our society is going through a crisis. Despite this being a 
concern in contemporary western societies, the detailed analysis of 
the discussion of the Resistance and the role of political parties 
after the war, carried out in the first section of this chapter, proves 
that intellectuals can take quite radical positions on important 
issues and have an impact on public opinion. Therefore, the lack of 
interest and participation in a debate on immigration has to be 
attributed to different factors than a crisis of the role of intellectuals 
in our society today. Or, at least, this crisis did not prevent them 
from taking upon themselves a role of leadership in central matters 
linked with identity but other than immigration. 
   Their influence on the perception of the Resistance is indeed 
huge and public opinion on the subject is shaped mostly by their 
interventions and the ideas they advocated. Moreover their taking a 
position on the matter also influences the way in which the state 
looks at it, as proved by several political choices such as the 
creation of a national commemoration, the Festa della Repubblica, 
established in July 2000, and of the Museum of the Resistance 
opened in July 2002 and the way they are entwined with the 
interventions of Italian intellectuals. The commemoration day for 
those killed by the Nazis at the Fosse Ardeatine on 24 March 1944 
promoted by intellectuals close to the DS (Democratici di sinistra) 
represents another clear example of the influence of intellectuals on 
the state on matters linked to national identity and shared 
memories.  
     The case of the analysis of the Northern League is slightly more 
complex, since sociologists, political scientists and journalists have 
discussed it systematically but privileging some aspects and often 
neglecting others. Indeed, they seem to take into account only the 
reasons for the rise to power of the party and the means it used to 
succeed but not the type of national  identity it has constructed and 
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the ways in which the latter differs from the traditional ones. 
Moreover, they do not seem to address the consequences that this 
new identity, characterised by being profoundly exclusionary, will 
have on both the general sense of national belonging experienced 
by citizens and the role and consequences of immigrants‟ presence 
in the country. A more detailed outline of the new imagined 
community and national identity constructed by the League and its 
effects on public opinion and on the state‟s policies toward 
immigration will be carried out in more depth in Chapter III, which 
will focus specifically on these aspects. 
   This chapter also attempted to identify the reasons why 
intellectuals seem to avoid considering immigration in a systematic 
and non episodic manner. A possible reason could be their 
acceptance of the dominant interpretation of immigration as a 
temporary phenomenon rather than an increasingly permanent 
trend. This would explain why they only consider single episodes 
without developing any broader analysis or clear position on the 
matter in general in order to provide long-term solutions or models 
of integration. This attitude is not characteristic only of intellectuals 
but, as the last chapter of this work will try to argue, is typical of 
the political system too and is reinforced by the media system.  
   Moving from the causes to the consequences of the weakness of 
the intellectuals‟ role in the debate on national identity and 
immigration, one of the aims of this study will be that of analysing 
the effects of this lack of contribution upon the political sphere and 
the state‟s decision-making as well as public opinion in general. 
The first outcome of such a lack of participation on the part of the 
intellectuals in the public sphere consists in their inability to 
influence the state‟s decisions on the matter, especially by 
comparison with other actors which are taking part in the debate, 
such as the Northern League and the Catholic Church. Despite their 
different motivations, as we shall see, these two actors share a 
similar attitude to the issue and often aim at the same goals. The 
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laws and policies on immigration and the ideas or ideologies 
inspiring them will be investigated in the last chapter of this thesis.  
   The effect of the absence of most prominent intellectuals from 
the debate on immigration upon public opinion and the citizens is 
quite complex since, as mentioned above, some of the works of 
philosophers and thinkers are not reachable by the majority of 
people. This is due to different reasons and particularly to the 
language in which they are expressed and their theoretical nature as 
well as to the filtering mechanisms exerted by the media. 
Consequently, the voices which could be heard the most have been 
those that have adopted an aggressive and uncompromising tone. 
The case of Oriana Fallaci is representative of this situation.  
   As a result of the intellectuals‟ silence, these aggressive positions 
are likely to determine a growing anxiety towards immigration and 
therefore indirectly provide the state with a widespread consensus 
for its restrictive policies towards immigration, based on the need 
to prevent any further arrival of immigrants, rather than facing it 
with a long-term and well thought-out strategy. Moreover, their 
absence from the public discussion on the theme and their lack of 
interest in being the subjects who tell the national „narrative‟ to the 
country, determines a shift of power towards those actors which 
have engaged in the debate by putting forward their own narratives 
and presenting their ideas as objective and a-problematic, as this 
work will try to prove in the following chapters.  
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                                     Chapter II 
The Catholic Church and the debate on identity and 
immigration 
 
‘Quieta non movere’   
 
„La Chiesa si può combattere; la Chiesa si può perseguitare; con la 
Chiesa si può patteggiare; ma la Chiesa non si può ignorare: è 
questo un dato di fatto che diciannove secoli di storia confermano‟ 
(Stefano Jacini, speech given during the general discussion on the 
project for the Italian Constitution, 4 - 24
  
March 1947). 
 
1. Introduction    
While analysing the political factors which contributed to creating 
an Italian identity, the previous chapter focused, among other 
things, on the influence of political subcultures in shaping national 
belonging. It examined the „white‟ subculture, linked with the 
Catholic Church, in order to prove how influential it has been in 
building a strong – although, according to some scholars, partial – 
sense of Italianness. This chapter aims to consider in more depth 
the role of the Catholic Church in the context of the wider debate 
on immigration and national identity. In order to accomplish this 
task it will start from a general overview of the debate on religion 
and politics in Western democracies as it developed since the 
1980s. It will deal with the specific case of Italy and provide a brief 
account of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the 
Italian State. It will then focus on the documents released in the last 
decade by some representatives of the Catholic hierarchy and 
particularly on the „nota pastorale‟ written by Cardinal Giacomo 
Biffi, archbishop of Bologna, in 2000. It will question whether the 
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debate on immigration was triggered by particular circumstances, 
such as the so-called „march for the brotherhood between 
churches‟, the opening of new Mosques and Sikh temples and the 
protest resulting from the removal of the crucifix from a school 
classroom following the request of Muslim citizens. 
   In doing so, this chapter will investigate to what extent these 
events and Biffi‟s pastoral note mentioned above can be seen as 
related by a cause-effect link. It will address the following 
question: is the Church reacting to matters of law and order 
following widespread feelings of uncertainty and anxiety among 
ordinary citizens, often reinforced by the media? Or, rather, is it 
reacting to immigration in order to reassert its own power, which 
its own representatives often define as declining, at least in terms of 
active participation? The need to start from Biffi‟s document comes 
from the fact that it can be considered the focus of the Church‟s 
interventions on immigration and on the role the state should play 
in regulating the incoming flux of foreigners in the country. The 
analysis of this and other documents produced by prominent 
representatives of the Church, will involve a discussion of certain 
key concepts indispensable for understanding the ongoing debate 
on the issue, such as those of „fundamentalism‟, „extremism‟, 
„otherness‟ and „freedom of speech‟.  
   Following this, the reactions of different groups and individuals 
to this pastoral note will be analysed. First of all the response of 
various Catholic representatives will be taken into account, 
showing that the Church‟s position on the matter became more 
radical after 2000. This section will also highlight how within the 
Church there are different if not opposing positions on the issue, 
where the main opposition pits the Pope and the hierarchy on one 
side and Catholic voluntary associations as well as a few individual 
parish priests close to anti-globalisation movements on the other. 
This chapter will also compare and contrast the documents 
approved by the Pope, such as the Dominus Jesus, written by the 
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then Cardinal Ratzinger, with other documents which represent 
personal positions and have not been officially commented on by 
the Pope, such as Cardinal Giacomo Biffi‟s pastoral note. The 
analysis will also examine sermons and speeches by ordinary 
priests who either disagreed with the pastoral note or praised Biffi 
for it, as well as the reaction of Italian journalists, politicians and 
opinion makers to the same document. Finally the reactions of the 
representatives of other religions, and particularly those from the 
Muslim community, will be analysed. 
   The main aim of this work is to address the circumstances 
surrounding, and the strategies and the means adopted by the 
Church to open the debate on immigration, looking both at its 
public discourse on the issue and its influence on the state‟s policy-
making in this field. It will argue that the positions taken by Church 
representatives on the everyday „emergencies‟ linked with the 
arrival of immigrants in the country often represent no more than a 
pretext for reasserting the importance of certain values. In this 
sense, the debate on immigration contributes to constructing a 
highly visible space in which to develop a broader dialogue – albeit 
often a monologue rather than a dialogue - on a subject related to 
immigration but closer to the interests and needs of the Church: the 
identity of Italians as Catholics and, as a consequence, the necessity 
to defend and protect this traditional identity against its potential 
detractors.  
   The analysis of the above mentioned documents and the reactions 
to them will try to prove three main points. Firstly, as already 
stated, it will be argued that the debate on immigration has been 
„exploited‟ by the Catholic Church to remark upon the need for a 
stronger feeling of national belonging strictly linked with Italy‟s 
„Catholic origins‟.  In this sense the issue of immigration worked as 
an opportunity to reassert the importance of Catholicism in Italian 
history and in the nation-building process as well as the supremacy 
of Christian values vis-à-vis both alternative ideas of the good life 
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and a much feared growing relativism. Secondly, this chapter will 
assess the strategy followed by the Church to achieve national 
relevance and go beyond the boundaries of an internal Catholic 
reflection. This strategy consists in claiming for itself a right to 
freedom of speech which, according to the Church, is not yet 
guaranteed by the State. This right to express ideas also includes 
the right and duty on the part of the Church not only to put forward 
a particular view of the good life but also that of intervening in the 
public sphere by suggesting to the State how to react to issues 
raised by the presence of immigrants in the country. In this respect, 
the Church assumes a dual and contradictory role: on the one hand, 
it intervenes in matters related to public administration such as law 
and order, on the other hand, it officially denies its responsibility in 
making decisions in this sphere, on the basis that it is not its duty to 
deal with such issues. As a result, the Church constantly engages in 
polemics and discussions on immigration, going so far as 
suggesting practical solutions to deal with this phenomenon, but at 
the same time it promotes a rhetoric of political disengagement. 
Finally, this chapter will explore the concept of rationality and how 
it has been used to justify certain statements and radical positions 
on immigration and on the superiority of Catholic values. In 
particular, it will focus on the assumption that all human beings 
provided with common sense are Catholics. This is an idea 
reinforced by various representatives of the Church, such as 
Cardinal Biffi, throughout the debate on immigration. One of the 
aims of this chapter is to unveil the dynamics of such statements to 
show how they are often based on authority rather than on 
rationality, justified by an old tradition so unquestioned for 
centuries as to become self-evident. It will show how misleading 
this syllogism can be, as it uses as interchangeable terms deeply 
different concepts such as those of nationality, citizenship and 
religious belonging, with the result of providing a picture of 
Italians, where, for instance, Muslims are referred to as immigrants, 
neglecting the fact that many of them are actually Italian citizens. 
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   The main questions which underlie this chapter are therefore the 
following: how and to what extent does the Catholic Church 
influence the debate on national identity and immigration? To what 
extent does it reach public opinion and shape it? And finally: what 
impact does it have on the state‟s decision making on this matter? 
By answering these questions, this chapter will argue that the 
Church is putting forward an original model of identity and 
citizenship based on the concept of „selective solidarity‟, while 
seemingly aspiring to the construction of a quasi-theocratic state 
where the concepts of religious and national belonging coincide. It 
will also suggest that this approach to the phenomenon and the 
double role played by the Church as a point of reference for Italians 
and as a victim of new enemies contribute to reinforcing the 
citizens‟ growing anxieties towards immigration and provide the 
state with a general consensus for its restrictive policies towards the 
arrival of both legal and illegal immigrants to the country. 
 
2. The general debate on religion and its impact on politics  
The post-modern era, usually defined against the concepts of 
globalisation, mobility and secularism, is seemingly characterised 
by the decline of traditional common values based on moral 
judgment. Such common values have been replaced by new set of 
criteria capable of enabling an interpretation of the world based on 
the tangible progress achieved in the fields of economy and 
science, supposedly detached from any belief, faith or spirituality, 
which have been relegated to the private sphere.  
In these „liquid‟ times (Bauman, 2006) a growing number of 
scholars would today agree with Jacini‟s concern about the 
impossibility of neglecting the role of the Catholic Church and 
more in general of religion, in the analysis of contemporary 
societies and the mechanisms and common patterns according to 
which they work and develop.  
 85 
  As Jelen and Chandler (1996: 142) explain, scholarly research has 
shown in over a decade that religion is an important source of 
political attitudes. „Indeed a number of analysts have suggested that 
the West in general and the United States in particular, are in the 
midst of a “culture war”, in which religiously based values supplant 
economic interests as the basis for political conflict and 
mobilization‟ (Hunter, 1991; see also Hayes, 1995; Hammond et 
al., 1994; Kellstedt et al., 1994). 
   Since the late 1980s, religion has therefore come back to centre 
stage in the debate on democracy, political participation and the 
construction of identity. In particular, scholars have started 
analysing its role from different perspectives and disciplines, 
ranging from religious and cultural studies to international 
relations, from social and welfare studies to trans-national 
migration studies. Religion has emerged as an important factor in 
order to explain not only the nature of conflict in contemporary 
societies but also the construction of national, multiple and 
collective identities, the behaviour of political parties and social 
movements, the process of inclusion and exclusion, attitudes 
towards European citizenship and the reactions to, and critique of, 
modernity and post-modernity. The development of these fields of 
research and the respective questions they have generated and 
attempted to answer have determined a convergence on the part of 
academics from different disciplines in the debate on the role of 
religion in our democracies.  
   This section aims to briefly outline the state of the debate on 
these issues and the general conclusion academics have drawn from 
their analysis of religion and its impact on identity and politics. 
This broader picture of the role of „churches‟ in national and 
international political life will provide a general background for the 
analysis of a specific case study: that of the Italian-based Catholic 
Church and its role in the public discussion on national identity and 
immigration. Indeed, despite the fact that most of the studies on the 
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role of religion in our democracies come from the American debate 
on the issue and draw their conclusions from the empirical studies 
conducted in the United States, the general discussion and its 
conclusions can well be applied to the rest of the Western world, 
including Italy.  
   The revival of interest in the dilemmas linked to morality and 
beliefs was triggered by a general acknowledgment on the part of 
scholars that historically religion has greatly contributed to the 
emergence and differentiation of modern nation-states and their 
capacity to grant citizenship and representation as well as to 
mobilise participation in political choices. The intellectuals who are 
taking part in the debate tend to focus on the process through which 
traditional religions have redefined themselves in the post-modern 
era, how they have shaped a new (political) message in order to 
maintain, increase or regain support, and the extent of their 
influence on local, national and super-national politics.  
   This renewed awareness of the need to analyse institutionalised 
forms of belief and their engagement in replacing the vacuum left 
by the current dominance of economic values (Jelen and Chandler, 
1996), has brought scholars to investigate the links between 
secularised or civil religion in the era of globalisation and the 
process of identity building (Cochran, 1981; Seidler, 1986). Indeed, 
the central question of these studies – „how does religion react to 
modernity?‟ (Seidler, 1986) – implies a broader investigation of 
themes related to group identity (Leege and Kellsted, 1993); 
religion as an interest group (Wilcox, Jelen and Leege, 1993; 
Warner, 2000), capable of mobilising people at a local level 
(Greenberg, 2000); the ability/inability of religious groups to foster 
trust and horizontal links (La Porta, et al., 1997) and finally their 
role in enabling citizens to sustain multiple identities as 
transnational migrants who take the church as the trait d’union 
between their homeland and the host country (Voye, 1999). 
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   Moreover, these recent investigations into the role of religion in 
democratic societies have extended to looking at its impact on 
politics and its relationship with international, national and local 
governments. This analysis revolves around a fundamental double 
question which scholars such as Jelen and Segers have formulated 
as follows: „Are there distinctive contributions that religion can 
make to political discourse?‟ and „Are there special reasons for 
limiting religions‟ role in political discourse?‟ Jelen and Segers, 
1998: ix). Regardless of the different answers given by scholars to 
this issue, the question itself already implies the acknowledgement 
that religion matters in politics and it matters in the making and 
breaking of alliances with political parties, therefore representing a 
central factor in the dynamics of allocating power to competing 
political actors (Warner, 2000: 17). As a result, another field of 
investigation is represented by the behaviour of political parties, 
and particularly European Christian Democratic Parties, and their 
need to compromise with religion to gain the consensus of a 
considerable sector of society (Cochran, 1981). Indeed, as Warner 
(2000) argues by quoting Antonio Gramsci, religion does not 
formally differ from other ideologies and therefore deserves an 
accurate analysis of its representation in politics and its place in the 
competition between different actors to gain visibility and space in 
the public sphere. Indeed, religion, similarly to other ideologies, 
„provides an interpretative map of the world, a system for 
evaluating the justice and distributive schemes as well as ethical 
and behavioural codes to follow‟ (Warner, 2000: 17). 
Acknowledging this implies the recognition of religious 
organizations and particularly the Catholic Church as a „strategic, 
calculating and influence-maximizing organization‟ (Ibid.).  
   Scholars seem to agree that „there is little doubt that, historically, 
religion was a major organizing system in the emergence of 
modern nation states‟, even though it has often been neglected by 
historians and sociologists who, for a long time, seemed to identify 
the nation with its geographical position and the common history 
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and language of its people (Hornsby-Smith, 1999: 172). 
Nevertheless, „it has generally been recognised that a major 
component in culture has been the dominant religion, its 
institutional arrangements, its relationship with the state and with 
the social and political elites, rituals of memory and celebration, its 
values and moral beliefs system and so on‟ (Ibid.). As Cochran 
argues referring to the United States of America but also to the 
West in general, „whatever one might think in the abstract about the 
desirability of religious commitment in political life, the concrete 
fact of American history demonstrates that the issue was settled 
generations ago. Like it or not. Americans are religious people. 
Religion has played a major role in the chief development of our 
history‟ (Cochran, 1981: x). The scholar recalls the exchange 
between Segers and Jelene on the legitimacy and utility of 
American institutions and the role of religion in recognising and 
promoting such authorities, all issues which revolve around the 
concept of „civil religion‟.  
   The core of the question therefore is investigating whether 
democratic societies need religion in order to survive or can find a 
social „glue‟ in other common beliefs and dominant ideologies. In 
other words, scholars discuss the possibility for a nation to be 
secular and yet find unity and national cohesion in a different set of 
traditions and myths. Segers seems to reject the possibility of a 
society detached from religion and its values whereas Jelene 
believes in the alternative of „secular creed foundation‟. However, 
both recognise the actual great influence of the Christian churches 
and organisations upon public debates on themes such as those of 
„abortion, gay rights and sexually explicit content in television, 
movies and music, and on the Internet‟. Both scholars also 
recognise that these discussions and the Church‟s support of certain 
political parties have often determined the results of American 
elections, not rarely achieved through the exploitation of themes 
linked to family values perceived today to be under the constant 
challenge of different life styles (Jelen and Segers, 1998: xi).  
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   Regardless of the different answers these authors give to the 
dilemma on whether the foundations of a nation‟s culture rely on 
„firm moral ground‟ derived from religion or rather on individual 
choices and progressive forces of cultural change, both 
acknowledge that the debate on the public role of religion 
necessarily opens a debate on the idea of identity and national 
belonging. As Cochran argues, religion can contribute to a 
democratic dialogue, which is why, according to him, political 
actors „must tolerate beliefs and practices that diverge from their 
own, even those they find deeply offensive‟ (Cochran, 1981: xvi). 
Moreover, they also have to be ready to accept religious arguments 
in public debates, and it is their duty to counterbalance them using 
„arguments and ideas that everyone can understand and at least 
potentially accept, otherwise they will never be able to persuade 
anyone‟. Finally, they must be willing to compromise rather than to 
radicalise their own positions (Ibid.). This willingness to adapt and 
compromise does not necessarily imply a positive judgment of 
religious groups as political actors: if Segers underlines the central 
role religion has always had in modern history, Jelene believes that 
religious groups have often proved „too intolerant and uncivil‟ as 
well as too concerned with their own aim to participate in a 
dialogue which has to be based on a democratic „give and take‟. As 
the scholar states, this incompatibility of religion and democratic 
political dialogue comes from the impossibility for churches and 
organisations to be true to themselves and their theological 
concerns and faithful to democratic values at the same time. The 
difficulty in communication between the two spheres depends also 
on the language they use to convey their messages: the specific 
unique vocabulary of the Church and a publicly accessible 
language which the state has to use to address citizens (Ibid.).  
   The new element in the dialogue between Jelene and Seger 
consists in opening the way to another „dilemma‟ linked to religion: 
that of language and its accessibility to common individuals and the 
gap between trust and rational choice, which has been analysed by 
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many other scholars while attempting to set the necessary 
conditions following which religions and churches can be given a 
role in the political arena. For religious groups seeking visibility in 
the public sphere, Cochran seems to advocate an internal 
democratic discourse. Indeed, „political actors will not take 
particularly seriously monolithic communities without internal 
freedom that seek a place at a pluralistic table‟. Another condition 
for inclusion in the public arena is again linked to language and 
prescribes the need for churches and religious groups to abandon 
their specific terms and theological references for a „neutral 
language‟ typical of a public open dialogue. However, this is a 
neutrality which Cochran defines as „impossible‟, showing as much 
as Jelene a lack of faith in the churches‟ ability to transform and 
adapt in order to gain respect in politics (Cochran, 1981: xvi).  
   A clear example of the influence of religion in international 
affairs and in the process of identity-building comes from recent 
studies on the concept of European citizenship. Scholars such as 
Schlesinger and Foret (2006), Hornsby-Smith (1999), Voye (1997), 
Boswell (1994) and Nelsen, Guth and Fraser (2001), who have 
investigated the attitude of mainstream religion towards Europe, 
have come to the conclusion that it is possible to group European 
religions into three dominant dichotomies: Northern Protestantism 
vs. Southern Catholicism, Western Catholicism vs. Eastern 
Orthodoxy and Christian Europe vs. Muslim Turkey. They agree 
on the fact that Catholicism has played a fundamental role in the 
process of European integration. Indeed, the Catholic Church 
inspired the attitude of Christian Democratic Parties whose values 
are traditionally based on „integration, compromise, 
accommodation and pluralism‟, as proved by their positive 
response to the project of a monetary union (Hanley, 1994: 2). 
According to the outcomes of studies conducted since the late 
1980s, Christian Democratic Parties more than others have shown 
explicit support for a supranational identity and seen „European 
integration as a means to overcome nationalism‟ (Hanley, 1994: 8). 
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The same scholars argue that, on the contrary, Protestant countries 
are usually Eurosceptic and more interested in the affirmation of 
national and regional identities (Voye, 1999: 281). Moreover, they 
perceive a strong differentiation between the Church and the state 
as desirable (Willaime, 1995: 320; Voye, 1999: 281). As Voye 
recalls, among the first twelve countries which joined the European 
Union, seven were quasi-exclusively Catholic (Voye, 1999: 281). 
Vincent goes as far as to say that even the EU flag with its stars 
reminds Europeans of their Catholic origins since it is a clear 
reference to the veil of the Virgin Mary (Vincent, 1993: 79). The 
Catholic Church‟s interest in the European project has been 
welcomed by political forces working for its realisation as it offers, 
as an alternative to a purely economic union, that of a Europe 
unified by religion and therefore clearly different from the Arabic 
and Muslim world (as proved by the difficulties of allowing Turkey 
to join the „Christian club‟) (Voye, 1999: 280). In this respect, both 
the Church and national political parties are in the ideal position to 
pursue their particular aims while publicly being perceived as 
committed – as Voye puts it – „to giving a soul to Europe‟ (Ibid.).        
   Regarding the impact of religions on national and international 
affairs, scholars seem to agree on the fact that the Catholic Church, 
as well as many other churches, can be considered as an interest 
group. Studying these interest groups involves an analysis of the 
process of identity building they promote in order to be successful, 
which means retaining a central role in societies characterised by a 
growing secularism and globalisation. Indeed, as Warner recalls, 
after World War II the Catholic Church faced the challenge of 
establishing itself again in the new democratic nation states. In 
order to do so, it necessarily had to form alliances with political 
parties. Following this strategy, the Catholic Church behaved as „an 
interest group whose actions can be modelled as if it were a firm in 
a market seeking a supplier of goods‟ (Warner, 2000: 4). Forming 
or breaking an alliance depends on how successful the Church is in 
pleasing its followers and obtaining benefits for them and for itself 
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(Ibid.). In this sense, the Church becomes a representative of a 
particular subgroup in society that needs a connection to political 
parties in order to be represented in the public sphere, a sort of 
„transmission belt‟, which passes the requests of citizens to the 
political system (Eldersveld, 1964; Lawson, 1980; Becker, 1983; 
Zeigler, 1985; Warner, 2000). Alternatively, as Panebianco 
explains, churches create their own parties as in the case of the 
Catholic Church and the Italian Christian Democratic Party, which 
is „a party born from the direct will of religious institutions‟ 
(Panebianco, 1992: 229). The concept upon which all scholars 
insist is that interest groups „provide an important link between the 
government and the governed‟ (Thomas, 1993: 1) and that the 
struggle in which the Church is involved is mainly aimed at 
confirming and reinforcing its „monopoly of power‟ (Warner, 
2000: 21).  
   In order to understand better the power of the Church in national 
and international politics, researchers have then started applying 
theories used to analyse group identity and interest groups to 
religious organisations. After decades of silence on this matter, a 
renewed interest in identity building started emerging in the 1980s 
and has coincided with the revival of the debate on the role of 
religion in secular democracies. Since then, scholars have come to 
generally similar conclusions regarding group identification and 
features. Tajfel (1981) argues that there are two main 
characteristics typical of group identification: an awareness of 
membership and psychological attachment to the group, whereas 
those who feel attached to the group and its values but do not see 
themselves as members can be considered as exhibiting group 
sympathy (Conover, 1986). According to Wilcox, Jelene and Legge 
(1993), group consciousness includes different factors that scholars 
have classified as follows: group identification; power discontent 
(„the belief that your group has less power than it deserves‟); 
system blaming („the belief that your group is disadvantaged by the 
system and does not deserve its subordinate position‟); and 
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orientation toward collective action (Wilcox, Jelene and Leege, 
1993: 72; Miller, Gurin and Gurin, 1980;  Miller et al., 1981; 
Gurin, 1985; Klein, 1984; Cook, 1989).  
   Other scholars have analysed „polarized group affect‟, the affinity 
towards members of one‟s own group and hostility towards 
members of different groups: both attitudes and group 
consciousness determine a more active political participation on the 
part of members (Wilcox, Jelene and Legge, 1993: 72). This is why 
the analysis of group-related attitudes is of central importance in 
understanding politics, as religious groups help citizens make 
political choices, particularly on specific policies and on the 
candidates to be elected. In other words, religious groups strongly 
influence both their members‟ political behaviour and the electoral 
results, as well as the reactions and strategies developed by 
political parties to gain or maintain their power (Ibid.). Moreover, 
the study of „polarized group affect‟ contributes to explain how an 
„enemy‟ is much needed in order to build a well defined group 
identity.  
   According to the literature on the theme, it appears that, precisely 
for this reason, members of minority religions seem to be more 
committed to the group and more keen to act in its name and 
defence. This datum finds confirmation in Jelene‟s and Wilcox‟s 
(2002) investigation of Catholicism. As they argue, Catholicism is 
more effective in inculcating values when it is not the mainstream 
religion: Catholics in non-Catholic countries prove more faithful to 
conservative values and show a much higher level of church 
attendance than those living in Catholic countries. The same  can 
be said of minority religions in Catholic countries, which 
seemingly attract more practising followers than they do in 
countries where they represent the mainstream religion (Jelene and 
Wilcox, 2002). In other words, attachment to the group is inversely 
proportional to the power of that group and a stronger attachment 
to the group is justified by the struggle on the part of minority 
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religions to emerge and gain visibility in the public sphere. As a 
result, „competition between religious dominations has a positive 
effect on religious involvement and, conversely, […] religious 
monopolies tend to inhibit personal religiosity‟ (Jelene and Wilcox, 
2002: 72) . This is why Catholics in Protestant countries exhibit 
higher levels of religious observance than where they are the 
majority, as for instance in Italy. Applying this interpretative model 
to Italy would also imply an acknowledgment of the deeper internal 
cohesion and orthodoxy of minority religions such as Islam. The 
relationship between religion and the state is also determined by the 
power of a particular religion: indeed, where it is dominant it will 
tend to support the state and contribute to reinforcing citizens‟ trust 
in the institutions, whereas if it represents a minority competing 
with more powerful religious antagonists it will show a critical 
attitude towards the state (Jelene and Wilcox, 2002).  
   In a similar way, Vallier too analyses the relationship between 
religious groups and the national state, this time looking at the issue 
from the opposite perspective and taking as a point of reference 
governments and democratic institutions. In his perspective, the 
control the state exerts on religions is inversely proportional to its 
power: the weaker and more politically unsure of itself a state is, 
the more „it will attempt to maximize the scope of political control 
over ecclesiastic affairs‟ (Vallier, 1971: 16). Moreover, the greater 
this political control is, the more the Church will be „fashioned to 
serve political ends‟ and the less the state will prove capable of 
developing a secular theory of political legitimacy. In this sense, 
according to Vallier, nations which are closer to Rome and have a 
clear separation between the state and the Church „provide the Holy 
See and its transnational units the greatest possibilities for 
influence‟ (Vallier, 1971: 16-18).  
   This relationship between mainstream religions and nation states 
began to emerge after World War II following the process of 
increasing secularisation which saw civil democratic values replace 
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religious ones. Vallier, as well as other scholars, found that the 
Church, forced to give up temporal powers and having lost its 
control on political affairs, re-shaped its own role within national 
boundaries and in international affairs while gaining more freedom 
to assert its views on controversial issues and ethical problems. 
Having realised that the days of political alliances had gone for 
good, the Church started looking for new allies, which it found in 
other Christian religions (Vallier, 1971: 18): „Through this process 
the Church has moved up in the hierarchy of social control towards 
a systematic position as a global pastor‟ (Vallier, 1971: 22-23). In 
this sense, it managed to reinforce its power rather than surrender 
to its evident decline while gaining increasingly stronger support 
from citizens whose trust in the institutions was being weakened by 
religion itself. Indeed, as Putnam (1993) argues, hierarchical 
religions, while attracting people‟s support, damage the 
development of horizontal ties of solidarity and trust. This theory, 
aimed at proving „strong negative association between trust and 
strong hierarchical religions‟, particularly fits the case of Catholic 
countries and Italy above the others (La Porta, Lopes De-Silener, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 333-338).  
   While weakening citizens‟ trust in national institutions, 
Catholicism also has the effect of mobilising people at a local level, 
both in a negative sense, as for instance to show discontent with the 
institutions, and in a positive sense, building stronger connections 
within the group and increased commitment to it (Greenberg, 2000: 
377-394). At the same time, the Church reinforces its own power at 
an international level since, as proved by many studies on 
transnational migration, it represents a point of reference for 
individuals who relocate themselves in a new country but keep 
strong connections with their homeland, or at least feel part of both 
their country of origin and the new place where they work and 
spend most of their time. Indeed, religious identities and practices 
also enable migrants to sustain membership in multiple locations. 
This is made possible not only by the links the Church holds with 
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its institutions in other countries but also by the similarity of 
membership required for the two groups, which give migrants a 
sense of continuity and often represent their only chance of 
integrating (Levitt, 2003, 847-873).  
   Voye (1999), Warner (2000), Cochran (1981) and Segers and 
Jelene (1998) agree on this interpretation of religious groups and 
particularly Catholicism as experts in practical ethical issues and on 
their great impact on decision making, especially on the part of 
weak political actors and governments. With the shift from a 
codified and institutionalised public morality to a more 
individualistic attitude according to which choice is relegated to the 
private sphere, Catholicism, as well as other religions, presents 
itself as a „neutral consultant‟ in the field of ethics in post-modern 
societies. As a result, in the 1990s, representatives of the Church in 
Europe started becoming opinion-makers and points of reference 
for states unable to make decisions on controversial matters 
(Warner, 2000; Vallier, 1971; Jelene and Segers, 1998). Even more 
importantly, this shift and re-qualification of religion took place 
without any intervention or opposition on the part of governments 
and mass media, which rather portrayed the phenomenon as 
natural. To achieve this new status the Church had to change 
substantially: it presented itself as de-dogmatised and was more 
careful about the language it employed to express ideas and put 
forward solutions to controversial questions, as for instance 
referring more often to human rights rather than to the „laws of 
God‟ (Warner, 2000: 278). As a result, contemporary societies have 
to deal with the paradox of Catholic representatives acting as 
influential members of consultative committees on ethical 
dilemmas which are supposed to offer disinterested and neutral 
opinions on questions of central importance for the Church. Warner 
warns of the impossibility for the Church to play such a role, since 
it implies taking a distance from its own set of values and its 
particular idea of the world. He also calls into question the role of 
the media, which have failed to denounce, or indeed even to 
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acknowledge, the existence of such a deep contradiction (Warner, 
2000: 278).  
   The different aspects of the debate on the role of religion in 
contemporary democratic societies and its relationship with 
national and international politics summarised in this section 
provide a general background for a further analysis of the Italian 
case and particularly of the role of the Catholic Church in the 
debate on Italianness and immigration. As this chapter will try to 
prove, if on the one hand the scenario described above seems to 
apply perfectly to the Italian case, on the other hand Italy can be 
considered as a special case precisely because of its geographical 
and historical closeness to the Holy See, a factor that Vallier sees 
as a cause of high interference on the part of the Church in politics 
and vice versa (Vallier, 1971). This peculiar relationship between 
the Vatican and the Italian state is the focus of the following 
section of this chapter.  
 
3. Universal aspiration and its formal limits: the relationship 
between State and Church 
The adjective Catholic comes from the Greek katholikos, which 
means universal. The Church, by proclaiming itself Catholic, 
claims a universal power that „concerne tutti gli uomini, l‟umanità 
intera‟, „tutto l‟universo‟, „che è versato in ogni scienza e 
disciplina; che si allarga a considerare i più svariati rami dello 
scibile‟ (Dizionario Garzanti Linguistica, Universale, 2005).  „La 
Chiesa è cattolica in un duplice senso. E‟ cattolica perché in essa è 
presente Cristo. […] Essa è cattolica perché è inviata in missione 
da Cristo alla totalità del genere umano: tutti gli uomini sono 
chiamati a formare il nuovo popolo di Dio. Perciò questo popolo, 
restando uno e unico, si deve estendere a tutto il mondo e a tutti i 
secoli, affinché si adempia l'intenzione della volontà di Dio, il 
quale in principio ha creato la natura umana una, e vuole radunare 
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insieme infine i suoi figli, che si erano dispersi‟ (CEI, 2003: III, art. 
830, 831). But how can this universal aspiration free from temporal 
and geographical limitations be reconciled with the autonomy and 
independence of particular sovereign secular states? Or, in other 
words, how can a universal Church whose territory is 
geographically incorporated in a foreign country exert its universal 
influence? This section will address the special relationship 
between the Catholic Church and the Italian state in order to 
provide a political and historical explanation for the recurring 
interference in the administration of Italian internal affairs, and in 
this case  immigration policies, on the part of the Church. 
   Before addressing the specific case of the Italian state and its 
official relationship with the Catholic Church, it is necessary to 
briefly take into account more generally the connections between 
secular nation-states and churches operating within the same 
national boundaries. According to Ferrari, a state needs to possess 
two characteristics in order to be defined as secular. Firstly, it must 
guarantee „individual religious freedom, which means the 
irrelevance of one‟s religious convictions with regard to the 
enjoyment of political and civil rights‟ and it must prohibit the 
discrimination of those who have beliefs different from the 
mainstream one. Secondly, there must be a distinction between 
state and Church, based on the autonomy of minority religions and 
the lack of interference on the part of the Church, a reversible 
principle which also establishes the independence of the state from 
any form of religion. The latter cannot have any role in legitimising 
a power which has to be based on citizens‟ will (Ferrari, 2006: 11). 
As the scholar states, this independence is today guaranteed to 
Western democracies despite the fact that in certain countries, such 
as Britain, Denmark and Norway, political authorities have to 
profess a certain religion, since state authorities are free to be 
atheists or followers of minority religions without this implying 
any „diminution of their civil and political rights‟ (Davis, 2000: 
Ferrari, 2006: 12). Ferrari, referring to Warnink (2001) and 
 99 
Robbers (2001), explains that the autonomy of the state and the 
Church in European countries is established with the Constitutional 
Charters and with the specific agreements or „concordats‟ 
stipulated by the representatives of the state and those of 
recognised religious minorities (Ferrari, 2006: 12):  
 
Within the limits now outlined it is possible to maintain that „the 
secular State‟ constitutes a model of organisation of relations 
between religion and politics that is widely shared in European 
countries, beyond the legal superstructures still hinging on the 
existence of concordats, State Churches or dominant religions. 
Within this picture the presence of Muslim communities 
constitutes a dual challenge: on the one hand, for the Muslims 
themselves who have to find a means of integration in a reality (the 
secular State) that is culturally alien to many of them, and on the 
other, for the Europeans who have to understand how far the 
secularity of the State can go in integrating this reality (Ibid.).  
 
Given this premise and leaving momentarily aside the „challenge‟ 
of European Muslim integration, which will be addressed later on 
in this chapter, the specific case of Italy and its peculiar 
relationship with the Roman Catholic Church can now be 
addressed, as it emerges from the official agreements signed by 
representatives of the two institutions.  
   This peculiar relationship is formally regulated by the Lateran 
Pacts signed in February 1929 by a representative of the Pope, 
Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and the then Prime Minister Benito 
Mussolini. If until then the saying „libera Chiesa in libero stato‟  
(free Church in free state) had vaguely established the duties and 
the rights of the two powers, the Lateran pacts ratified in detail the 
separation of and the relation between these two entities. After 
decades of disputes following the taking of Rome in 1870 and 
various attempts to resolve the tensions between the Papacy and the 
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newly born Italian state, such as the Act of Guarantees in 1871 or 
the pact promoted by Gentiloni in 1913, the Lateran Pacts gave to 
the Holy See absolute and visible independence, allowing it to 
become an autonomous territory on which the Pope could exert full 
sovereignty, which marked the official birth of the Vatican State. 
Moreover, it confirmed that the Roman Catholic religion was the 
only official state religion, as already documented in the first article 
of the Statuto Albertino. The pact also granted the Church some 
privileges concerning the citizens of the Vatican State, the 
immovable property of the Holy See and tax exemptions. Finally, it 
involved a conspicuous assignment of shares („titoli azionari‟) as 
compensation for the annexation of a relevant part of the Holy 
See‟s territory by the Italian state. The part of the agreement 
denominated „Concordato‟, which regulated the relation between 
Church and state, recognised the validity of religious marriages and 
the power of the Sacra Romana Rota to annul them and granted the 
teaching of Catholic religion in Italian schools at every level of the 
educational system (Legge 25 Marzo 1985/121, Modificazioni al 
Concordato lateranense dell‟11 Febbraio 1929 tra la Repubblica 
Italiana e la Santa Sede).  
   After the war, following a process promoted by the Democratic 
Christian party and supported by a Communist Party worried about 
the possible class and ideological clashes that could further weaken 
the newly born Italian Republic, the regulations of the Lateran 
Pacts were included in the Republican Constitution, whose article 7 
establishes that „Lo Stato e la Chiesa Cattolica sono, ciascuno nel 
proprio ordine, indipendenti e sovrani. I loro rapporti sono regolati 
dai Patti Lateranensi. Le modificazioni dei Patti accettate dalle due 
parti non richiedono procedimento di revisione costituzionale‟ 
(Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, 1947). A long process of 
consultation between the Italian state and the Vatican for a revision 
of the Lateran Pacts, started in 1969, resulted in 1985 in a new 
„Concordato‟, which on the one hand affirmed the citizens‟ right to 
freedom of religion and the independence of the Catholic Church, 
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and on the other hand abolished the compulsory weekly hour of 
religion in the school syllabus as well as the state‟s stipend to the 
clergy (www.chiesacattolica.it). Moreover, according to the 
„Protocollo addizionale‟, a sort of appendix to the „Concordato‟ of 
1985, „Si considera non più in vigore il principio, originariamente 
richiamato dai Patti Lateranensi, della religione cattolica come sola 
religione dello Stato italiano‟(Law n.121, 25 March 1985). The 
discussion on a possible further revision of the Lateran Pacts, 
pushed forward by certain political representatives, is still ongoing 
today and causing tension between the political system and the CEI 
(Italian Episcopal Conference), which recently reacted vehemently 
to what Monsignor Betori calls „pallottole di carta‟ (paper bullets) 
referring to the pressure coming from the press and the government 
(Anon., 16/11/2005). 
     This digression on the relationship between the Church and the 
state was meant to provide a general background to better 
understand on which basis the Church takes part in public debates, 
claims for itself special rights and intervenes on political issues.  
According to Provenza, the Catholic Church has always been 
involved in politics, as recently proved by the so-called 
„vademecum‟ written in 2003 by the then Cardinal Ratzinger in 
order to give Italian MPs instructions on which laws and measures 
discussed by the Parliament were to be considered ethical and 
which not (Provenza, 2003). If issues such as divorce, abortion, 
artificial insemination, research on stem cells and euthanasia have 
always been considered ethical questions and therefore the Church 
has always taken part in political discussions on them, immigration 
has recently become an ethical matter too, as it entails a reflection 
on concepts and values which are crucial for the Church. Moreover, 
as this chapter will try to prove, the Church has exploited the 
debate on immigration to give prominence to concepts of identity 
and otherness, thereby promoting a firm defence of what it calls 
„the rights of the individual‟, including the right not to restrict 
religious beliefs to the private sphere.   
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4. From Ratzinger to Biffi: a comparative analysis of the 
Catholic Church’s interventions on identity and immigration. 
This section will address the sometimes contradictory interventions 
on the part of the Catholic Church in the discussion on 
immigration. When did the Church start considering this issue as 
relevant and to feel it had a duty to have a say in it? Where does 
this interest originate from? Or, to put it differently, when did 
immigration begin to matter to the Church?  
   The Church‟s involvement in the debate does not seem to 
coincide with the wider political awareness of the phenomenon, 
which can be traced back to the early 1990s, following the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the war in former Yugoslavia. This is 
confirmed by the Church‟s lack of interest in the laws on 
immigration approved by the Italian parliament before the end of 
the last century: indeed the so-called „Bossi-Fini‟, the law on 
immigration passed in 2002 and named after the MPs who designed 
it, was the first measure that members of the Catholic hierarchy 
discussed, praised and/or blamed. Until then the Church had 
spoken on matters related to foreign immigrants within the country 
from a sociological perspective, based on the general assumption 
derived from its doctrine, that immigrants have to be considered as 
brothers to be welcomed and supported in the name of an 
unconditional love and Christian charity. The question is why this 
shared feeling and official position of the hierarchy towards those 
traditionally defined by the as „gli ultimi‟ changed dramatically at 
the turn of the new century, when the Church started engaging in 
the debate on specific laws and measures, becoming one of the 
stronger voices in the public discussion on the theme. 
   This section will try to answer these questions through a 
comparative analysis of the main documents, which represent a sort 
of turning point in the debate. In looking at the chronology of these 
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documents, the main characteristic which emerges at a first glance 
is the fact that the most controversial of them, which had a stronger 
impact on public opinion, were all written in the few months 
between June and September 2000. Indeed, Cardinal Ratzinger‟s 
„Nota sulla espressione chiese sorelle‟ was approved by Pope John 
Paul II on the 9
 
June 2000 and published on 30 June 2000. 
Similarly, another document signed by the now Pope Benedict XVI 
entitled Dominus Jesus was dated August 6
th
 and published on 5 
September of the same year. Another crucial document which 
contributed to open a strong debate on immigration was written the 
same year and month and sent to parishes on the 13
th 
of August: 
Cardinal Giacomo Biffi‟s „nota pastorale‟ entitled „La citta‟ di San 
Petronio nel terzo millennio‟. These three documents, and 
particularly the Dominus Jesus and Biffi‟s note, represent a clear 
turn in the Church‟s attitude towards immigration, from that 
general goodwill based on traditional Christian charity towards a 
much more political and utilitarian attitude, which this work will 
refer to as „rational selection‟ (as opposed to a „natural selection‟).  
    
The analysis of these texts will be followed by a brief overview of 
several interventions and proposals which were put forward by 
individual parish priests as well as important members of the 
hierarchy immediately after the initial heated discussion derived 
from Biffi‟s intervention. Although the latter can be considered as 
the cause of the „scandal‟, it seems appropriate here to follow the 
actual chronology in order to address a central question: why were 
all documents published in 2000? And why one after the other, 
within a period of three months? 
 
   The „Nota sull‟espressione chiese sorelle‟ written by Ratzinger 
for the „Congregazione per la dottrina della fede‟ had the precise 
aim of clarifying the meaning of the expression „sister churches‟, 
and to remove the ambiguities of its common usage in official 
documents. As the Cardinal recalls, the term, originally used in 
official documents to describe the dialogue between the Catholic 
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and the Orthodox Churches, had become part of a common 
language to indicate the relationship between them. Nevertheless, 
as the Cardinal insists, „purtroppo recentemente l‟uso di tale 
espressione è stato esteso in certe pubblicazioni e da alcuni teologi 
[…] per indicare la Chiesa cattolica da un lato e la Chiesa ortodossa 
dall‟altro, inducendo a pensare che nella realtà non esisterebbe 
l‟unica Chiesa di Cristo, ma essa potrà essere di nuovo ristabilita a 
seguito della riconciliazione tra le due chiese sorelle‟ (Ratzinger, 
2000a). Subsequently the term „chiese sorelle‟ began to be applied 
also to the Anglican and other non Catholic churches. Therefore, 
this document, approved by Pope John Paul II on 9 June 2000, 
meant not only to denounce the use of this expression with a 
meaning deeply different from its original one, but also to clarify 
the need for an official intervention to regulate – or, better, ban – 
this recent use, particularly in official documents.  
   This apparently purely theological specification can be 
considered as much more politically significant if linked to the 
other documents mentioned above, and in this sense can be seen as 
a first step towards a more articulated strategy in addressing the 
debate on immigration. This is confirmed by the register of the 
Dominus Jesus and Biffi‟s „nota pastorale‟, which followed after a 
few months and contributed to reinforce the still veiled message of 
an intrinsic superiority of the Catholic Church. 
   The incipit of the Dominus Jesus, extracted from Mark‟s Gospel, 
opens with a reminder of the Church‟s universal mission of 
bringing the Gospel to every single human being in the world and 
of distinguishing between those who will listen to it and those who 
will not as „chi crederà [..] e sarà salvo‟ and „chi non crederà e sarà 
condannato‟ (16, 15-16). This exquisitely doctrinal statement 
reveals its political inclination in an attempt to establish which 
attitude the Church should adopt towards those who do not believe. 
The Church, Ratzinger writes, looks with sincere respect at those 
„ways to behave and live‟, those doctrines that, however different 
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from the Church‟s, reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all 
men. Moreover, as the Cardinal states, announcing this truth 
involves practising an inter-religious dialogue whose aim is to 
enrich and get to know each participant while responding to the 
truth and respecting freedom (Ratzinger, 2000b: § 2). 
   In less than a page, Ratzinger established a double premise: the 
first one is to define vaguely the other religions as „stili di vita‟, in 
this sense almost referring to them as arbitrary choices among 
different life styles. The second one consists in defining them as a 
sort of partial derivation from a superior truth, a ray descending 
from a single origin and later on simply as „esigenze culturali 
contemporanee‟ (contemporary cultural needs) (Ibid., § 3). 
According to him, the most appropriate means to deal with these 
ways of life is through a dialogue considered as the only possible 
communication in a world threatened by relativistic theories, aimed 
at justifying religious pluralism not only de facto but also de iure. 
In other words, the Cardinal is arguing that if the coexistence of 
different beliefs in contemporary democracies is undeniable, and 
therefore should be recognized (de facto), however it cannot be 
explained,  even less justified, in its principles (de iure) (Ibid., § 4). 
In order to stem and correct this growing relativism according to 
which no revelation can be the true one, it is necessary to reassert 
the definitive and complete character of the Catholic universal 
revelation (Ibid., §§ 5-6).  
   Here the Cardinal introduces for the first time that concept of 
rationality and intelligence which turned out to be so controversial 
in his Regensburg lecture in December 2006.  Indeed, he goes so 
far as to say that Catholicism allows people to reach the truth 
through the use of „coerente intelligenza‟, whereas „the other 
religions consist of a mixture of experience and thought on which 
men‟s wisdom is based as they are on a search for truth which has 
not yet found a clear confirmation. Therefore they can only rely on 
God‟s magnanimity in partially revealing himself through a still 
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confused and erroneous perception‟ (Ibid., §§ 7-8). In this sense, 
the uniqueness and unity of the Catholic religion cannot be 
questioned but only accepted in its evidence (Ibid., paragraph 16). 
As a consequence, Ratzinger concludes, the Church cannot be 
considered as the sum of the different churches, nor can the idea of 
the absence of a unified Church be accepted and compensated by a 
common search for it (Ibid., §19).       
   As a result, despite the genuine attitude of the other churches, it is 
not possible to neglect the fact that their faith comes from various 
mistakes, if not from superstition, and in this sense they represent 
an obstacle to salvation (Ibid., § 21). In this respect the dialogue 
can be seen as an attempt to bring salvation to those who are 
excluded from it. This dialogue has to be based on an equal dignity 
of the different interlocutors, even though this equality refers to the 
individuals, that is to say, the subjects who carry their beliefs, and 
not to the specific content of those beliefs (Dominus Jesus, 2000: § 
22). The document‟s conclusion specifies that only when this unity 
is complete, can it be affirmed that „Non siete più stranieri nè 
ospiti, ma siete concittadini dei santi e familiari di Dio‟ (Ibid., § 
23).  
   I would argue that the choice of terms such as „foreigner‟ as 
opposite to „citizen‟ is not a random one but rather expresses a 
precise political concern on the part of the Church and not only the 
need for a doctrinal specification. This is confirmed by the speech 
given by Cardinal Ratzinger on 5
 
September, the day in which his 
„Dominus Jesus‟ was presented to the press. At the press 
conference, Ratzinger was even clearer in his reference to such 
words. First of all, he reminded the audience of how often 
nowadays people tend to assume that different religions represent 
diverse ways to salvation: this attitude „si può definire, senza 
timore di essere smentiti, relativismo‟ (Ratzinger, 2000c). 
According to the Cardinal, relativism, defined as the prevalent 
attitude in contemporary Western world, is often justified on a 
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theological basis with the impossibility of receiving a full and clear 
divine revelation. This relativistic attitude towards the truth 
becomes therefore a justification for a widespread religious 
pluralism according to which what is true for an individual could 
not be true for the others (Ibid.). In this respect, the idea of a 
universal and binding truth diffused by the Church is often 
mistaken for a sort of fundamentalism, an attack on the spirit of the 
modern age and a threat to tolerance and freedom (Ibid).   
   Ratzinger laments that the meaning of the term „dialogue‟ itself is 
therefore erroneously intended, far from the one established by the 
II Vatican Council, because it does not represent a mission of 
conversion, a way to find the truth, but rather it becomes „l‟essenza 
del dogma relativista, l‟opposto della conversione‟  (Ratzinger, 
2000c: 1). As the Cardinal argues, according to the dominant 
relativistic thought, „dialogue‟ is the attitude of putting different 
beliefs on the same level, so that everything assumes the same 
importance and dignity, being at the same time relative. This kind 
of dialogue is invoked to promote collaboration and integration 
between different religious positions (Ibid.).  
   Not only does Ratzinger criticise this attitude for its false 
premises, but he goes as  far as to argue that as long as relativism is 
seen as a „filosofia dell‟umanità‟ capable of guaranteeing tolerance 
and democracy for our societies, it will have as its first result that 
of „marginalizzare ulteriormente chi si ostina nella difesa della 
identità cristiana e nella sua pretesa di diffondere la verità 
universale‟ (Ratzinger, 2000c: 2). As this section will argue later 
on, this statement represents a fundamental first step towards the 
strategy that the Church has been developing in order to reassert its 
own role in the country: a strategy based on the presumption that 
the Catholic Church has today become a victim, a minority and 
therefore has to be protected and supported by the state. To make 
his message even clearer, Ratzinger defines the growing critique of 
the Catholic Church‟s aspiration to an absolute and definitive truth 
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as „un falso concetto di tolleranza‟ (Ibid.). Moreover, he claims that 
the idea of tolerance as an expression of freedom of conscience, 
thought and religion has indeed been defended and promoted by the 
II Vatican Council and re-asserted in the Dominus Jesus, and has 
always been a fundamental ethical position in the Christian belief, 
in this way affirming the Catholic origins of this value. 
Nonetheless, according to him, this principle of respect for freedom 
has today been manipulated and extended to the content of what is 
tolerated, thereby assuming that different religions, lifestyles and 
views of the world have equal dignity and neglecting the existence 
of a universal and objective truth. In this respect tolerance means 
renouncing the truth, which is indeed today perceived as a 
secondary and irrelevant issue. As a consequence, the Cardinal 
states, faith and superstition, experience and illusion cannot be 
differentiated (Ibid.). 
   Finally, without a search for the truth, the recognition of other 
religions itself becomes contradictory, as it is not based upon clear 
criteria of discernment when judging what is positive and what is 
negative or distinguishing between a superstition and a religion 
(Ibid.). One might question how such criteria could be formulated, 
since it seems clear that the Church would wish to promote a 
particular idea of the truth, which would most probably be seen as 
unacceptable and arbitrary by those who do not share the same 
views or faith. Here, Ratzinger does not engage more openly with a 
definition, which is however already implicit in the document and 
seemingly based on rationality.   
   Ratzinger‟s speech for the presentation of his Dominus Jesus 
follows the same path of the document itself in its opening with a 
declaration of respect for different religions, followed by a core of 
theological and ideological clarifications, which represent the main 
message and a conclusion which reaffirms the initial reassurance 
about the Church‟s respect and positive disposition towards 
different beliefs. Nonetheless, just before re-asserting this attitude 
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towards dialogue at the end of his speech as well as his document, 
in order to leave the reader with the impression of a constructive 
process of mutual understanding, Ratzinger shoots his last and 
most sharpened arrow: „Tutto ciò che di vero e buono esiste nelle 
religioni […] va riconosciuto e valorizzato. […] I semi del Logos 
sono sparsi ovunque. Ma non si possono chiudere gli occhi sugli 
errori e inganni che sono presenti nelle religioni‟ (Ratzinger, 
Presentazione Dominus Jesus, 2000: 2). This is why, he concludes, 
the Catholic Church‟s esteem and respect for other religions cannot 
lessen the originality and uniqueness of the Christian revelation, 
and therefore cannot put a stop to the Church‟s mission of 
evangelisation (Ibid.). 
   The Dominus Jesus had been presented as a general theological 
reflection, addressing both the whole Catholic community and non-
Catholics in explaining the Church‟s attitude towards the other 
religions. It was written in a formal technical language which made 
its polemical and practical implications remain quite implicit. On 
the contrary, the pastoral note „La città di San Petronio nel terzo 
millennio‟ by Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, written on 13 September 
2000, a week after the previous document, begins by addressing a 
limited audience (the people of Bologna and more precisely „i 
credenti‟) and a precise issue (the roots of these citizens‟ Christian 
identity) and its polemical intent was quite clear from the 
beginning.  
   The document opens with a call to the people of Bologna for a 
stronger awareness of the privilege of belonging to this city and the 
sense of pride this belonging requires. In the section entitled „Un 
volto cristiano‟, Biffi introduces a long reflection upon the city of 
Bologna aimed at justifying the pride citizens should feel in 
considering themselves as part of a town which was born and 
developed in a culture deeply influenced by Catholicism and 
shaped by the Church‟s enterprise (Biffi, 2000: § 7). Then he 
embarks on a sort of review of all the historical sites and 
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monuments of Bologna, which represent a symbol and a product of 
this Catholic culture: the shrine of the Madonna di San Luca, the 
Church of San Petronio, icon of unity of aims and values as 
opposed to the towers as symbols of conflict and civil wars, the 
cathedral, Santo Stefano, and even the arcades, typical of 
Bologna‟s architecture (Ibid.: §§ 9-17). This overview of places 
linked to Catholicism ends with an „osservazione conclusiva‟ on 
what Biffi calls the historical truth that unfortunately the new 
generations are forced to ignore, which is that in the whole 
peninsula and not only in this city the public works that represent 
Italy in the world were commissioned by the Church and still today 
represent Italians‟ adhesion to traditional Christian values (Ibid.: § 
18).  
   Characteristic traits of Bologna, according to Biffi, are also love 
for science, intellectual curiosity and a determination to fight 
ignorance and backwardness. Moreover, the people of Bologna are 
also well known for their ability to investigate things in depth in 
order to identify the „final aim‟ that grants life a precise meaning 
(Ibid.: § 25). The city, the Cardinal states, is renowned for its 
renewed faith in God which represents the source of beauty, 
brotherhood and health in the region, and which takes a concrete 
form in the many institutions in support of the poor or the 
marginalised (Ibid.: § 33).  
   Despite this glorious past and world fame, however, Biffi also 
pauses to reflect on the „innegabile calo di tensione‟ - intended as 
spiritual and ethical relaxation - occurring not only in Bologna but 
in the rest of the world as well (Biffi, 2000: § 24). The city, he 
states, seems to have lost its traditional attachment to those ancient 
values on which its civilisation was built, an issue which leads to 
the need for identifying what he calls „le difficili sfide del nostro 
tempo‟. To these challenges the city should react without panic or 
alarmism, but rather by asking itself how to preserve its own 
identity (Ibid.: § 36). But what are the challenges Biffi is referring 
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to? The Cardinal specifies that two main causes can be identified in 
order to explain the moral decadence of our societies: „Le sfide che 
già ci sovrastano sono principalmente due: il crescente afflusso di 
genti che vengono a noi da paesi lontani e diversi: il diffondersi di 
una cultura non cristiana tra le popolazioni cristiane‟. (Ibid.: § 36). 
The last statement opens the way to a section of the pastoral note 
entitled „La questione dell‟immigrazione‟ which can be considered 
almost as a separate document for two reasons: first because its 
register is very different from the rest and secondly because it can 
be considered as the main source for the discussion on immigration 
on a more practical level on the part of the Church. I will therefore 
examine this section of the pastoral note in some detail. 
   In the first paragraph („Una sorpresa‟) Biffi states that first of all 
it is necessary to acknowledge that the massive arrival of 
immigrants in the country has been a surprise for „all of us‟, where 
„us‟ means both the Church and the state. According to him, the 
latter seems lost and unable to deal with the situation rationally; 
nonetheless the Church too has been caught unprepared and despite 
its efforts to alleviate the discomfort and privations of the newly 
arrived, it has not proved until now capable of developing a 
common practical and less abstract position on the matter. Indeed, 
the generic solidarity and the importance of evangelical charity  - 
despite their being both legitimate principles and a duty for the 
Church - have proved more well-meaning than useful since acting 
in their name does not deal with the real complexity of the problem 
(Biffi, 2000: § 37). Nevertheless, the Cardinal argues that solving 
social issues such as that of immigration is not a duty of the 
Catholic Church, whose members should not feel guilty for not 
having the strength to deal with them and to put forward practical 
solutions. Charging the Church with such a responsibility and 
expecting it to confront these „problems‟ would be a sign of an 
intolerable „integralism‟, since its mission rather is that of 
spreading the Gospel and following „il comando dell‟amore‟. This 
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mission can be accompanied by but not replaced with charitable 
action (Ibid.).  
   According to Biffi, the Christian duty of proselytism implies as a 
pre-condition an attitude of an open and sincere dialogue, even 
though it can never be limited to such a dialogue. The one outlined 
by the Cardinal is a dialogue which can be supported by an 
objective knowledge of different positions and views but which can 
be considered as fulfilled only when it has managed to bring the 
knowledge of Christ to „quei nostri fratelli, che sventuratamente 
ancora non ne sono beneficiati‟ (Biffi, 2000: §§ 38-40). From 
Biffi‟s perspective, the fact that this evangelical mission does not 
tolerate any deliberate exclusion of addressees and has therefore to 
be universal, is something which should never be neglected. 
Catholics are called to provide an answer to this „indeclinabile 
responsabilità che essi hanno nei confronti di tutti i nuovi arrivati‟ 
(Muslims included), a responsibility alleviated by their awareness 
of possessing a truth which is „assolutamente inconfrontabile con i 
pur preziosi barlumi offerti dale varie religioni e dall‟Islam‟  (Biffi, 
2000: § 40). Moreover, Biffi remarks upon the duty already 
discussed in the Dominus Jesus, of behaving towards immigrants 
with Christian charity, which means helping them to reach the 
knowledge of the truth according to their concrete possibilities 
(Biffi, 2000: § 41). 
   Having established these general premises based on Christian 
values and duties and an explicit call for a differentiation in the 
state‟s and the Church‟s respective responsibility in relation to 
immigration, in the section entitled „Un approccio realistico‟ Biffi 
seemingly leaves to one side the theoretical aspect of the issue and 
begins to address it at a more practical level. This paragraph opens 
with the consideration that in dealing with the variegated 
phenomenon of immigration, Christian communities cannot avoid 
considering and judging differently specific individuals and groups 
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in order to realistically react to them in the most appropriate way 
(Biffi, 2000: § 42). 
   At this point the Cardinal engages in a more detailed analysis of 
the different cases, starting with Catholic immigrants: they – 
regardless of the language they speak and the colour of their skin – 
have to be treated in a way that makes them feel that „all‟interno 
della Chiesa non ci sono stranieri‟, they have to be welcomed and 
considered as brothers, part of the same family. Moreover, when 
they are part of a large group they should be encouraged to 
preserve their particular Catholic tradition, which will be regarded 
with „affettuosa attenzione‟ (Ibid).  
   Biffi goes as far as to set out a sort of regulatory plan on practical 
issues in order to clear the way of possible misunderstandings and 
avoid contradictory responses on the part of the Church. In 
particular, he clarifies, the members of the ancient Oriental Church 
will have to be considered with respect and, despite their not yet 
complete harmony with the Roman Catholic Church, should 
occasionally be allowed to use Catholic churches to celebrate their 
rites. Nonetheless, the attitude towards non Christians, who have to 
be „amati e, per quanto è possible aiutati nelle loro necessità‟, has 
to follow what had been established by the Nota CEI (Italian 
Episcopal Conference) in 1993, which is that in order to avoid a 
dangerous confusion, they cannot be granted the use of churches, or 
places commonly used for activities connected to the Catholic cult. 
(Biffi, 2000: § 42; CEI, 1993)  
   The next section of the pastoral note, entitled „Considerazione 
generale‟, is the most specific and detailed one, since it addresses 
„il comportamento auspicabile dello stato‟ and of its representatives 
towards immigration. It contains the most unequivocal statement 
on the – according to the Cardinal – most adequate means to deal 
with the issue, which later on became the focus of a heated debate 
and which today represents one of the very few seemingly rational 
criteria set out in order to answer the questions posed by the arrival 
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of immigrants in the country. Here Biffi states: „I criteri per 
ammettere gli immigrati non possono essere solamente economici e 
previdenziali. […] Occorre che ci si preoccupi seriamente di 
salvare l‟identità della nazione‟, since Italy is not an uninhabited 
deserted land with no history and living traditions, or cultural and 
spiritual features, to be populated indiscriminately as if it had not a 
patrimony of civilisation which needs to be saved (Biffi, 2000: § 
43). In Biffi‟s view, in order to build a peaceful coexistence, if not 
a desirable integration, the state must take into account that the 
immigrants‟ conditions at the start of the process are not equally 
favourable: in other words they are not equal, which is a fact that 
the representatives of Italian institutions should never neglect 
(Ibid.). Moreover, the document explains, the newly arrived should 
be urged to learn better the traditions and identity of the „peculiare 
umanità‟ they want to integrate in (Ibid.). 
   Paragraph 44 addresses specific themes in even more detail and 
can be seen as the most controversial in the whole document. Here 
indeed Biffi embarks on an analysis of the case of Muslim 
immigrants, arguing that: „il caso dei musulmani va trattato con una 
particolare attenzione. Essi hanno una forma di alimentazione 
diversa. […] un diverso giorno festivo, un diritto alla famiglia 
incompatibile col nostro, una concezione della donna lontanissima 
dalla nostra (fino ad ammettere e a praticare la poligamia). 
Soprattutto hanno una visione rigorosamente integralista della vita 
pubblica, sicché la perfetta immedesimazione tra religione e 
politica fa parte della loro fede […] anche se di solito a farla valere 
aspettano prudentemente di diventare preponderanti‟. To conclude, 
the Cardinal states, the role of the Church is that of evangelising 
whereas it is the state - every modern Western state - which has to 
develop a political strategy to manage the phenomenon (Biffi, 
2000: § 44).  
   Before bringing the focus back to the city of Bologna, Biffi 
concludes this more polemical part of the document with a short 
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section concerning Catholicism as the historical national religion to 
remind his addressees that, even though Catholicism is no longer 
the official state religion, it is nevertheless the historic religion of 
the Italian nation as well as the source of its identity and past 
greatness. Therefore, according to him, it is absolutely inadequate 
to compare it to other religions or cultural views. Moreover, he 
argues that a democracy which grants minorities a respect which 
damages the majority or does not imply an equal respect for what 
represents a tradition, is a very peculiar democracy. He goes further 
to mention as an example of „intolleranza sostanziale‟ the case of 
those schools where the crucifixes have been removed following 
the request of students and families who have faiths different from 
the Catholic one (Biffi, 2000: § 45).  
   Biffi then briefly mentions the other challenges typical of 
contemporary societies: immigration in fact is not the only issue 
they have to deal with. First in his list comes the spreading of a 
culture that even though not hostile to Catholicism does not take it 
into account and does not refer to it in establishing its principles: 
this is the case of the prevailing scientific thought orientated 
towards functional aims rather than concerned with a search for the 
truth. At the same time, according to him, the growing 
globalisation at a social and economic level is destined to produce a 
state of deep alienation, while the developing sector of media and 
communication grants space and visibility to a culture based on 
superficial perceptions that pay scarce attention to individuals, their 
historic memory and their capacity to invest in long term projects.  
   The degeneration of our society, mirrored for instance by the 
difficulties faced by institutions such as the family, can be ascribed 
to a state of „libertà senza verità‟, that is to say, freedom not linked 
to and not based on values, which damages above all the dignity of 
human beings. Nevertheless, Biffi specifies that not everything 
linked with modernity has to be considered as evil: in his view it is 
necessary to distinguish what can be accepted and what must not. 
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The criterion for this distinction should never be political as politics 
aims to find a compromise and stipulate agreements but should 
rather be based on faithfulness towards an immutable truth and „la 
nostra identità di credenti‟ (Biffi, 2000: §§ 47-48).  
   Biffi‟s main point, briefly mentioned earlier on in his pastoral 
note, becomes clear at this point when he states that Italian 
contemporary society seems to be led by mere „opinions‟, often 
antagonistic to the Catholic view of the good life, since it looks 
upon Catholicism with hatred. What the archbishop finds surprising 
in this scenario is the fact that the Church‟s representatives do not 
seem to be concerned, or even aware, of this process. When the 
Cardinal anticipates the outcome of this trend in the relatively short 
term, he seems quite convinced that „L‟Europa o ridiventerà 
cristiana o diventerà musulmana‟: no matter what direction it is 
going to take, the „cultura del niente‟ – Biffi never calls it 
relativism as Ratzinger does – has no chance to prevail. Indeed, a 
culture indifferent to values will not resist the ideological assault of 
Islam: the latter can only be defeated by a return to „the origins‟ 
and therefore necessarily to traditional Christian foundations (Biffi, 
2000: § 52). Despite the general rhetoric of disengagement used by 
the Catholic hierarchy to remark upon the need to distinguish 
between the role of the state and that of the Church in dealing with 
immigration, Biffi does put forward practical solutions that the 
Italian state should enforce to deal with this phenomenon, as for 
example the idea that the state should give preference to Catholic 
immigrants, who are easier to assimilate. 
   Before taking into account the reactions to these documents on 
the part of other members of the Church as well as of 
representatives of other religions, this section will analyse the 
similarities and differences between Ratzinger‟s Dominus Jesus 
and Biffi‟s pastoral note as well as the points they each try to make. 
As stated earlier on, Ratzinger‟s and Biffi‟s positions on the foreign 
presence in the country are not the first interventions on the matter 
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of immigration coming from the Church. Indeed, several pastoral 
notes had already been written in the past, such as „Stranieri dal 
terzo mondo. I nuovi poveri tra noi e il nostro impegno‟ (CEI, 
1982); „Uomini di culture diverse; dal conflitto alla solidarietà‟ 
(CEI, 1990); „Ero forestiero e mi avete ospitato‟ in 1993 and „Nella 
Chiesa nessuno è straniero‟ (CEI, 2000). Nevertheless, these 
previous documents only remarked upon the traditional concept of 
Christian charity, and looked at the issue from a general doctrinal 
point of view according to which immigrants had to be considered 
as the new poor, whom the Church and Catholic individuals had the 
duty to love, welcome and when possible support. In this respect, it 
also has to be said that the pastoral notes mentioned above 
expressed the position of CEI (Italian Episcopal Conference), a 
position which represents the more welcoming face of the Catholic  
hierarchy, as it will remarked later on in this chapter. 
   Ratzinger‟s Dominus Jesus and Biffi‟s „La città di San Petronio 
nel terzo millennio‟, represent a turning point in the message of the 
Church since, despite the fact that the idea of Christian love still 
represents a point of reference in the Church‟s attitude towards 
immigrants, this attitude is clearly informed with an intrinsic 
superiority of Catholicism which makes Ratzinger state that 
Catholics cannot even be tempted by Islam (Ratzinger, 2000a). 
Moreover, for the first time the Church not only comments upon 
this supposed superiority but goes so far as to put forward practical 
solutions to these „difficili sfide del nostro tempo‟ (Biffi, 2000), 
questioning among other things the role that the state should play in 
dealing with the issue.  
   Although written in different styles and aiming to achieve 
different objectives, the core of ideas expressed in the Dominus 
Jesus and Biffi's pastoral note overlap and often coincide. They 
both consider different religions as „ways of life‟ resulting from 
empirical experience and erroneous thoughts, whereas Catholicism 
is seen as the only religion capable of reaching the truth through a 
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rational process, using intelligence rather than superstition or 
common sense. Regarding the criteria the two representatives of the 
Church consider adequate to judge other beliefs, Ratzinger 
advocates that only the principle of truth – rationality – represents a 
means to defeat contemporary relativism, while Biffi, even though 
agreeing on the principle of truth, focuses more on a practical/ 
utilitarian criterion to regulate relations with people who have 
different ideas of the good life: the common characteristic which 
can promote and facilitate integration on the part of immigrants and 
the pre-requisite to welcome them can only be Catholicism. The 
choice of Catholicism as the only solution to matters related to 
immigration is based on a common syllogism which both Ratzinger 
and Biffi construct which has as its premise the fact that „every 
man provided with logic and rationality sees the truth and therefore 
is Catholic‟ and ends with the seemingly logical conclusion that 
„every Italian is Catholic‟. In Biffi‟s case the privileged treatment 
accorded to Catholic immigrants not only follows the principle of 
truth but is also based on the practical distinction between peoples 
who are easy to assimilate and others who are judged to be  
impossible to assimilate, as for instance Muslims.  
   Both Ratzinger and Biffi consider relativism as a sort of false 
tolerance, since they believe that tolerance coming from passive 
acceptance of different ideas of the good life is based on a 
fundamental mistake: the idea that different views have the same 
dignity and therefore nothing is absolute, as well as the fact that 
tolerance is extended not only to the individuals who hold a 
particular belief but also the content of that belief, whereas the only 
tolerance which remains faithful to the principle of truth is a 
tolerance towards  individuals.   
   Finally, they both agree that the Church has the right to 
accomplish its mission which consists in proselytism: only after a 
sincere conversion is it possible to become a member of the Church 
and – this is a recurrent message in the Cardinals‟ documents – 
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„within the Church nobody is a foreigner‟. Recognising the 
superiority of Catholicism and becoming part of the Church seems 
to be the only way immigrants can shift from being „others‟, 
foreigners, to becoming citizens, part of the Catholic family. The 
concept of the Catholic family, interestingly enough, seems to 
coincide with that of the nation since not being a foreigner and 
therefore being Italian coincides with being Catholic, following a 
transitive property of the above mentioned syllogism which 
„proves‟ that every Italian is Catholic and is aimed at granting 
Italian citizenship to every Catholic.  
   On 18 April 2005, during the Missa pro eligendo Romano 
Pontefice, the then Cardinal Ratzinger advocated that a clear and 
strong faith and an open belonging to the Catholic Church are 
today seen as a sign of fundamentalism, whereas a spreading 
relativism seems to be judged as the only adequate attitude in this 
era in which people let themselves easily shift from one doctrine to 
another as the wind changes. This ironical statement already 
contains implicitly the claim for a stronger freedom of expression 
on the part of the Catholic Church, which implies a critique of the 
concept of political correctness, particularly when referring to the 
Muslim community (De Magistris, 2005).     
 
5. The first reactions to Biffi’s pastoral note 
On 6
 September 2000, a day after Ratzinger‟s press conference on 
the Dominus Jesus, and a week before the release of Biffi‟s pastoral 
note, a letter by Don Gianni Baget Bozzo to Northern League‟s 
leader Umberto Bossi was published in the League‟s newspaper La 
Padania. Although it could be seen as a personal request to Bossi, 
the letter is central to the discussion on Islam as it indirectly asks to 
make the „natural‟ alliance between the Church and the Northern 
League more institutionalised. Indeed, Baget Bozzo starts by 
reminding Bossi of the role the League plays in defending Italian 
traditional identity, which is nowadays threatened by Islam. 
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According to him, the threat is due to the fact that Islam is 
supported in our societies by political actors who, despite having 
diverse aims, see it as a minor evil. The reference is both to non–
Catholics who consider Islam almost as a symbol of secularism 
(probably because of its fight against traditional Catholic symbols 
such as the crucifix) and to Catholics themselves who seem to give 
up their religion for a new faith, which consists in an unconditioned 
love for the others (Baget Bozzo, 2000). These two perspectives 
are, according to him, vitiated by the same mistake: they consider 
individual Muslims rather than focus on their beliefs, which – 
Baget Bozzo claims – constitutes the real problem. In the 
concluding part of his letter, he addresses the Catholic 
representatives for their misinterpretation of Christian charity, the 
only consequence of which will consist, in his view, in a growing 
power of Islam within Western countries. This, he insists, is a 
scenario made plausible if not very probable by the Church itself 
and its choice to grant Muslims places for their „cult‟ without 
realising that „every place given to them becomes a territory of 
Islam‟: a situation which will inevitably cause a deep incurable 
fracture in Italian society (Ibid.).  
    Despite being similar in tone and content, Baget Bozzo‟s letter to 
Bossi cannot be seen as a reaction to Biffi‟s pastoral note which 
was presented to the press a week later. Nevertheless, this 
intervention can be considered as part of that movement, internal to 
the Catholic Church, which has identified immigration as the cause 
of the decline Italian society is supposedly going through. This 
movement produced not only isolated official documents but a 
lively debate which was mirrored in interviews, sermons and 
seminars such as the one organised by pro-immigrant association 
„Migrantes‟ on 30 September 2000, whose main speaker was 
Cardinal Biffi, determined, once again, to remark upon the ideas 
already expressed in his pastoral note. 
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   Interestingly, however, the first reaction to the Dominus Jesus 
and to „La città di San Petronio nel terzo millennio‟ did not come 
from the Church: neither Pope John Paul II nor other members of 
the Catholic hierarchy intervened either to criticise or praise them, 
at least not until a more immediate reaction came from the press 
and from the representatives of other religions. Both documents 
would probably have remained part of an internal discussion if 
Italian newspapers, included Catholic ones, had not reported 
extensively on them. The general impression in analysing these 
articles is a lack of moderate stances, as all interventions, both in 
favour and against Biffi, seem quite radical. Questioned by 
journalists immediately after Biffi‟s press conference, most of the 
Church‟s representatives seemed to strongly support the Cardinal. 
Monsignor Alfredo Maria Garsia, head of the CEI commission for 
immigration, praised the rational criteria elaborated by Biffi to 
allow immigrants into the country. A similar position was adopted 
by Don Oreste Benzi, Cardinal Angelo Sodano, secretary of the 
Vatican State, and Monsignor Francesco Gioia, secretary for the 
„pastoral for migrants and itinerant people‟. The latter, quoting 
from the 1998 pastoral note „La Chiesa di fronte al razzismo. Per 
una società più fraterna‟ (CEI, 1989), focused on the need for 
social justice which is today threatened by certain minorities‟ 
attempts to impose their idea of the good life on a weaker majority 
(Anon., 2000a). 
   If these first interventions were aimed at supporting Biffi‟s 
document without entering into the details of its contents, a more 
theoretical debate started in the pages of the magazine L’Espresso 
on 28 September and developed until the first week of October. 
Throughout this period, the main newspapers addressed the 
contents of Biffi‟s note and its ideological orientation while the 
Pope, without commenting on Biffi‟s ideas, gave a series of 
speeches aimed at promoting the dialogue between different 
cultures, and Prodi took part in the opening of a new Sikh temple 
near Reggio Emilia.  
 122 
   Giovanni Sartori, political scientist, writer and columnist for 
Corriere della Sera, opened the debate from the pages of 
L’Espresso. In his articles, Sartori explained that his first reaction, 
when interviewed immediately after Biffi‟s press conference, was 
to take a distance from the Cardinal‟s words. Nonetheless, having 
read the whole document, the author reconsidered his own position 
while reflecting on how „una fede intelligente sia vicina e 
conciliabile con la intelligenza della ragione‟ (Sartori, 28/09/2000). 
Despite their different preoccupations and priorities – the good 
religion for Biffi and the good society for Sartori – the latter agrees 
with the Cardinal‟s views that the state cannot distinguish between 
immigrants to welcome and immigrants to reject using criteria 
exclusively based on economic convenience or welfare 
requirements. Moreover, he agrees with the idea that the main 
problem with immigration is the presence of Muslims among the 
new arrivals. With specific reference to centre-left minister Livia 
Turco‟s negative reaction to Biffi‟s list of irreconcilable differences 
between „us‟ and  „them‟, and her call for the need to remember not 
only what divides but also what unifies people with different 
beliefs, Sartori reminded Turco that the word „Islam‟ means 
subjection and that the Arabic word for freedom – „homayai‟ – 
only expresses a condition of non–slavery. According to him, 
Biffi‟s depiction of a future scenario in which Islam will prevail is 
correct (Sartori, 2000). Finally, Sartori concluded that Biffi was 
one of the few who followed an ethic of responsibility, a morality 
which takes into account the consequences of our choices, whereas 
many, the Pope among the others, base their judgements on an 
ethic of principles according to which what really counts is the 
intention, and unexpected or negative results can be ignored (Ibid.).  
   On 1 October, Stefano Andini, in his article for L’Avvenire, 
argued that Biffi‟s intervention unveiled worries and thoughts 
which were already implicit and shared by political parties as well 
as common citizens and that the Cardinal managed to raise his 
voice against a spreading hypocrisy. According to him, Biffi was 
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not stepping back from the Church‟s traditional message of 
Christian charity but was simply addressing a real situation. It was 
not by chance, he stated, that this position was shared by 
intellectuals such as Sartori himself, Ernesto Galli della Loggia and 
Giuliano Ferrara who had never been particularly close to the 
official position of the Church. Moreover, he believed that the 
Muslim community was protesting against this document not 
because it was concerned about its members‟ integration into 
Italian society but rather because it could represent an obstacle to 
its claim for more privileges, which it was at that time discussing 
with the government  (Andini, 2000).  
   During the first days of October two articles signed by Leonardo 
Zega and Jenner Meletti, published in the mainstream newspapers 
La Stampa and La Repubblica respectively, focused on the 
impossibility of obtaining the views of any representative of the 
Church on „La città di San Petronio nel terzo millennio‟. After the 
first public reaction immediately after the press conference, the 
Catholic hierarchy seemingly stepped back and refused to comment 
on the polemics and debate raised by the document, insisting that it 
represented an internal discussion. However, they seemed to 
generally support their „colleague‟ Biffi, often inviting the 
journalists to read the document with more attention in order to 
realise that it represented a message of love rather than hatred 
towards „the other‟ (Zega, 2000;  Meletti, 2000).  
   While very few Cardinals, bishops and parish priests, as reported 
by Zega and Meletti, accepted to be interviewed on the subject and 
none of them accepted any of the many invitations to participate in 
TV programmes during the days following Biffi‟s press 
conference, John Paul II decided to speak.  This decision was 
interesting as it came when the discussion was still very heated, 
which is what led many to think he wanted to give his followers a 
clear direction. However, on 1 October, during the Sunday 
Angelus, the Pope talked about Ratzinger‟s Dominus Jesus rather 
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than Biffi‟s pastoral note, despite the fact that the controversy of 
those days was mainly about Biffi‟s view, the Dominus Jesus being 
simply seen as a starting point for a theological legitimation of the 
Church‟s new rhetoric on immigration. Contrary to expectations, 
the Pope never mentioned the Cardinal‟s pastoral note: instead, he 
tried to explain the real meaning of Ratzinger‟s thought. 
Considering Catholicism as the only religion able to reach the truth 
as superior to all other creeds, he stated, does not imply an arrogant 
and discriminatory attitude towards different faiths, towards which 
the Church maintains the respect and love that have always been 
fundamental in its doctrine. Moreover, the Pope remarked upon the 
importance of keeping the dialogue with the others as open and 
sincere as it had been during the few days in September when 
representatives of different churches and states met in Lisbon with 
the aim of promoting an inter-religious dialogue (Anon., 2000h; 
„Anon., 2000a).  
   The day after Biffi‟s press conference on his pastoral note, La 
Padania published an unsigned article on the document, which 
summarised the Cardinal‟s thought. It focused on the need for the 
state to deal with the situation without attributing an inadequate 
responsibility to the Church, as well as on the Church‟s right to 
distinguish between its doctrine, which was based on the already 
mentioned Christian love for the other, and the issues linked to 
social justice that had to be dealt with by the government. La 
Padania insisted on defending Biffi‟s statement that: „alla fine 
vogliamo avere il coraggio di dire che gli unici che non hanno la 
libertà culturale sono i cattolici‟ (Anon., 2000f). This polemical 
statement, which was later on remarked upon by other members of 
the Catholic hierarchy, represents a key concept in the debate on 
immigration and a clear demand on the part of the Church for more 
space in the public sphere, typical of minorities who react to past 
discriminations.  
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   Even though the first reactions of other Church members to 
Ratzinger‟s and Biffi‟s documents tended to be in favour of the 
opinions they expressed, these positions did not represent the 
Church as a whole. It rather seems that, even though most of the 
higher members of the Catholic hierarchy supported the Cardinals, 
nevertheless many priests who worked with Catholic associations 
were critical of these interventions. However, the reaction of these 
associations was not immediate, probably because they were not 
stimulated to speak up by the media, which were more interested in 
the authoritative views of important members of the Catholic 
hierarchy. An exception in this case is represented by Don 
Vitaliano Della Sala, a young priest in the parish of Sant‟ Angelo 
della Scala, close to the social centres and the Seattle anti-global 
movement, who denounced Biffi for incitement to racial hatred. 
According to Della Sala, Biffi‟s statements resulted from a deep 
ignorance of immigrants‟ conditions of life in Italy, as well as on a 
need to build or preserve a particular identity on the basis of a 
constant struggle against an enemy, which in the past was 
Communism and today was represented by immigration and 
particularly Muslim immigration. According to the priest, the 
Church‟s opinion on issues relating to both legal and illegal 
immigrants was quite homogeneous and his voice represented a 
rupture and relatively isolated position in the Catholic mainstream 
position (Anon., 2000b).  
   Della Sala‟s reaction was the strongest, even when compared to 
that of representatives of other religions such as the Waldensian 
theologian Paolo Ricca and the leaders of the Muslim community 
of Bologna Altounji M. Radwan and Daniele Parracino. Ricca had 
intervened on Ratzinger‟s „Nota pastorale sull‟espressione chiese 
sorelle‟ the day after it was released, but did not comment on 
Biffi‟s document which was published a week later, nor did he 
express his opinion later on, when the discussion became of central 
interest in the media. This quiet reaction can be plausibly explained 
with the fact that immigration was not the main concern of the 
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Waldensian community, since most of its members are Italian, and 
therefore did not perceive themselves as the target of the document. 
In his response to Ratzinger‟s note as well as to the Dominus Jesus, 
Ricca defined the latter as in open contradiction with the spirit of 
the Second Vatican Council which, according to him, Rome 
seemed to have forgotten. Moreover, he embarked on a critique of 
the doctrinal contents of the document and claimed the right to 
define the Waldensian community as a Church, basing this right on 
a brief analysis of the Gospel (Ricca, 2000).  
   More concerned with the issue of immigration was the 
declaration of Pallavicini, leader of the CO.RE.IS (Italian Muslim 
Community), who remarked upon the dialogue developed with 
Italian institutions and firmly hoped that documents such as those 
published in September with their insistence on the superiority of 
Catholicism and the danger of immigration would not interfere 
with the ongoing process of mutual understanding between the 
Italian state and the CO.RE.IS.  Despite the quiet tone of his reply 
and his intention to keep the dialogue open, Pallavicini underlined 
the confusion and contradiction in Biffi‟s use of terms such as 
Muslim and immigrants which were not necessarily synonymous. 
This was evident in his own case, since he was the first Italian 
Muslim citizen. Moreover, the CO.RE.IS claimed that the Church‟s 
current attitude towards other religions was in open and clear 
contradiction with the message in favour of a dialogue given by 
Pope John Paul II in 1986 during the inter-religious meeting in 
Assisi (CO.RE.IS, 2000).  
   In a similar fashion, the Muslim community of the city of 
Bologna called for a stop to all the controversies which, as they 
stated, they themselves were not interested in fomenting. Rather, 
they took their chance to thank Romano Prodi and Livia Turco for 
their support for the Muslim cause (Anon., 2000c; Anon., 2000d). 
Indeed, Prodi and Turco were among the few politicians who, 
immediately after the publication of Biffi‟s pastoral note, 
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intervened to reassert the laity of the state as a fundamental trait of 
contemporary democracies in general and of Italy in particular. 
Romano Prodi intervened in the debate the day after Biffi had 
criticised, among other things, those Catholics who held positions 
of leadership in the country. The Cardinal had attacked them for 
their lack of commitment in supporting their Church and their 
attitude in ignoring what, in his view, was happening in Italy, 
which he summed up as „è impossibile praticare il cristianesimo in 
Italia‟ (Ibid.).  
   Prodi never mentioned the Cardinal directly while taking part in a 
ceremony for the opening of a Sikh temple in Novellara, not far 
from Bologna, on the 1
st
 of October 2000. Rather, he referred to 
Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, whose position on immigration was 
diametrically opposed to Biffi‟s. Indeed Prodi, quoting Martini, 
remarked upon the importance of values such as difference, 
coexistence and pluralism and stated that „una società che non sia 
pluralistica e multietnica […] è destinata a chiudersi‟ (Anon.,  
2000e). Moreover, Prodi stated that in Europe all citizens have the 
same rights, regardless of their condition of immigrants, as long as 
they respect the law: thus Italy could be the home of everyone who 
worked for a „harmonic coexistence‟, as Martini defined it. The 
opening of the Sikh temple – with the participation of a 
representative of the Muslim community, Professor Mahmoud 
Salem Elsheilch - had also been an occasion to talk about the law 
on freedom of religion presented by Prodi on 3 July 1997 and under 
the Parliament‟s scrutiny in those days.  
   After this first outburst, the Catholic representatives waited for 
the situation to calm down before intervening again. It is interesting 
to note that the whole discussion started suddenly, developed 
vehemently with a cross fire of articles, press conferences, counter-
reactions and declined quietly all within a period of two weeks, 
after which things seemed to be back to normal and the „incident‟ 
was forgotten.  
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   The obvious question concerns the reasons why this happened, 
why all the documents which created the controversy were written 
in the same month and why after the first reactions aimed at 
denouncing this „clash of civilisations‟ the debate faded away. 
There are two main logical answers to this question. First, the 
origin of the whole discussion was without doubt Ratzinger‟s 
Dominus Jesus, which opened a new era for the Church, as it 
became less concerned with „political correctness‟ and more 
determined to raise its voice, a determination probably facilitated 
by the spreading awareness of a progressive decline of Catholicism, 
as openly recognized by both Ratzinger and Biffi. Moreover, 
Ratzinger‟ point of view, which has always been decisive for the 
Church‟s official positions on certain issues, started to emerge 
more openly despite being seemingly far from the Pope‟s 
perspective on the same themes. I argue that what made it possible 
for Ratzinger to speak the way he did about the superiority of the 
Catholic Church was precisely his awareness of the role of John 
Paul II as the paladin of dialogue between different religions. The 
idea of brotherhood promoted by the Pope through inter-religious 
meetings and marches, and his interpretation of difference as 
enriching and, not least, his personality and attitude towards his 
followers made it easier for Ratzinger to use a different tone. This 
chapter argues that it is precisely because of this more open attitude 
towards immigration that Ratzinger could take a different role in 
the debate. It also has to be said that the Curch had always relied on 
Ratzinger‟s knowledge and theological rigour in the redefinition of 
the Catholic doctrine and its adjustment to different historical and 
political times. In a certain sense, the Cardinal‟s cold and rational 
approach was moderated by the Pope‟s personal charisma. It could 
be said that Ratzinger‟s intervention gave an indication of how the 
Church‟s positions on certain issues would have been much more 
radical if he had been the Pope, as confirmed after his ascention to 
the Papal throne.  
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   A second hypothesis to explain why the debate exploded so 
suddenly in the autumn of 2000, and as rapidly faded a few months 
later, can be linked to the fact that 2000 was the Jubilee year, and 
therefore an important occasion for the Church to celebrate 
Catholicism and somehow re-launch it. As proven by the 
documents previously analysed, the Catholic hierarchy seemed 
aware of a progressive „calo di tensione‟, as Biffi defined it, 
meaning a decline, at least in terms of active participation of the 
followers. The Jubilee could then represent, or had to represent, a 
chance to remind Italians of their Catholic origins and their natural 
and traditional belonging to Christianity. This call for a return to 
tradition was based on different strategies. As mentioned above, if 
Wojtyla‟s role as Pope was that of the father (or the grand father as 
he had been defined during the various World Youth Days), 
Ratzinger had the more difficult role of the theologian, whose duty 
was that of clearing away theoretical misunderstanding and 
clarifying the implications of the dogma, regardless of the 
consequence this activity could bring. Ratzinger‟s speech can be 
seen as part of this strategy, which often seems to be based on a 
constant warning of the danger represented by the other. In this 
sense, as the rebel parish priest who spoke against Biffi argued, the 
Church always had to define itself against an enemy, previously 
Communism and today immigration. 
   To conclude, it has to be said that, despite the clear turn in the 
Church‟s rhetoric on otherness, and despite the lack of open 
criticism of Biffi‟s pastoral note and Ratzinger‟s Dominus Jesus, a 
brief overview of the post-2000 interventions on immigration on 
the part of the Curch shows that both Pope John Paul II and the CEI 
have maintained their traditional attitude of openness towards the 
newly arrived.  In November 2004 indeed, bishop Lino Bortolo 
Belotti, president of the „Commissione Episcopale per le 
migrazioni‟, authored the official message for the 91st „Giornata 
Mondiale per le migrazioni‟, entitled „Il mondo come casa: dalla 
diffidenza all‟accoglienza‟. The document established for the first 
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time the link between Italian emigration since 1914 and the arrival 
of „migliaia di uomini, donne, bambini pronti ad affrontare viaggi 
costosi e pericolosi per raggiungere il “sognato paradiso terrestre” 
delle terre europee‟ (CEI, 2004: 1). Citing the gospel, it remarked 
upon the need to look at the immigrant „con benevolenza, con 
simpatia, come vicino, come persona umana quindi portatrice di 
valori e ricchezze, non come straniero, non come potenziale 
nemico, come sembra guardarlo la legge, o come incomodo da 
allontanare, ma come membro di un‟unica grande famiglia i cui 
legami sono destinati a essere sempre più stretti e costruttivi‟ 
(Ibid.). Leaving aside for a moment the criticism directed at the 
laws on immigration, what is interesting in this document is that it 
seemed to focus on specific categories of immigrants, among them 
those of Rom and Sinti, „spesso oggetto di scherno‟. However, it 
referred exclusively to those immigrants who are only temporarily 
present in the territory as, for instance, „fieranti e circensi‟, or „gli 
addetti alle navi da trasporto o da crociera‟. In this sense, despite 
the welcoming spirit behind the document, grouping the Rom and 
the Sinti with other groups characterised by a nomadic lifestyle 
seems quite a superficial generalisation, since the presence of Rom 
and Sinti communities in Italy dates back as far as the XIII century 
and many of their members are Italian citizens, and therefore they 
cannot be compared to temporary migrants. Moreover, if Rom and 
Sinti have often been at the centre of heated debates on „the other‟, 
this has not been the case for the other categories taken into 
account by the CEI. Grouping together these very different 
categories of migrants under the label of „temporary‟ has the only 
effect of promoting tolerance for those who are simply passing 
through the country, who incidentally are far less discriminated 
against than those who decided to set permanently in Italy. As the 
next chapter will show, the immigrants who are looked at with 
suspicion and who are marginalised more within the Italian  society 
are those perceived as a threat precisely because of their intention 
to settle in the country for good. This mechanism of temporary 
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sympathy or tolerance for passer-by immigrants has proved quite 
dangerous, as for instance in the case of Albanians, welcomed at 
their arrival and discriminated against once  it became clear that 
they intended to stay and start a new life in Italy, as Chapter V will 
highlight.  In this sense, even if the document signed by Belotti 
explicitly encouraged Italians to welcome these immigrants and 
therefore implicitly distanced itself from positions such as those 
expressed by Biffi and Ratzinger, somehow it plays with a fake 
problem, and therefore can be considered as more welcoming only 
in its intentions and its general rhetoric. Moreover, even if it 
seemed to protect Rom and Sinti, it actually does not do them a 
favour as it presents them as temporary and therefore to be 
temporarily welcomed rather than methodically integrated. In this 
sense, these immigrants have to be loved and treated according to 
Christian charity in everyday life but no debate is opened on their 
long-term presence and need/right to integrate. However, it is 
important to anticipate that the CEI did stand against active 
discrimination when the Bossi-Fini and the „security package‟ laws 
were passed in 2002 and 2008 respectively, as will be explained in 
Chapter IV. 
   The case of Pope John Paul II is quite different and provides an 
example of that welcoming rhetoric based on the importance of the 
dialogue, which allowed Ratzinger to assume a more radical 
position, as mentioned earlier. John Paul II intervened officially on 
the theme of immigration in 2004, with a message written for the 
„Giornata Mondiale del Migrante Rifugiato‟. The document focuses 
on the integration of the newly arrived intended not as an 
assimilation which neglects the specific cultural identity of the 
immigrants, nor as a marginalisation which could lead to a situation 
of apartheid. According to Pope John Paul II integration is „una 
maggiore conoscenza di ciascuno. E‟un processo prolungato che 
mira a formare società e culture [...] Il migrante, in tale processo, è 
impegnato a compiere i passi necessari all‟inclusione sociale, quali 
l‟apprendimento della lingua nazionale e il proprio adeguamento 
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alle leggi e alle esigenze del lavoro, così da evitare il crearsi di una 
differenza esasperata‟ (John Paul II, 2004). The document also 
remarks upon the conflicts created by the coexistence of different 
identities, which can only be resolved by finding the „giusto 
equilibrio tra il rispetto dell‟identità propria e il riconoscimento di 
quella altrui‟. The solution put forward by the old Pope was that of 
promoting an open dialogue „fra uomini di culture diverse in un 
contesto di pluralismo che vada oltre la semplice tolleranza e 
giunga alla simpatia‟. Finally, the Pope agreed with Ratzinger‟s 
belief that „Se coerenti con se stessi i Cristiani non possono poi 
rinunziare a predicare il Vangelo di Cristo ad ogni creatura (cfr 
Mc15,15). Lo devono fare, ovviamente, nel rispetto della coscienza 
altrui‟ (John Paul II, 2004).   
   To a certain extent, it can be said that the new position of the 
Church on the issue of immigration, marked by Ratzinger‟s 
Dominus Jesus and Biffi‟s pastoral note set an important precedent 
and contributed to legitimising an exclusionary rhetoric later 
exploited by Right-wing political parties such as the Northern 
League. However, it is not possible to consider the Church as a 
united front lined against immigration. Solidarity and openness 
towards the immigrants have been occasionally expressed by 
institutions such as the CEI and by the Pope himself even after 
2000, regardless of the fact that they were overshadowed in the 
debate by the more radical anti-immigrants interventions.  
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6. Conclusion  
The analysis of the interventions on the part of the Catholic 
hierarchy in the debate on immigration shows a new trend in the 
Church‟s attitude towards the newly arrived. For decades and until 
2000 the Church‟s reaction towards immigrants had always been 
inspired by Christian charity according to which others had to be 
loved, welcomed and possibly helped in their needs, an official 
position noted in the documents and pastoral notes on immigration 
written until the end of the 1990s. Ratzinger‟s Dominus Jesus and 
Biffi‟s pastoral note represent a dramatic turn in the Church‟s 
rhetoric on identity and immigration. Through the account of the 
transformation undertaken by mainstream religions since the late 
1980s, this chapter has tried to frame this new attitude within the 
struggle of churches seeking to overcome an acknowledged decline 
and (re)gain power.  In the case of the Italian Catholic Church, the 
first step in this new strategy was to claim for recognition of 
Catholicism as superior to other beliefs, which are defined as mere 
„ways of life‟ based on empirical experience or even worse simply 
on superstition. The documents analysed argue that every human 
being provided with rationality necessarily has to be Catholic. 
Despite the fact that the syllogism is based on a non-demonstrable 
and non self-evident premise, the final equation identifies all 
Italians with Catholics. The battle fought by the Church becomes 
then a battle which has to be supported by the whole nation, since, 
according to Cardinal Biffi and Cardinal Ratzinger, it is not only 
the Church but Italian identity as well which is threatened.   
    Both Ratzinger and Biffi argue that the only duty of the Church 
is evangelisation: this process of enlightenment, they claim, is 
made today particularly difficult, if not impossible, by the „false 
tolerance‟ typical of our societies. The idea that different 
interpretations of the good life can be attributed equal value results 
in an aggressive attitude on the part of non-Catholic individuals and 
groups towards the Church. Hence the latter is portrayed as a 
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victim and the only subject to whom the right of freedom of speech 
is denied or whose freedom of expression is defined by others as 
integralist and intolerant. Having re-defined itself against the other, 
the Muslim enemy, and its role as a victim, the Church appropriates 
the strategy typical of traditional minorities, which consists in a 
dual demand to the state for a positive freedom (being given more 
space in the public sphere) and a negative one (denying other 
groups the same right). According to the literature on identity and 
otherness, minorities claim protection from the state in the name of 
past discriminations. The Church, in a diametrically opposite way, 
carries on these requests in the name of its glorious role in the past 
of the country. At a time when it seems to be struggling against an 
openly recognised decline in popularity, Islam is invoked to gain 
visibility and confirm a privileged role within the country.  
    Despite the fact that the Church‟s main interest is not the arrival 
of foreigners with different cultures and religions, its contribution 
to the debate on immigration is of central importance. In filling the 
gaps left in the public discussion by the lack of participation of 
Italian intellectuals and by the still confused position of the 
political class, the Church emerged as a leading voice on the theme, 
as can be proved by the analysis of its interventions particularly 
during the autumn of 2000, year of the Jubilee. In this sense, it 
followed a mechanism which, in the last three decades, all 
mainstream religious groups in Europe and in the USA have 
followed, namely presenting themselves as „global pastors‟, neutral 
state consultants on ethical matters, which now also include 
immigration. In order to acquire this new role and start a dialogue 
with the government, the Catholic Church has developed new 
communication strategies, based on a language and rhetoric which 
privilege terms linked with human rights rather than the gospel.     
    As this chapter tried to prove, despite its acknowledgement of 
the need to distinguish between the responsibilities of the state and 
its own, the Church also put forward practical solutions to deal with 
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the situation, proving very influential in the state‟s decision-making 
in matters related to immigration, particularly since Ratzinger‟s 
ascent to the Papal Throne. Even though controversial, „rational 
selection‟ based on Catholicism as a guarantee for a smoother 
assimilation promoted by Biffi represents one of the few clear and 
coherent criteria set until now.  
   While enabling a rhetoric of disengagement, the Church 
seemingly aims at replacing the state by granting immigrants 
citizenship, following a principle of „selective solidarity‟ according 
to which all immigrants have to be loved but only those who are 
ready to abandon their own religious identity to embrace 
Catholicism can become Italian.  More than a call for integration, 
this solution seems to be a call for the need to assimilate different 
cultures and religions and to reduce them to a state where religion 
and nationality coincide. Such a system could only work in a 
theocratic state, where the Church would have the power to allocate 
rights such as that of citizenship and whose realisation probably 
represents what the Church aspires to in the future. This theocratic 
state, where being Catholic would coincide with being Italian and 
vice versa, would not be much different from what the Catholic 
hierarchy defines as the integralist Muslim idea of the identification 
of religion and state.  
   Finally, as Chapter III will argue, the Church‟s strategy is very 
similar to that of the Northern League, which probably represents 
the only other strong voice in the contemporary debate, even 
though following different premises and aiming at different results. 
As a consequence, the Church‟s response to immigration, based on 
a recurrent use of terms such as foreigner and citizen, Catholic and 
Italian, Muslim and immigrant as well as its constructed dual role 
as victim but also as a point of reference for the country, 
contributed to increase public anxiety and shared concerns. As 
explained earlier, the Italian Catholic Church had also the 
advantage of being close to Rome, a position that, as argued by 
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Vallier, made it easier and almost natural to „serve political ends‟. 
In this sense, its rhetoric of identity and immigration, supported by 
other political actors, indirectly provided the state with widespread 
support for its restrictive policies, as will be analysed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter III 
The Northern League and the debate on identity and 
immigration. 
 
„La Lega, alla radice delle sue origini, è anzitutto una condizione 
dell‟anima‟ 
 (Francesco Valsecchi, Alle radici di una protesta, 1997) 
 
1. Introduction 
The rise to power of the „leghe autonomiste‟ and particularly that 
of the Northern League can be seen as the most relevant change in 
the political scenario of post-war Italy. Since the early 1990s, the 
leagues have marked a season of new political and electoral trends 
within Italian society. Their success can be attributed mainly to 
their ability to interpret, from a new perspective, political issues 
based on the traditional conflicts within the country: from the 
North/South divide, to the public versus private debate, to the lack 
of communication between civil society and political parties 
(Diamanti, 1993: VII).  
   Since its advent on the national political scene, countless 
definitions of the Northern League have been formulated in an 
attempt to explain its origins as well as the conditions which made 
possible its progressive and often unexpected rise to power. From a 
condition of the soul, to an expression of thoughts already 
discussed in every Northern family before the League‟s advent, to a 
movement of rupture, to an anti-party protest, the League and the 
many leagues incorporated into it, with their contradictions and 
changes of strategy, have been investigated in depth by scholars 
such as Biorcio, Diamanti, Moiolo, Cartocci, Rusconi, Cento Bull 
and others. 
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   This work does not intend to engage with the now extensive 
literature on the several factors which brought the League to 
national attention, its origins and electoral growth nor does it aim to 
investigate its ideology in exhaustive terms. It will only mention 
the conditions under which the party was created,  the implications 
of its growing electoral success and its main interests in order to 
provide a general background for the analysis of a specific issue 
deriving from its position on identity: that of immigration. The 
investigation of the League‟s perspective on immigration and 
(sub)national identity requires an analysis of the central values on 
which these positions are based, and of the rhetoric used to put 
these views forward in the national debate. To a certain extent, this 
chapter will mirror the structure of the previous one. It will start 
with a brief account of the origins and rise to power of autonomist 
leagues in the 1980s and their merging into a unitary party a decade 
later. It will then investigate the shifts in aims and strategy of the 
Northern League, particularly since the invention of Padania, and 
its influence in the ongoing process of identity building in the 
Northern regions of the country. While leaving aside a more 
detailed analysis of the League‟s electoral results and its 
transformations, the chapter will summarise the different 
definitions of the party provided by scholars, focusing particularly 
on the theoretical and pragmatic reasons for its distinctive attitude 
to immigration. It will also ask whether this attitude has changed 
since the advent to power of the League as well as the reasons 
behind this hypothetical shift.  
   In order to provide a clear picture of how the phenomenon of 
immigration is perceived by the party‟s leader and its followers, the 
chapter will take as a case study the interviews, editorials and 
letters which have appeared in the Northern League‟s official 
website, which are for the most part extracted from articles 
published in the party‟s daily newspaper La Padania in the last few 
years. It will then introduce its ambiguous relationship with the 
Church, arguing that both  pay a particular attention to certain key 
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concepts such as freedom of speech, solidarity, multiculturalism, 
integration and traditional identities. They also share an original 
rhetoric based in both cases on the critique of what they perceive as 
the supposed hypocrisy resulting from political correctness. Despite 
what this chapter will define as a conflictual and often 
opportunistic relationship, and despite a radical difference in their 
declared aims, these two political actors, albeit moved by diverse 
concerns, contribute to push the government‟s reactions towards 
immigration in the same direction, as this analysis will attempt to 
prove.  
   This investigation shows how, despite the leghisti‟s constant 
reassurance that they are not racist and that they support values 
such as solidarity, the message their interventions conveys seems to 
go in the opposite direction. It appears that the League  influenced, 
if not inspired, the government‟s restrictive policies towards 
immigration and even more that it created a public which, moved 
by irrational fears, demands such measures. Finally and most 
importantly, this works intends to frame the attitude of the 
Northern League to immigration into a theoretical model, which 
will be referred to as an „institutionalised state of exception‟. My 
interpretation will stress the immigrant‟s resignation to a status of 
„permanent transitoriness‟ and a role as „homo sacer‟ as the only 
condition for being at least temporarily tolerated (integration is not 
even contemplated) following a process of „intermittent 
conditioned selection‟ on which s/he has no control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
2. Ethnic identities in the era of globalisation   
At the time of its first appearance on the national political scene, in 
the late 1980s, the Northern League was seen by opinion makers 
and political opponents as a marginal movement with scarce 
influence on the electorate and was often neglected if not ridiculed 
as a folkloristic manifestation of local demands and mostly 
irrelevant for the majority of the country. When, in the early 1990s, 
it became clear that the new party was gaining visibility and had 
the power and the popular support to influence Italian political life, 
many scholars, such as Biorcio, Diamanti and Cartocci, started 
warning the political class of the danger of underestimating this 
ambitious and unconventional new political contender.  
   In his La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia di un nuovo 
soggetto politico (1993), Diamanti, a pioneer in this field, stated 
that the topic of the rise to power of the Northern League was still 
relatively obscure. Moreover, he argued, the attitude of other 
parties‟ representatives and of opinion makers who often 
underestimated the role of this „movimento di rottura‟ did not 
contribute to opening a debate on a phenomenon that many had 
defined as absolutely unique (Diamanti, 1993). Not only Diamanti, 
but scholars such as Tambini and Cachafeiro as well remarked 
upon the need to consider the Northern League as a complex and 
nuanced political phenomenon in terms of origins, electoral growth 
and aims. According to them, an accurate analysis of the party had 
to start from the acknowledgment of the fact that Umberto Bossi‟s 
League is not a single-aim party but is rather characterised by 
multiple objectives which keep changing and developing constantly 
(Diamanti, 1993; Tambini, 2001; Cachafeiro, 2002).  
   As Giovanni De Luna recalls, the Liga Veneta, commonly 
defined as „the mother of all leagues‟, took its first steps at the end 
of the 1970s, a time which was characterised by the decline of 
those social movements that, a decade earlier, had contributed to 
promoting the values of community, solidarity and civil 
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consciousness. New claims started emerging from the ashes of that 
„grande utopia egualitaria‟, which had marked a period of 
commitment towards communitarian shared ideals (De Luna, 1994: 
24). This decline opened a new season of less ideologically 
oriented claims, which had their roots in individualistic and mainly 
material interests. In post-industrial Italy, the fragmentation and 
decentralisation of the main industries had brought about a shift 
from a unitary representation of workers, for instance in opposition 
to factory owners, towards a more pluralistic scenario in which 
„l‟unicità viene sostituita dalla pluralità, la concentrazione dalla 
disseminazione‟ (De Luna, 1994: 24). The crisis faced by industrial 
committees, workers‟ associations, women and proletarian 
movements marked the end of the traditional opposition between 
genders as well as between work and capital, which had provided 
until then a clear means of representation and had contributed to 
shaping recognisable and socially accepted – albeit antagonistic – 
identities. Social conflicts stopped becoming politicised, while 
politics began to aim at finding legitimation in itself and its 
mechanisms. According to De Luna, this passage from solidarity to 
selfishness can only be explained by referring to the categories of 
„victory‟ and „defeat‟, since the movements emerging in the 1980s 
would not have had a chance to prevail without sweeping away 
those which had preceded them. It was in these circumstances that 
the fluxes of communication were interrupted, ideas started losing 
fluidity and became stiff and entrapped in fixed schemes leaving 
space for the widespread distrust and selfishness which became „a 
common practise‟ in the 1980s and particularly after the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 which officially marked the decline of 
Communism and one of its main agents in Europe: the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) (De Luna, 1994: 25).  
   De Luna focuses on the crisis of Italian post-industrial society 
and the decline of the Communist Party in the late 1980s in order to 
explain the loss of identification with a community and/or a social 
class and the fracture between the social and political spheres, 
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while other authors also look at the other Italian popular-party – the 
DC (Democrazia Cristiana) the Italian Christian Democratic Party - 
in order to explain the origins of this new era of selfishness and 
individualism. Cachafeiro, Diamanti and Cartocci consider the role 
that the DC played in the crumbling of the Italian party system, and 
the subsequent loss of identity and feeling of bewilderment on the 
part of citizens, a factor that acquires a particular relevance in the 
light of the fact that the Northern League has proved more 
successful in those regions where the „white subculture‟ was 
traditionally stronger (Cachafeiro, 1994; Diamanti, 1993; Cartocci, 
1994). As Cartocci argues, even though the level of trust in 
traditional mass parties in Italy seemed to stay stable during the 
1980s, this was quite a fragile equilibrium based on the attitude of 
voters to grant parties a „voto di appartenenza‟, that is to say, a vote 
motivated by the belonging to a well defined group and adherence 
to specific values traditionally promoted by a party characterised 
by a strong ideology. This type of vote was destined to be replaced 
by the so-called „voto di scambio‟, an instrumental and volatile 
vote granted to a party on the basis of possible advantages deriving 
from it (Cartocci, 1994: 91), whereas a vote based on a free choice 
on the part of citizens fully informed on the different options and 
free from ideological prejudices represents a „voto di opinione‟ 
(Parisi and Pasquino, 1977: 215-239). The final blow to the already 
troubled Italian party system arrived in 1992 with the „mani pulite‟ 
police investigation into parties‟ corruption, which, as already 
mentioned in this chapter, resulted in the disappearance of 
mainstream political parties and in the end of the First Republic.  
   The 1980s were characterised by radical protest by the core 
regions of Northern Italy demanding to be recognised as „different‟ 
and „special‟ on the basis of their ethnic specificity, a request which 
left scholars „puzzled‟ (Cachafeiro, 2002: 45). Indeed, as 
Cachafeiro explains, there is academic agreement on two facts: that 
the North cannot be considered as ethnically homogeneous, and 
that a protest such as that which took place in those years did not 
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come from peripheral areas of the country as might have been 
expected, but from the more economically advanced regions of 
Piedmont, Veneto and Lombardy (Ibid: 46). 
As Romanelli explains, since the 1960s the rapid economic growth 
and the extent of state intervention in social matters put the need to 
organise more functional local governments at the centre of public 
discussion, a debate which led to the creation of „ordinary regions‟ 
(Romanelli, 1995).   Putnam (1993), Cachafeiro (1994) and 
Kitshelt and McGann (1995) agree in identifying the creation of 
partially independent local governments as the reason for the 
protest of Northern regions seeking recognition as special. In the 
1980s, this claim did in fact come from the so-called „ordinary 
regions‟ despite their internal lack of ethnic and cultural difference 
(Cachafeiro, 2002: 45).  
    If this request left sociologists and political experts „puzzled‟, as 
Cachafeiro put it, they considered even less understandable the fact 
that these claims were justified on the basis of specific ethnic 
identities and linguistic minorities. The only linguistic minorities in 
Italy are represented by the German-speaking population of South-
Tyrol, the French-speaking inhabitants of Valle D‟Aosta and the 
Slavic minority groups who live close to the border with ex-
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the protection of a linguistic idiom 
supposedly shared by most regions in the North of the country, 
seemingly represented the main concern of these new movements 
whose ideology combined Ethnism and „Thirdworldism‟, defined 
as „political discourse of internal colonialism in European states‟ 
(Cachafeiro, 2002: 46). Since the late 1970s, this rhetoric of 
internal colonialism and Thirdworldism, based on the concepts of 
oppression and victimhood exploited by the League, had become a 
common means to put forward claims of independence and self-
determination in many other European countries, following the 
process of de-colonisation of the 1960s (Ibid: 58). 
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   Even though the creation of „ordinary regions‟ is clearly not the 
only or indeed the main reason behind the birth of these 
movements, it nevertheless contributed to put the stress on the 
importance of territory as a means to gain recognition and show 
antagonism and disillusionment towards the political system. 
According to Diamanti, the concept of territory as a source of 
identity is indeed of central importance in providing an explanation 
for a new type of local identity based upon specific interests within 
a local economic and social context. Moreover, it also contributes 
to the shaping of an „anti-identity‟, as it allows members to 
distinguish between them and the other, the enemy: in the case of 
Italy, this dichotomy historically applied to the North-South divide 
and to the difficult relationship between the centre and the 
periphery. In this respect nationalism, federalism, regionalism and 
other theoretical models to define identity come precisely from 
these diverse interpretations of the idea of territory (Diamanti, 
1993: 14).  Diamanti also explained how the Northern League had 
been able to manipulate the ambiguity of the idea of territory in 
order to achieve its own goals. In his view, the party managed to 
translate all its claims into territorial issues, from fiscal federalism, 
to the opposition to traditional political parties, from the call for 
protection of a linguistic/cultural minority to the anti-immigrants 
rhetoric (Ibid.: 6).   
Moreover, the League became visible at a time which saw in all 
European countries the passage from traditional to modern 
societies, a process characterised by two main trends: secularisation 
and globalisation. As Cento Bull explains, this shift was often 
connoted by the tension between a set of dichotomies representing 
old and new values and ways of interpreting life. The first 
antagonistic attitudes she identifies are those of „individualism‟ as 
opposed to „localism‟: in this sense the local dimension of life and 
the close ties with the family work as a „„filter‟ through which 
external „modernising‟ cultural and social influences are mitigated 
and even neutralised‟ (Cento Bull, 2000: 11). Moreover, the new 
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political and social climate in some Northern provinces of the 
country also contributed to creating a new model of associationism, 
characterised by horizontal connections established through 
rational choice rather than resulting from ascriptive characteristics. 
Secularisation played a central role in this tense process of 
modernisation since religious values usually linked to conservative, 
non-liberal attitudes started being challenged by secularist values 
typical of modern societies, characterised by those individualist 
attitudes held responsible for instance for the demise of the DC. 
According to Cento Bull, while in Europe „administratively unitary 
states […] developed class-based cleavages in the course of the 
industrialisation process, but also shed locally – and regionally –
based subcultures, in Italy the traditional sub-culture weakened but 
did not disappear in the post-war period (Cento Bull, 2000:12). If 
the voting behaviour in traditional societies was determined by the 
orientation of family and friends and bounded to loyalty towards a 
precise set of values and a well defined sense of belonging, in 
modern societies the vote is supposedly freed from these 
constrictions, becomes individualistic and based on rational choice. 
Finally, in modern societies voting behaviour is also supposedly 
not influenced by the different territorial and/or class political 
subcultures (Cento Bull, 2000:13).  However, the non-linear pattern 
of modernisation in the areas previously dominated by the white 
subculture can also explain the rise to power of a new type of 
territorial party following the demise of Christian Democracy. 
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3. From local movement to national party: a brief account of 
the League’s rise to power  
While most scholars start their investigations into „leghismo‟ from 
the first electoral successes of the Northern League in the early 
1990s, others and particularly Cachafeiro and Diamanti include in 
their accounts different local protest movements, which were born 
at least a decade before Bossi‟s League, in order to show where the 
latter originates from as well as which elements of its predecessors 
it dropped and which ones it retained (Cachafeiro, 2000; Diamanti, 
1993). The rise to power of the political actor that established itself 
as the third national political party in the 2008 elections (Battaglia, 
2008) has its roots in the many leagues and movements which 
started claiming recognition by and independence from the Italian 
state in the 1970s. Back in those days, many much more 
fragmented and less structured leagues voiced local protests in 
„peripherical‟ areas of Northern Italy. Ethno-territorial political 
claims started emerging from the contradiction represented by the 
core regions‟ resentment towards the state due to their perceived 
economic marginalisation. Ethnicity, even invented, became then a 
„principle of legitimacy for the acquisition of rights in the Italian 
state‟ (Cachafeiro, 2002:47). 
   This new trend in Italian politics arose from a European ethnic 
wave of political mobilisation which took off in the late 1960s and 
kept growing in the following decade, creating a „category of 
practice‟ – namely that of self-determination based on ethnic 
difference – which provided European sub-regions with a relevant 
criterion to put forward claims of „speciality‟ (Cachafeiro, 2002: 
47). Born already as a movement  in the 1950s, ethnism grew 
increasingly popular in the 1960s and 1970s, which saw a renewed 
interest in national minorities and the creation of institutions such 
as CIEMEN (Centro Internazionale Escarrè per la Minoranze 
Etniche e Nazionali), aimed at granting representation to those 
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groups that perceived themselves as „colonised‟ by the nation states 
emerging from World War II.  
   Piedmont had already expressed its autonomist claims in 1952 
with the creation of the Movimento Autonomista Regione Piemonte 
(Cachafeiro, 2002: 49). More organisations were to follow soon, 
even though they only established themselves as political actors 
relevant at a national level about two decades later. Particularly, 
„the mother of all leagues‟, as Liga Veneta‟s leader Franco 
Rocchetta defined it, represents the precursor of this new trend in 
Italian regional politics as it was the first one to organise itself in a 
movement in the 1970s, and later on in a party, and to give the 
general dissatisfaction of Northern industrial areas a more 
structured form. As Cachafeiro explains, in the 1980s in the region 
of Veneto economic transformation took place in parallel with a 
profound change in politics as well. After two decades of industrial 
growth which had reshaped the urban landscape of the area, the 
region became a highly productive zone strongly oriented towards 
a new economy based on exports, at the same time as the crisis 
experienced by traditional mass parties in the area started becoming 
increasingly more evident. Veneto had in particular always been a 
stronghold of the Christian Democratic Party and, consequently, of 
the Catholic Church and its subculture (Cachafeiro, 2002: 58). Not 
only did the Venetian leaders of the DC lose their privileged roles 
within the party at a national level (Pansa, 1986) but the growing 
process of secularisation of Italian society also contributed to the 
erosion of loyalty towards the old party and to the rise to power of 
the Liga Veneta, officially born in 1980 (Diamanti, 1993). At the 
same time, the spontaneous movements of protest in Piedmont 
started converging into a more structured organisation claiming 
recognition of ethnic difference. The Movimento Autonomista 
Rinascita Piemonteisa (later Union Piemonteisa) was born in 1980 
under the leadership of Roberto Gremmo. In Lombardy the protest 
underwent the same process and Lega Autonomista Lombarda, 
destined to rise to the national political scene under the leadership 
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of Umberto Bossi, was officially launched in 1980-1 (Cachafeiro, 
2002: 64).  
   Moving from the chronology of the development of the leagues 
to the analysis of the geography of the vote, scholars form Cartocci 
(1994) to Diamanti (1993), from Cento Bull and Gilbert (2001) to 
Cachafeiro (2002) seem to agree on the fact that the Northern 
League has proved more successful in achieving electoral 
consensus in the industrial districts of those Northern regions, 
whose economy is based on family-run factories and small 
industries and where the DC had traditionally been the most 
powerful party in terms of support and identification. In his 
analysis of voting patterns in Northern provinces, Diamanti 
identified three main areas of influence: the first coincides with the 
provinces of Piedmont, such as Turin, Vercelli and Cuneo; the 
second one is represented by the core of Veneto and included 
Vicenza, Treviso and Verona, while the third area covers Northern 
Lombardy with the cities of Bergamo, Varese and Como 
(Diamanti, 1993: 30). Considering these areas, the sphere of 
influence of the leagues included the whole of the Northern 
regions, with the exception of the cities of Milan and Pavia, where 
its presence was not yet relevant. (Ibid.).  
   An analysis of the electoral trends shows a certain continuity and 
internal consistency to the extent that the leagues‟ uniform 
presence in these territories resulted in the creation of a new sub-
culture comparable to the red/communist one and the 
white/Christian Democratic one which were prevalent until the late 
1980s. The League succeeded in creating a strong feeling of 
belonging shared by a considerable number of citizens within the 
boundaries of the regions mentioned above. Moreover, this new 
sub-culture seemed not only to replace the white one but to show a 
high degree of continuity with it, a fact confirmed by the increasing 
electoral decline of the DC in the areas of growth of the Northern 
League (Diamanti, 1993: 35).   
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4. A racist party? 
Until today there have been many attempts to define the Northern 
League and to channel its claims, contradictions, changes of 
strategy and shifts in priorities into a coherent interpretation. If 
scholars such as Cachafeiro and Diamanti identified ethno-
regionalism and nationalism as the most appropriate framework to 
understand the early days of the movement, others such as Biorcio 
(1997) and Diani (1996) focused more on the anti-system instances 
of what they saw primarily as a populist party.  Besides the various 
definitions, Bossi‟s party has generally been labelled as racist by 
political opponents and opinion makers: whether interpreted 
according to the theoretical frameworks of populism or ethno-
regionalism or nationalism, all these definitions have generally 
been associated with a fundamental xenophobic attitude. The 
recurrent use of a provocative and not at all politically correct 
language, described by Roberto Iacopini and Stefania Bianchi in 
their La Lega ce l’ha crudo (1994), contributed to spreading the 
idea that being „leghista‟ involved, among other things, a refusal of 
„the other‟. This meant Southerners in the first instance and then 
foreign immigrants but also gays, drug addicts, and all subjects 
generically described as „weak‟ members of society.  
   Three of the characteristics attributed to the party are particularly 
relevant for the analysis of the League‟s position on the issues of 
identity and otherness. The first one is the concept of territory and 
its role in creating what De Winter and Tursan (1998) call  „an 
exclusive group identity‟, albeit an invented one (Cento Bull and 
Gilbert, 2001: 56). The second one is the category of nationalism 
applied to the League by scholars such as Tambini (2001) and 
Melucci (1985) and, particularly, nationalism intended as a political 
strategy, a way of doing politics rather than an analytic concept or, 
in other words, an inauthentic posture functional to the 
achievement of specific goals (Breuilly, 1992; Brubaker, 1992).  
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Both interpretations can prove useful to understand the role and 
authenticity of the party‟s discourse on immigration vis-à-vis 
identity, and the shift in the definition of the latter during the last 
decade, as the section on the editorials from La Padania will show.  
   Moreover, even though establishing whether the League can be 
defined as racist is not the aim of this investigation, it becomes 
relevant when we try to understand what role this intolerance plays 
in the construction of a specific model to deal with immigration. In 
other words, the League‟s controversial statements and restrictive 
measures put forward to deal with the phenomenon will be taken 
into account to establish whether they contribute to the creation of 
a particular model or idea of the state, peculiar to the Northern 
League, and how this hypothetical idea might respond to the 
foreign presence within the country. The following examples of 
unconventional or politically incorrect interventions, often 
perceived as racist, can provide the first elements to unveil the 
League‟s sometimes implicit definition of identity as it emerges 
from its opposition to the otherness personified by immigrants.  
   It is possible to describe the linguistic code used by „leghisti‟ as 
layered like an onion, with the more institutionalised and politically 
correct statements and speeches given in official circumstances 
working as a superior layer which envelops a core of progressively 
stronger messages. Many examples of the latter have been collected 
by journalist Gian Antonio Stella in his Dio Po – Gli uomini che 
fecero la Padania (1996), a collection of interviews and 
interventions on the part of members and MPs in which they 
manifested an open intolerance towards „ethnicities‟ or „races‟ 
grouped together as different from the „Padana‟.  
   The leghisti‟s main object of denigration has traditionally been 
those whom they define as „terroni‟, a term derived from the word 
„terra‟ – soil – invented to describe in pejorative terms those 
employed in agriculture, and generically referred to Southerners. In 
this  sense, the term „terrone‟ works as a synonym for being lazy, 
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backward, dirty, Mafioso and ignorant. In fact it sums up all the 
characteristics which have in time come to be associated with the 
concept of „Southernness‟. From the slogan „Ammazza i terroni, 
risparmia milioni‟ used in a meeting in Chioggia on 15 September 
1996 to recurrent statements such as Giuseppe Babbini‟s „Il Nord 
ha solo un problema: i terroni‟, the League has always identified 
non-Northerners as „a problem‟ if not as „a plague‟ for „our 
society‟, the latter referring to the North, to what is often called 
„casa nostra‟ (Stella, 1996: 2; 34). A reason for the resentment of 
the people of the North towards Southerners is the privileges they 
are supposedly granted by the state and by their „massive‟ presence 
in public administration. In this sense, the protest arises from the 
perception of a double difference: a cultural/ethnic incompatibility 
and a difference in attitude on the part of the state towards 
Southerners and Northerners, based on the supposed systematic 
discrimination against Northerners in the distribution of resources.  
   The words of Gipo Farassino exemplify Northerners‟ attitude 
towards non-Padani: „Siamo colonizzati. Vivo a Torino e non posso 
parlare torinese in un negozio perchè il bottegaio è meridionale, in 
un ufficio perchè l‟impiegato è meridionale… Ti dicono: per favore 
parli in italiano […] Ma non lo vede? Al cinema si parla 
napoletano, a teatro in napoletano, in tivù napoletano…pensi a 
Troisi‟ (Quoted in Stella: 59).  Not only is the North perceived as 
„invaded‟ or „colonised‟ but Southerners themselves, according to 
many leghisti, do not recognise themselves as Italians but rather 
keep as a point of reference their regional origins. Quoting again 
Gipo Farassino, „Ha mai sentito un italiano dire „sono italiano?‟ 
No, dicono: sono calabrese, sono siciliano… non siamo fedeli a una 
nazione ma a una regione […]  Uno stato multietnico non può 
esistere, puoi tenerlo assieme per un pò con la forza delle armi, ma 
prima o poi c‟è la reazione‟  (Quoted in Stella: 46).  What is 
interesting in this statement is the fact that the impossibility of 
keeping together without coercion a multiethnic state is referred to 
as a state in which Southerners represent the „foreign‟ component: 
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a state whose multiethnic component is determined by the presence 
of fellow Italians classified as non-Padani.  As the analysis of more 
recent debates on multiculturalism will show, Southerners seem to 
have now been replaced by non-Italian immigrants in this rhetoric 
against a pluralistic state. This does not mean that Southerners have 
smoothly managed to integrate into the North of the country, but  
they are not the main concern of the Northern league today. In this 
sense, if Southern identity has been essentialised in fixed 
stereotypes and exploited in order to built an alternative identity 
and provide Padani with a sense of belonging, after the invention of 
Padania the League‟s rhetoric on identity started focusing on the 
new „other‟: the „extracommunitario‟.   
   As Balbo and Manconi explain in their Razzismo – Un 
vocabolario (1993), the word „immigrants‟ stresses the „otherness‟ 
of different people who share a common status characterised by 
their travelling, their suffering and their memories of the country of 
origin, which overlooks their internal differences (whether they are 
men or women, black or Asian, their different traditions, languages 
and history of their homelands). The term „extracomunitario‟, 
however, which only exists in Italian and does not translate in other 
languages, put the stress on Europe, on its citizens‟ shared identity 
rather than on the people it refers to and aims to describe. In this 
sense, while still seeing immigrants as being „extra‟, external and 
therefore excluded, it contributes to reinforcing the feeling of 
belonging to a European identity „that until not many years ago was 
completely alien‟ to those who now exploit it to preserve the status 
quo of the „fortezza Europa‟ (Balbo and Manconi, 1993: 18-19).   
   The following statements collected by Stella in a series of 
interviews are examples of the fact that despite not having 
completely replaced the „terroni‟, the „extracomunitari‟ have 
nonetheless become the centre of the League‟s concern. As the 
journalist recalls, Northern League MP Mario Borghezio has often 
stated that immigrants have to be washed, boarded on a military 
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plane (and not on civil planes as they would rape the hostesses) and 
sent back to their countries (Stella, 1996: 36). The only contact that 
the true leghista is allowed to have with foreigners and of which he 
can be proud is seemingly sexual intercourse, often used to prove 
the lack of racism of any sort among the party members. In this 
respect, Mario Borghezio proudly recalls episodes of sex tourism 
involving „le negre‟ referred to as „local product‟, while embarking 
on a complicated differentiation between migrant women in Italy 
(„le bruttone nigeriane che battono qui da noi‟) and black women 
abroad. As Stella states, that is quite a contradiction for a man who 
became notoroius for his violent call for the repression of „costumi 
corrotti‟ of the citizens of Turin and of the local prostitutes and for 
the need to use plastic bullets against black people. Paradoxically, 
the MP defines himself as non-racist and, on the contrary, as 
interested in different cultures as supposedly proved by his anti-
colonial positions (Stella, 1996: 39). He instead classified as the 
worst form of racism the employment of black people in the 
domestic sector on the part of those who publicly speak against 
immigration (Ibid.: 43). The apparent contradiction in these racist 
statements is that they are often expressed precisely to reject the 
charges of racism or to address the same accusation to the Italian 
state. In this sense, Borghezio‟s opinion, expressed through the use 
of anti-colonialist rhetoric, that the true racists are those who 
employ immigrants or delude them with the perspective of an 
easier life is shared by many leghisti and is recurrent in the 
speeches of the leader himself. This sense of solidarity and anti-
colonialism, which will be analysed in more depth later on in this 
chapter, clearly does not prevent Bossi from referring to 
immigrants of African origins as „bingo bongo‟ or from suggesting 
opening fire against immigrants‟ boats that disembark in Italy. The 
latter suggestion was followed more recently by Northern League 
representative Matteo Salvini‟s idea to segregate immigrants on 
train coaches different from those reserved to the Italians (Anon., 
2009a).      
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   Despite the general acknowledgment of the party‟s 
„institutionalised intolerance‟, some scholars who analysed the 
phenomenon Lega in its early days tend to classify it as non racist, 
or at least as not primarily centred on a xenophobic ideology. In 
rejecting the idea of the Northern League as a purely racist 
organisation, authors such as Balbo and Manconi refer to the 
classical definitions of racism resulting from academic research on 
the subject. It is now worth looking briefly at this literature on the 
theme to better understand not only where the idea that the League 
is or is not racist originates from but also whether any of the 
attitudes described by scholars in the field emerges in the party 
anti-immigration rhetoric and actions, which will be taken into 
account later on when analysing the editorials from La Padania. 
And more importantly, what sort of model the party is constructing 
in its almost schizophrenic attempt to reconcile  a public rejection 
of the charges of racism, a response to the demand for a new 
workforce by the Northern economy and its followers‟ more or less 
explicit rejection of the „other‟. 
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5. Beyond traditional racism 
Academic investigation of racism has produced a broad literature 
on a subject which is still under scrutiny and defined as in constant 
transformation. As Goldberg (1993) stated, any definition of racism 
has to be based on empirical observation and to result from its 
diverse manifestations in everyday life and therefore cannot be 
formulated „a priori‟, at a purely theoretical level, as detached from 
the reality in which it manifests itself. Scholars such as Miles and 
Brown (2003), while agreeing on the idea of racism as a concept in 
continuous transformation, are concerned with the fact that a 
„Wittgenstinian‟ argument like the one put forward by Goldberg, 
needs to be counterbalanced by a political imperative according to 
which there must be consensus on what racism is in order to define 
it as politically or morally unacceptable. In the absence of such a 
clear definition, according to the authors, any opposition to racism 
becomes meaningless and any analysis of the subject is invalidated. 
They believe that too broad a definition of the term, as for instance 
„everyone is racist‟, would result in racist attitudes escaping 
censure as a mere „product of cultural determinism or an expression 
of human nature‟. On the other hand, they also warn their readers 
that too narrow a definition of the concept would allow racism to 
acquire a certain degree of legitimacy, as in the case of „racial 
hierarchy‟ theories that have been used by nation states to label 
their ideologies as nationalist rather than racist since the 1950s 
(Miles and Brown, 2003: 3)  
   If there seems to be consensus among scholars on the idea that 
racism is not a static phenomenon, as for instance illustrated in the 
writings of Wetherell and Potter (1992), the same thing cannot be 
said on the use of the term „race‟. The concept is considered by 
Banton (1996) as necessary today in order to draw the boundary 
between legal and illegal behaviour and to provide victims with 
laws aimed at protecting them. In this sense the concept of racial 
groups is the price to be paid for a law against indirect 
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discrimination (Miles and Brown, 2003: 4; Banton, 1996). 
Moreover, Banton stresses the importance of „racialised 
consciousness‟ among oppressed groups who find their own 
identity by virtue of being socially discriminated for their „inferior‟ 
race; in this respect, they use the term race as a symbol of their 
status, their suffering and their history, as shown by pre-colonial 
African or modern Afro-American history (Banton, 1996).  
   Other scholars, such as Gilroy, believe in the importance of 
taking a distance from the idea that the use of these invented races 
is necessary in order to achieve justice (Gilroy, 2000: 52). As 
Balbo and Manconi recall, since 1951 Unesco has been arguing the 
case for abolishing the term „race‟ and replacing it with „ethnic 
group‟. Nonetheless, the authors believe that the idea of racism is 
clearly already quite ambiguous and difficult to define, and that 
therefore the concept has to be explored and constantly redefined in 
order to prevent its opposite – anti-racism – from becoming equally 
meaningless and unclear. In other words, they argue that only by 
reaching consensus on what racism is and by acknowledging its 
presence in our societies is it possible to react to it in a strong way, 
a position similar to that held by Banton.  If we cannot talk about 
„invented races‟ which do not exist, then it becomes impossible to 
react to the attitude classified as „racism‟. Racist attitudes can only 
be firmly opposed if recognised as a fundamental problem, a clear 
enemy easily identifiable (Balbo and Manconi, 1993: 10). Balbo 
and Manconi believe that the problem that European countries are 
facing in their attempt to fight racism originates from an erroneous 
interpretation of the phenomenon. Particularly, they blame the 
media for a distorted representation of the issue: according to them, 
the question to be asked is not whether an individual, a group or a 
place, are racist, as the answer to these questions can only be 
positive if the individual, the group, the citizens of a specific place 
openly declare their racism with a verbal statement or with an 
active oppression or segregation of those they consider as‟ inferior‟ 
(Ibid.: 10). Moreover, they insist on the risk implicit in using the 
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„classic‟ conception of racism in order to establish who falls into 
the category of racist. Indeed, not only can there be racism even in 
the absence of openly racist claims, but also the idea of a racism 
based on the biological and physical superiority of a group does not 
represent the main trend in contemporary societies, where racism 
manifests itself in different, more subtle and more ambiguous 
ways. In other words, Balbo and Manconi are tackling the issue of 
a grey zone in which racism originates and grows without being 
recognised as such. As this chapter will try to show, this is 
precisely the case of the Northern League. Even though its 
ideology seems not to be centred on biological difference,  
nonetheless it contributes to cultivating a xenophobic attitude, 
while providing a justification for inner fears linked to „the other‟ 
within Italian society (Cento Bull, 2000). 
   Since the 1990s academics seem to have abandoned the 
traditional belief typical of the 1930s and 1940s that racism is 
based on the physical distinctiveness of its victims, as made self-
evident by the impossibility, for instance, of distinguishing a 
Bosnian Muslim from a Bosnian Serb. As Miles and Brown recall, 
this impossible distinction has not prevented the eruption of one of 
the „worst genocides of the second half of the twentieth century‟ in 
the political and civil sphere (Miles and Brown, 2003: 6).   
   They explain that investigations of racism have also tried to cover 
the moral aspect of the issue by trying to answer a fundamental 
question: why is racism wrong? The studies of Bonnett (2000) and 
King (2000) among others have attempted to show the dangers 
implicit in this ideology and its everyday manifestations. Taguieff 
(1995) polemically dismisses the moral distinction between good 
and evil as closer to the category used by medieval Christian 
theology than to scientific discourse in order to stress the 
importance of analysing the issue at a political level rather than in 
its moral implications. Many scholars agree with Taguieff that the 
political issues linked with racism are much more relevant in our 
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societies than a moral judgement on it, and state that what really 
matters is its effect on contemporary societies and the possible 
(political) answers to deal with it. This belief comes from the 
acknowledgment of the fact that, since the 1980s, political parties 
in many European countries have started to demand legitimisation 
and public recognition for racist claims not very different from 
those put forwards by fascist ideologies in the 1930s (Miles and 
Brown, 2003: 15).  
   Authors such as Turner et al. have formulated a more political 
definition of racism, purely based on the distribution of resources 
and access to basic rights, by stating that the term „racism‟ 
identifies a system of distribution of power according to which 
certain groups are given access whereas others are systematically 
excluded from benefiting from it (Turner et al., 1984: 2). Balbo and 
Manconi list three different types of racism as have been outlined 
by scholars in the last two decades: „razzismo addizionale‟ 
(additional racism), „razzismo concorrenziale‟ (competitive racism) 
and „razzismo culturale‟ (cultural racism). Additional racism results 
from „adding‟ a physical, ethnic or cultural difference to a factor of 
social fears, and is linked to pre-existing feelings of anxiety due to 
perceived threats of, for instance, crimes against property or the 
person, drug dealing, fears of spreading illnesses and viruses and of 
other behaviour considered „irregular‟ or different. Be the threat 
imaginary or real, the common reaction is always that of finding 
somebody responsible for it outside the community: the guilt has to 
be placed onto a subject who can be easily identified as different, 
following a psychological mechanism which seeks to take 
immediate distance from the „deviant behaviour‟ (Balbo and 
Manconi, 1993: 62-63). This attempt to „rationalise‟ fears and 
intolerance works according to a standard process: the first step 
consists in putting an emphasis on the „criminal act‟, second comes 
the description of immigrants‟ lives as „miserable‟ and socially 
stigmatised and finally the neglect of immigrants‟ everyday life, 
which includes their families, their jobs, their social networks. By 
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simplifying their existence and reducing it to the act perceived as 
deviant, this mechanism contributes to the creation of stereotypes 
and to the classification of a specific group as relevant only in 
terms of public security (Ibid.: 62-66).  
   The second type of racism is based on the defence of the territory 
and its resources: it arises from the idea that immigrants represent 
potential competitors in the allocation of resources such as 
transport, accommodation, health system and jobs. It is 
characterised by the battle for „space‟, be it a square, a street, a 
train station, and the fear that allowing different groups to occupy 
it, even though temporarily, will result in the exclusion of citizens 
from those areas and will determine a loss of control on the part of 
the community. The struggle not to lose territory has as its first 
consequence the creation of „areas of segregation‟, ghettos where 
the weakest groups contend with each other for „lo spazio vinto ai 
locali‟ (Ibid.: 66-74).      
   Finally, cultural racism originates from the attempt to preserve 
and protect from external threats a set of values, a precise view of 
the world and life style and from the rejection of different cultures 
and ideas of the good life. This interpretation of immigration 
results in a series of fixed answers to the phenomenon: when asked 
whether immigrants could be considered as „normal‟ citizens, a 
high percentage of Italians answered „as long as they respect the 
rules of our society‟ (FGCI survey carried out in Milan, in Balbo 
and Manconi, 1993: 75). The ambiguity of this answer lies in the 
fact that it does not discriminate between breaking the law and 
simply living according to values, religions and traditions different 
from mainstream ones.  
   As the section on the editorials of La Padania will highlight later 
on, in the case of the Northern League all three categories of racism 
mentioned above seem to play a role in the construction of a 
generally intolerant attitude: from the control of territory to the 
supposed superiority of Padanian culture over different sets of 
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values, from the simplification of immigrants‟ private lives to 
linking their presence with fears of security and public order. In 
this sense, this interpretation of „the other‟ as a threat represents the 
premise for the development of an exclusionary model of 
citizenship aimed at the systematic marginalisation of foreigners. 
 
6. The invention of Padania and a new exclusionary identity 
In identifying the invention of Padania with the beginning of a new 
era in the Northern League‟s political response to immigration and 
in the creation of a new exclusionary identity, this section follows 
the interpretation offered by Bull and Gilbert in The Lega Nord and 
the Southern Question in Italian Politics (2001).  They argue that if 
the ethno-regionalism developed by the party in order to provide 
Northerners with a shared identity could until 1996 be considered 
just a mere „invention‟, later on downplayed by the leader himself, 
the advent of Padania determined a growing concern on the part of 
the League with the dangers implicit in a multiethnic state, on 
whom it declared war. They argue that the writings of party 
ideologue Gilberto Oneto, and particularly L’invenzione della 
Padania (1997), prove that the creation of the new nation 
represents a key-moment in the League‟s strategy and a central 
concept in the re-definition of its claims (Bull and Gilbert, 2001). 
Following Oneto, „La Padania esiste geograficamente, etnicamente, 
linguisticamente, culturalmente ed economicamente (...) i suoi 
cittadini hanno lottato per affermare la propria identità nazionale. 
Non c‟è bisogno di inventare qualcosa (la Padania) che esiste già. 
Inventare così significa ridefinire, ritrovare, ritornare a, riscoprire‟ 
(Oneto, 1997: 11). The important element in Oneto‟s definition of 
the new nation consists in the claim that a constructed national 
identity was imposed by Fascism on people to whom it denied the 
right of self-determination (Oneto, 1997; Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 
115). This point assumes particular relevance in light of both the 
party‟s more recent exploitation of the concept of a common Italian 
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national identity as a means to reject immigrants and the rhetoric of 
victimhood that justifies such an exclusionary approach towards 
„the other‟, as the analysis of the more recent debate will show. 
   Until the invention of Padania, the recurrent references to a fake 
Unification, to a systematic colonisation of the North on the part of 
the central state, and to the „cultural cleansing‟ of what was 
described as a minority within the country, were mainly directed at 
reinforcing through a rhetoric based on victimhood a still weak 
unitary Northern identity, as it emerges for instance from Bossi‟s 
programmatic declarations contained in his La rivoluzione, written 
with journalist Daniele Vimercati in 1993. At that point, the future 
Padania was presented as a „terra di conquista‟, and its people as a 
minority group whose different identity was not acknowledged by 
the state (Bossi and Vimercati, 1993: 24). According to Cachafeiro, 
„The fabrication of a united North incorporated also a diverse and 
multicultural North. Sameness within the North also encompasses 
diversity. Lega politicians from Lombardy, Veneto and Piedmont 
assert the differences within the North but downplay their political 
relevance‟ (Cachafeiro, 2002: 103-104). This common identity was 
founded on the sameness of „race‟, traditions, language and culture. 
Ethnicity was not the only criterion for territorial distinctiveness. 
Since the 1990s, Bossi has rejected this „simplistic‟ interpretation 
and began to include „economic identity‟ in the number of 
characteristics shared by Northerners. While the differences 
between Northern regions were considered minimal and irrelevant 
in this phase, those between the North and the South were instead 
described as fundamental. According to Diamanti, the enemy that 
nationalistic groups desperately need in order to reassert their own 
identity was clearly identified in the Southerner and in the central 
state. Until 1996 there is in fact still no sign of the new threat of the 
„extracomunitario‟, as proved by the document „Superare lo Stato 
centralizzato‟, the official programme of the party published in 
1983. The document consists of a twelve-point list of programmatic 
declaration. These include the battle against the central state for the 
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allocation of resources, the autonomist project, the weak presence 
of Northerners in the public administration, and the federalist 
revolution (Lega Nord, 1983; Bossi, 1996. 12-12). Since 1996, as 
Cento Bull and Gilbert explain, the League has been getting closer 
to the positions typical of the New Right, particularly on 
immigration, while increasingly directing its interests towards 
„multiculturalism, American capitalism, European integration and 
the “other”, a phase characterised by a “profound cultural 
pessimism”‟ (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 127). A comparison 
between the pamphlet cited above and other documents published 
by the Northern League since 1996, and particularly „Padania, 
identità e società multirazziale‟ (Mussa, 1998), shows how 
radically the attitude towards immigration has changed . 
   The pamphlet argues that immigration from outside Europe is 
sustained if not promoted by a combination of forces such as global 
capitalism and the international Left that contribute to presenting it 
as a spontaneous and irreversible trend. The promotion of a 
multicultural society based on an individualistic and cosmopolitan 
view of citizens is supported by minority powers, which are, 
however „hegemonic‟ in the cultural sphere, and therefore will 
inevitably bring about the destruction of local and territorial 
identities. As a consequence, this trend has to be opposed by 
„people and their desire for independence and self-determination‟ 
(Mussa, 1998).   
   The document identifies five main points which correspond to as 
many strategies to protect this identity from the threat posed by 
immigration. It starts from the refusal to grant the vote to 
foreigners, who can never feel part of the community and feel a 
sense of duty towards the state, followed by the struggle to „save 
the specificity of our people‟ and the need to give Padanians 
priority in the social services. It also states the necessity to start a 
„polite request for the return of non-EU foreigners to their homes‟, 
while the last measure consists in a call for more investment in the 
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agriculture of non-European countries in order to provide their 
citizens with „a dignified alternative‟ to migration (Mussa, 1998; 
Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 128-9). The key elements of the 
party‟s current anti-immigration discourse, such as that of „internal 
multiculturalism‟, „conditioned/long-distance solidarity‟ and the 
feeling of victimhood, which will be analysed in the following 
section of this chapter, are already implicit in this document.  
   To summarise the main elements of this shift in the Northern 
League‟s strategy and ideology, it can be said that in the early days 
the party‟s discourse on identity was much more focused on the 
„us‟ component rather than on the external „them‟. Southerners, as 
the „other‟, played a role functional to the construction of a rhetoric 
based on victimhood used to gain autonomy from a tyrannical state. 
With the invention of Padania, however, the focus shifted from „us‟ 
to „them‟, the presence of immigrants, perceived not only as 
competitors in the allocation of resources but also as carrying an 
inner cultural and ethnic difference absolutely incompatible with 
Northerners‟ values and „inevitably‟ resulting in a clash of 
civilisations. At this point, immigrants not only started being 
presented as dangerous for (potentially) stealing job opportunities 
but also for the „invented‟ fixed characteristics attributed to them 
by leghisti, as for instance their supposed intention of colonising 
the Padania and Italy and imposing their own ideas of the good life. 
In the early days, the League‟s rhetoric on identity and otherness 
was seemingly based on the instrumental concepts of tolerance 
(towards the others as long as they stayed in their countries) and 
solidarity (towards its own people first of all and then to the 
„others‟, following a long distance charitable approach to the Third 
World) always put forward with the double aim of rejecting the 
charge of racism and building bridges with the Catholic Church. 
However, more recently the party has launched several campaigns 
against immigration which leave no room for doubt. With the 
invention of Padania and the outline of a increasingly more 
exclusionary identity, the party lifted the veil on an implicit but 
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nonetheless substantial paradox. On the one hand, the North of the 
country keeps attracting immigrants who are much needed in the 
local economy, as recently shown by Andall (2009) in her analysis 
of the demand/offer ratio in some selected Northern provinces. On 
the other hand, its first political party develops a rhetoric of closure 
which entraps immigrants into fixed stereotypes and prevents them 
from integrating by making their presence relevant only in terms of 
public order and security. In other words, while they have to be 
employed in order to maintain the local economy in a healthy state, 
they are denied the most basic civil rights, from the voting to 
housing, while at the same time they are turned into the scapegoats 
for the North‟s problems, from criminality to pollution, from the 
decay of the cities to the growing fears linked to globalisation and 
secularisation.   
   Through the analysis of the Lega‟s more recent positions on 
immigration, the next section will try to show not only how 
foreigners are perceived by the Padani but also what long-term 
model of society the party is putting forward in reacting to the 
phenomenon. As anticipated in the Introduction, this is a model of 
an „institutionalised state of exception‟ based on the idea that the 
only way to „tolerate‟ the foreign presence within not only the 
North but the country as a whole, is to keep the newly arrived into 
a permanent state of precarious and temporary permanence.  
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7. The League’s anti-immigrant rhetoric 
Through the analysis of articles, interviews and editorials published 
in La Padania in the last three years, this section will provide a 
more detailed account of the party‟s position on immigration and 
the idea of an original, alternative identity behind it. It will try to 
show how the more exclusionary turn in the rhetoric on otherness 
since the invention of Padania, has become increasingly more 
radical during the past few years and how it translates into a battle 
fought on different fronts: from cultural/ideological discrimination 
to practical/everyday marginalisation of the immigrants. Moreover, 
it will investigate whether the League, in reacting to the foreign 
presence within the North of the country, is putting forward a 
specific or alternative model of citizenship. 
   The general impression in reading these interventions from La 
Padania is that they seem to follow a common pattern and be 
centred on two central issues presented as deeply linked: namely 
law and order and immigration. The discussion of these subjects 
involves the recurrent use of a predictable and fixed rhetoric based 
on the concepts of identity and otherness. The inner tension 
between the „us‟ and „them‟ poles is conveyed through the creation 
of an atmosphere of tension and fear, triggered by a precise  
communication strategy based on social alarmism. This rhetoric is 
sustained and brought in force by the use of terms such as: alarm; 
battle, emergency; peril; risk; terrorism; criminality; security; 
explosion; catastrophe; tragedy; suspicion; violence; colonization; 
invasion; Islamization and similar. It is indeed in these terms that 
the party addresses the issue of what is an open „us‟ versus „them‟ 
conflict, expressed by the opposition of two sets of contrasting 
stereotyped identities.  
The first of these includes the values of culture, right to self-
determination; nation; West; Christianity, truth, homeland, (our) 
people, tradition, rules of the state. The second one, which refers to 
immigrants, includes the terms clandestine, these people, 
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integralism, terrorism, Islam, Chinese mafia, (Islamic) propaganda, 
Islamic state, state within the state, Roma, guests, foreigners. The 
issues which concern the party are both ideological and practical: 
from the impossibility of a multiethnic society to council housing 
and the supposed discrimination of „famiglie padane‟, just to 
mention a few examples. Throughout the years, the measures put 
forward by the League as adequate to solve these conflicts can be 
summarised with two recurrent slogans: „tolleranza zero‟  and 
„pugno di ferro‟ (Stefani, 2009; Carcano, 2006).  
   The first fact which emerges is the central importance of the 
discussion on identity to the party‟s public discourse. Padanian 
identity features in most of the articles, most of the time referred to 
as a „lost‟ or „threaten‟ identity, which needs to be rediscovered and 
emphasised.  The titles of the articles are representative of this 
feeling of loss and fear and the consequent call for the defence of 
an oppressed or denied identity: „L‟Emilia riscopre la sua identità‟ 
(Iezzi, 2007a); „Aiutiamo le nostre genti a riappropriarsi delle loro 
identità‟ (Polli, 2007a); „Difendiamo la nostra terra dal furto della 
nostra identità‟ (Alessandri, 2007); „Manifestare per difendere la 
nostra identità‟ (Bassi, 2007a). However, even though the 
expression „la nostra identità‟ is recurrent in these interventions, 
this identity is defined only in negative terms, which is in relation 
to the events and circumstances which put it at risk. If in the early 
days of the party the supposedly common language, the economic 
and cultural environment, the local dimension of belonging and the 
Lutheran work ethics were presented as the essence of Padanian 
identity, the more recent definitions acquire a meaning only in 
opposition to „otherness‟, following a common mechanism in the 
construction of all identities. The concepts of „radici‟ (roots) and 
belonging to the territory still play a central role in the current 
debate as does the idea of „nostra gente,‟ committed to the 
protection of this identity and to the autonomy of the new nation 
and its values (Polli, 2009). However, the focus has shifted towards 
the external element to the extent that, occasionally, Padanian 
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identity appears to consist precisely of this commitment to fight to 
preserve the status quo, in this claim for freedom and reaffirmation 
of the concept that the North is „casa nostra‟ (Cota, 2009). In this 
sense, in order to provide a broader and more meaningful 
description on „Padanianess‟, it is important to analyse it in relation 
to the perceived threat that is supposedly endangering it.  
   The first and more general threat identified by the party is 
globalisation, understood as a pervasive phenomenon, which 
penetrates not only the economic but also the cultural, political and 
social spheres. A globalised society is a society where the 
differences are levelled and people behave according to the same 
social principles all around the globe. To this „utopian multi-racial 
society‟ the League opposes the preservation of differences, which 
also implies a „sincere respect‟ for alternative ideas of the good life, 
as long as they are put into practice in the countries in which they 
developed. When addressing the „issue of immigration‟, this 
differentialist approach advocates the need to give priority to 
immigrants who are easier to assimilate, while targeting Muslim 
immigrants as the least desirable (Bassi, 2007b; Ferrari, 2007). This 
is clearly the first of many links with the position of the Catholic 
Church analysed in the previous chapter. It is not only the people to 
be perceived as threatened but also the territory and its peculiar 
traditions. Interestingly enough, Catholicism is seen as a necessary 
counterpart to overcome the growing relativism and the announced 
Islamisation of the nation (Bassi, 2007c). As argued by Bossi in the 
speech given in Cà San Marco, „L‟individuo reciso da ogni legame 
con la propria terra e stirpe diventa così uno sradicato apolide, un 
albero senza radici e resistenza, in balìa del vento del potere 
mondialista  […] I popoli non sono come l‟acqua che si può 
mescolare a piacere. I popoli si mescolano con difficoltà. Gli 
uomini tornano sempre alle loro radici‟ (Bossi, 2006). When the 
links with the homeland weaken, „un popolo (…) rischia 
l‟annullamento‟: annihilation and colonization are the inevitable 
consequences of giving up the constant struggle aimed at „tenerci 
 168 
casa nostra‟ (Ibid.). The League puts forward a double strategy to 
accomplish this mission: on the one hand it proactively promotes 
cultural initiatives, such as the official Federalist Foundation 
promoted by MP Roberto Maroni and inaugurated in June 2007 
with the aim of „dare voce, sia sul piano teorico che su quello 
dell‟azione concreta, a tutte quelle espressioni della cultura 
federalista e identitaria in Padania e non solo‟ (Poli, 2007). On the 
other hand it targets what it identifies as the real danger and the 
ultimate challenge to the survival of such identity: immigration and 
particularly Muslim immigration.  
   The issue of immigration is presented by the League through a 
rhetoric based on an apocalyptic interpretation of „our future‟ that 
links it to other more general risks and catastrophies. This is why, 
according to the party, it is necessary to react first of all by sending 
out a „grido d‟allarme‟, „allarme culturale‟ and „allarme terrorismo‟ 
(Gibelli, 2007a; Mirabile, 2007a) in order to attract the attention on 
what is portraited as an invasion (Montanari, 2007a), a national 
emergency (Garavaglia, 2007) which threatens „il nostro futuro‟ 
and „il futuro dei nostri figli‟ (Gallizzi, 2007). The future as 
imagined in these articles is everything but rosy since it will 
involve a long phase of decline which has already started and will 
result in a new Islamic Nazi-fascism (Montanari, 2007a; 
Montanari, 2007b; Boiocchi, 2007). This scream of warning is 
considered by the League as a duty, to spread awareness among the 
people of the fact that any reaction to the phenomenon other that 
rejection is dangerous, as in the case of the Left‟s attitude of 
„buonismo‟ and false tolerance (Gibelli, 2007a; Iezzi, 2007b). 
   What was stated in reference to the region of Emila is quite 
representative of the party‟s main concerns. According to him, „the 
annihilation of the people‟ is determined by an ongoing war 
between the state in its local institutions and „ethnic groups which 
do not want and cannot try to integrate‟ and which benefit from a 
set of privileges, such as the right to vote, that the central 
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government intend to grant them to the disadvantage of the local 
community, the only one to pay the price for this lack of rules. 
Among the rules which should be respected there is the Bossi-Fini 
law which ties immigration to work; the necessary investigations 
on the mosques that often are just „falsi luoghi di culto‟ used to 
spread Islamic propaganda. The ruling class currently in power (at 
that time a centre-left coalition), Alessandri claims, has to be held 
morally responsible for the problems experienced by Northerners 
since its ignorance and private interests have turned Emilia into a 
„terra di conquista‟ (land of conquest) (Alessandri, 2007). In 
general, it can be said that immigration is believed to be 
aggravating an already „explosive‟ situation, a delicate phase that 
the country (interestingly enough the point of reference here is the 
old nation) and the entire world are facing and which corresponds 
to a loss of traditional values such as Christianity, and the role of 
the family, as this analysis will show. There are three main targets 
of the League‟s anti-immigrant campaign: the Chinese, the 
Romanian and all Muslims. The title of an article written by 
Northern League‟s MP Stefano Stefani and published on 
September 2007 seems to go to the heart of the problem, namely 
„Noi, loro e la sicurezza‟. „Il crimine è crimine‟, Stefani argues, 
implying that there cannot be any justification for it and demanding 
adequate punishments. These three groups, the first of two 
characterised by a nationality and the third one by religious 
belonging, seem to be the crucial ones in the League‟s battle, which 
is carried out on two different levels. On the one hand, these 
immigrants, grouped under the indistinct definition of „questa 
gente‟, represent a problem for law and order in Northern Italian 
cities, on the other hand, a fundamental issue with their presence is 
the clash of civilizations, ideas of life, religious and cultural 
difference, considered as absolutely incompatible with „valori 
leghisti‟(Montanari, 2007b). 
   Generally speaking, the references to daily violence and crime 
are rather vague: the facts are recalled quite superficially as are the 
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data on official surveys and investigations on the links between 
immigration and criminality. When referring to the police‟s and 
secret service‟s reports, the articles employ an ambiguous 
language: „secondo un recente rapporto, „recenti indagini‟, „alla 
luce di quanto recentememte avvenuto a Perugia‟, „come 
confermato dai servizi segreti, la situazione sul fronte terrorismo è 
particolarmente delicata‟, „le parole del capo della polizia ci 
devono allarmare‟. This strategy, while avoiding statistics, implies 
the existence of a strict relation between illegal immigration and 
problems of law and order as well as a constantly growing number 
of crimes presented as perpetrated by foreigners. Such crimes are 
often mentioned in the opening or at the very end of the article or 
interview serving a double function: on the one hand they justify at 
the beginning the strong opinions expressed in the core of the 
article, on the other hand they leave the reader with this image of 
immigrants as criminals and therefore with a last feeling of concern 
and fear (Alessandri, 2007; Bassi, 2007d). Apart from these more 
or less generic references to intelligence reports confirming and 
backing the concerns linked to the arrival of „questa gente‟ in the 
country, the alarmism is also based on some specific problems 
which have arisen in the last few years. The events mentioned in 
these editorials are the following: a Chinatown revolt in Milan 
(Stucchi, 2007); the results of the investigations into the terroristic 
cells  in Perugia, Turin and Cremona (Grimoldi, 2007; Indini, 
2007a); the link between Islam and the new BR (Red Brigades) in 
an anti-American struggle (Cota 2007); the assassination of a 
couple in Treviso (Garavaglia, 2007); the hijacking of a bus (the 
article does not mention when and where this happened) (Gibelli, 
2007b); the removal of the crucifix in Mangialli hospital in Milan 
(Gibelli, 2007c); the release of „il Rom della strage‟, Marco 
Ahmetovic, who killed a group of friends in a drunken car accident 
(Bassi, 2007e); the Reggiani Killing (Roselli, 2007) . 
   Not only are these episodes not described in detail but they are 
just mentioned in passing while analysing more general and more 
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ideological issues that they aim to push at the centre of the political 
debate. This impression seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
other crimes, which happened at the same time, are not reported at 
all as if a few symbolic ones could be enough to justify the need for 
a broader discussion on immigration or, better, for a more decisive 
strategy to prevent and stop new arrivals in the country. Moreover, 
the articles contribute to crystallising immigrants‟ identities, with 
the result that certain groups will be indissolubly associated with a 
specific threat. In this sense, the Chinese are essentially Mafiosi 
and represent unfair competitors in the local economy. As reported 
by Borghezio at the EU parliament, „La mafia cinese oggi è molto 
potente. Nel corso degli anni ha fatto un salto di qualità 
attrezzandosi addirittura in anticipo per le sfide della 
globalizzazione. Rappresenta il pericolo numero uno per il nostro 
futuro: è l‟associazione mafiosa meglio organizzata e dunque più 
pericolosa‟ (Gallizzi, 2007). According to the MP, Italian 
politicians cannot turn their heads away and pretend to ignore what 
is going on. He takes an unspecified „Chinatown revolt‟ in Milan to 
argue that the Chinese community in the city is blackmailing the 
state, which has showed its weakness and its incapability to 
respond adequately. Moreover, he remarks upon a shared belief 
among the party members that „queste comunità cinesi tendono a 
non integrarsi come dovrebbero, ma a costruire uno stato nello 
stato‟, which they finance through a series of illegal activities such 
as smuggling clandestines through the country (Ibid.). What is 
interesting here is the fact that Borghezio, speaking on behalf of his 
party, concludes his intervention by repeating that the battle against 
the Chinese power has to be considered as the first priority.  
   The first priority seems also to be that of dealing with the Muslim 
community, as clearly emerges from a number of articles on the 
subject. Muslim immigrants feature in most of these articles and 
their presence in Padania and beyond is constantly portraited as a 
bomb ready to explode, „bomba sulla nostra testa‟ (Cota, 2007) 
„bombe a orologeria‟ (Gibelli, 2007d). The party‟s representatives 
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seem to be primarily concerned with the „rischio terrorismo‟, based 
on the assumption that Muslim organizations are linked to the new 
BR and are ready to join their battle against America and the West 
(Cota, 2007). They see in the Left‟s laissez faire attitude and their 
proposal for a new law on freedom of religion a way to open the 
doors to the Islamisation of „our society‟(Montanari, 2007b). The 
mosques are nothing but „strutture che servono a proteggere 
integralisti o terroristi, che molto spesso sono la stessa cosa‟ 
(Mirabile, 2007; Gazzotti, 2007; Iezzi, 2009) and in this respect 
they are a clear example of how the project of integration has 
ultimately failed as much as any attempt to build a multicultural 
society in countries such as the UK (Gibelli, 2007e). Indeed, 
mosques contribute to create ghettos which become a „culla di 
terrorismo islamico‟ (Gibelli, 2007d; Girardin, 2009) and therefore 
should be closely monitored if not closed (Polli, 2007b). These 
„centrali del terrore‟ hide and protect people who have been trained 
to think that „è compito di ogni buon mussulmano prevaricare gli 
occidentali‟, a message that has become clear after September 11 
and the Madrid and London bombings (Indini, 2007a). A number 
of vaguely mentioned reports from Carabinieri and the secret 
services warn that „l‟Italia [é] nel mirino del terrorismo Islamico‟, 
presenting the country as the next target of terroristic attacks (Iezzi, 
2009). This threat cannot take anyone by surprise since „l‟Islam 
non ha mai dimostrato di essere moderato‟ (Indini, 2007a) and its 
followers have never committed themselves to respect the laws and 
duties required by their country of arrival (Ibid.) since it does not 
contemplate any exception to its „pensiero unico‟: „C‟è troppa 
gente che con la scusa di una ricerca del lavoro e per motivi di 
studio costruisce e addestra figure pronte a colpire in ogni 
momento. E la minaccia terroristica anche in armi di distruzione di 
massa è sempre più forte‟ (Gibelli, 2007d). 
   The threat of terroristic attacks is not the only concern of the 
League: „Questa è un‟autentica guerra di civiltà. Contro di noi, 
contro la libertà e la democrazia a favore dell‟assolutismo religioso 
 173 
e contro la ragione umana‟ (Gibelli, 2007d). This interpretation 
recalls that of some representatives of the Church and Ratzinger‟s 
Regesburg lecture analysed in the previous chapter. This presence 
is believed to represent a threat for the future of „i nostri figli‟ 
(Ibid.), our „piazze‟ and our people (Garibaldi, 2007c). To this 
challenge only the League seems to be ready to react, emerging as 
the „ultimo baluardo contro l‟invasione‟ (Montanari, 2007a), a role 
shared by its youth movement, committed to the respect of 
Padanian laws and traditions, against the burqua and „fedeli al 
concetto di “ognuno padrone a casa sua”‟ (Lega Nord, 2004).   
Besides the clash of civilization, the party seems concerned with a 
number of practical issues which arise from the foreign presence. If 
in the case of Muslims a clear issue is the request to remove the 
crucifixes from public spaces (Gibelli, 2007c), other „problems‟ 
concerning all immigrants and their requests have proved central to 
the League‟s rhetoric. Examples include the question of council 
houses, which should be assigned to Padanians first of all, whereas 
the „extracomunitari‟ should not be given the right to be included in 
the waiting lists. One article announces that „Grazie alla Lega 
finalmente non ci saranno solo Muhammed nelle graduatorie per le 
case popolari‟ (Lega Nord, 2005). This position is coherent with 
the party‟s commitment to defend the territory, its squares, streets 
and neighbourhoods. Moreover, immigrants should not be given 
the right to vote, even after a certain number of years of continued 
residence in the country, a position which is diametrically opposed 
to that of the Left. The latter is consequently perceived as the first 
cause of the problems linked with immigration and criticized for its 
false tolerance.  
   To conclude this overview on immigration, it can be said that 
there seem to be a number of practical reasons for the rejection of 
the immigrants. Most are summarized in a sort of manifesto which 
explains that these are of an economic, social and health and safety 
nature. At the economic level, it is argued that employing foreign 
labour at low salaries will end up damaging the local economy and 
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make it less competitive with the rest of Europe while triggering 
the discontent of native Padanians. At a social level, it states that 
Padanians and Italians are not ready for the changes brought about 
by immigrants, and that these alternative life styles represent a 
trauma for an otherwise homogeneous society. This is why the 
League declares itself ready to contribute to helping the 
disadvantage nations in their own territory. This last strategy plays 
an important role in the construction of a mono-directional long-
distance solidarity, which will be addressed later on in this chapter. 
   Moreover, the document remarks upon the fact that granting 
medical care to everybody without distinguishing between the 
locals and the immigrants (above all illegal immigrants) is not fair 
towards the Padani who pay taxes and contribute to the economic 
growth of the country. Finally, the article expresses a request of 
central importance for the party: namely that immigrants should be 
dealt with at a local level (Indini, 2007b, Garibaldi, 2007b). This 
request is often presented as the ultimate solution and is reinforced 
by the League‟s project of a federal state which is presented as the 
best form of state also in responding to the challenge of 
immigration (Ibid.). However, while working on the project of a 
federal state, the party has also put forward a number of measures 
to confront „the other‟, „quella gente‟.  These measures will only be 
mentioned here, as they will be the subject of the last chapter of 
this thesis, which will deal with the laws passed by different 
governments. One of these measures, suggested as a partial 
solution is that of taking immigrants‟ fingerprints in order to have 
more control on their identity and their movements (Maccanti, 
2007).  The range of initiatives is broad and stretches from the idea 
of using the navy to prevent the arrivals (and if necessary bomb the 
ships) to the call for public demonstrations against immigration in 
the squares of Padania, to more folkloristic threats such as the 
„maiale day‟ planned by MP Calderoli, which consists of 
„profaning‟ the building site destined for a mosque with pig manure 
(Pandini, 2007).  This is not dissimilar to the MP‟s public statement 
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on his plans to „celebrate‟ the beginning of the Ramadan by eating 
pork ribs (Ibid.).   
   The interventions of the Lega‟s representatives are reinforced 
through the use of military metaphors, which include the terms 
„guerra‟ (war) „barricate‟ (barricades) „trincea‟ (trench) „battaglia‟ 
(battle) „lotta‟ (fight). However, as mentioned above, while the 
main battle-ground sees the League fighting its number one enemy, 
the immigrants, it also carries on another offensive against an 
internal adversary, namely the Left, which it holds responsible for 
the national emergency, often perceived as resulting from an 
ideologically oriented response on the part of the Left-wing 
coalition.  
   The League was most critical while in opposition suggesting that 
such protest had the twofold aim of attacking immigration while 
undermining its political adversaries‟ credibility in dealing with the 
situation. The party accuses „la sinistra‟ of acting in the  name of a 
false tolerance merely aimed at achieving electoral results, for 
instance by allowing immigrants to vote in general elections after 
five years of residence in Italy. It accuses left-wing parties of 
looking at the issue of immigration through the „pink‟ lense of an 
ideology based on a fake „buonismo‟ (Gibelli, 2007f; Roselli, 
2007). In this sense, according to Bossi and his followers, it is this 
political class that should be recognised as racist, since it deludes 
people in need with the dream of better conditions of life and a 
series of promises that the country, at the moment, does not have 
the possibility to fulfil (Montanari, 2007c; „Mirabile, 2007b). With 
its attitude of openness and optimism, the centre-left coalition has 
shown the immigrants that „the door is open‟, that illegal 
immigrants will not be punished but on the contrary will be looked 
after (Polli, 2007b; Carcano, 2007). Such an irresponsible attitude 
has had as its first result that of institutionalising the clandestine 
presence within the country (Iezzi, 2007c). The leftist intellighentia 
is presented as trapped in its political correctness and driven by the 
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aim of proving the irrationality of citizens‟ concerns in order to 
achieve an electoral consensus. This idea of „tolerance‟ is 
denounced by the League as „empty‟, „fake‟ as well as leading to 
irresponsible and inadequate political action and qualifies these 
political representatives as the „real Talibans‟. Once again the 
citizens‟ life, homeland and culture are put at risk by those who 
insist on presenting „security‟ as a false problem (Garibaldi, 2007b; 
Baldi, 2009; Gibelli, 2007g).  In arguing that the real racism is that 
of its political opponents, the Northern League‟s representatives 
attempt not only to discredit the Left but also to prove that their 
party cannot be perceived as racist, since it only promises things 
that it cannot grant. Moreover, the party‟s resentment towards the 
Left is due also to the fact that the Left has also opted for zero 
tolerance and demanded the expulsion of all Roma, in times of 
crisis, such as after Reggiani‟s killing on 30 October 2007 at the 
Tor di Quinto station in Rome (Roselli, 2007): „Prima buonisti, ora 
sceriffi. Ma quando queste cose succedono al Nord nessuno a 
Roma ha mai mosso un dito. Sono razzisti al contrario‟ (Ibid.). 
According to the League‟s representatives, this is a clear sign that 
they were right and that, in dealing with immigration, political 
parties should not compromise, since the only possible solution to 
the „problem‟ is that of expelling even the communitarians 
(Montanari, 2007c) and prevent new arrivals tout court (Garibaldi, 
2007c).  Alternatively, they can go and live „nei comuni di centro 
sinistra dove sanno di essere accolti con buonismo e tolleranza (…) 
la questione principale non è neanche che tipo di politiche attuare 
perché il problema è che queste persone non devono neanche 
entrare nel paese perché  non abbiamo la possibilità di assorbire 
queste comunità in termini di lavoro. Scnza parlare del fatto che 
loro non hanno nessuna volontà e intenzione di integrarsi con noi‟ 
(Mirabile, 2007c).  
   The constant references to a difficult economic phase and to the 
difficulties met by Padanians themselves to find jobs contribute to 
justifying in rational terms the party‟s complete rejection of 
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immigrants while showing the failure and incoherence of the Left 
and its responsibility for turning the immigrants into victims. 
Indeed, the leghisti believe that the citizens‟ occasionally violent 
reactions towards them can be explained by the fact that they are 
„stufi‟ with the situation and with being denied the right to self-
determination, which can be summarised in the well-known 
formula „essere padroni a casa propria‟ (Cota, 2009).  
   The case of Romanians is emblematic of both this idea that 
Italians must react if they want to be in control of their territory and 
of the conflict with the Left. Slogans such as „Se torniamo al 
governo via i Romeni‟ (Roselli, 2007) were used in the League‟s 
electoral campaigns to gain a broader consensus. If Chinese and 
Muslim immigrants are tied to their fixed identity as Mafiosi and 
terrorists, the case of Romanians is ever more controversial. Most 
of the time simply labelled as „zingari‟, they are denied any 
recognition of their identity and internal difference in term of 
ethnic, cultural, national and religious belonging. The common trait 
under which they are grouped together is that of their nomadic 
lifestyle, while no distinction is made between non-nomadic 
Romanians, Roma and Sinti of other nationalities, included Italian. 
Indeed, despite the fact that many of them are Italian and have been 
such for centuries, they represent the ultimate „foreigner‟ and the 
essential criminals. Their innate difference is expressed through a 
series of stereotypes, as for instance the fact that „Il furto per i 
nomadi non ha lo stesso significato che ha per noi‟ (Gibelli, 
2007a). Their presence is linked with an increase in criminality and 
particularly with a rise of theft, child kidnapping and all sorts of 
„heinous crimes‟ in the immediate proximity of their camps. This is 
why the mayors of the North demand the power to deal with them 
at a local level, with the aim of forbidding their presence within 
their cities and sending them to build their barracks in councils 
ruled by the „more tolerant‟ Left (Gibelli, 2007a; Roselli, 2007). 
Perceived as seeking to exploit a state that they do not recognize 
and to live by stealing what they did not work for, they represent 
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the last „other‟, the most marginalized community (Ibid.). The idea 
that Italians have the right to control and protect their territory 
justifies the increasing violence against immigrants, actions that 
occasionally are not only legitimised but even triggered by some 
among the League‟s most extreme representatives. While 
legitimising such violent episodes, the party follows a double 
strategy in order to present itself as non racist: on the one hand it 
remarks upon the idea that Italians (not only Padanians) are the real 
victims and those discriminated against as they cannot be „padroni‟ 
in their own home, while, on the other hand, it reminds its 
detractors of the fact that solidarity represents a central value of the 
Lega‟s political thought. According to this rhetoric of victimhood, 
not only are „leghisti‟ unfairly considered racist, but they are also 
denied the right to freedom of expression, since every time they 
make public their position on immigration they are classified as 
intolerant. This was the case with the arrest in Brussels of European 
MP Borghezio following his demonstration outside the parliament 
wearing an anti-Islam T-shirt in September 2007. The party 
commented that episode stating that in Europe as much as in Italy 
people are denied the right to express their ideas in a peaceful way 
(Boiocchi, 2007). As a result, according to them, they have become 
the ultimate victims, to whom the most basic civil rights are denied, 
while the need to be politically correct brings about paradoxical 
situations such as that of removing the crucifix from classrooms in 
order not to offend Muslim pupils and families (Gibelli, 2007c; 
Gibelli, 2007h; Montanari, 2007a).  This last case is considered 
emblematic of a clear discrimination against Italian citizens 
together with a series of other situations, as for instance the fact 
that they have to pay taxes to fund the CPT (Centro di permanenza 
temporanea) in Lampedusa and pay for people that, once escaped, 
will also steal from their houses. Another example is that of tourists 
who travel on planes which also take on board illegal immigrants 
who need to be brought back to their countries. Both examples are 
used here to show how Italians are the true victims (Polledri and 
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Maraventano, 2007).  If the groups of immigrants mentioned until 
now share the common characteristic of being plotters planning to 
exploit the state without respecting it, others are, according to the 
party‟s strategy, those who need its solidarity. Whenever the 
League is accused of being racist, its leader and followers are keen 
to remind their detractors of the several initiatives and foundations 
that see them committed to providing relief and support for 
disadvantaged populations in their own countries. Such 
philanthropic actions are carried out in the name of an immutable 
principle: „aiutiamoli ad aiutarsi‟ or „aiutiamoli a casa loro‟ (Bossi, 
2009). This principle, derived from the party‟s anti-colonial belief 
that people have the right to be sovereign in their own countries, is 
aimed at demanding the same attitude of respect for Italian citizens. 
The anti-immigrant rhetoric of the articles published in La Padania 
is often mitigated by the claim that „Umanitaria Padania‟ or Co.Pa 
(Cooperazione Padana) has always been active in offering support 
to countries such as Somalia, Serbia, Romania, Eritrea, Bulgaria 
and others (Mariani, 2006). These initiatives, as well as those of the 
voluntary association interestingly named „guerrieri della pace‟, are 
usually only mentioned to prove a more general point – the 
Northern League is not racist  –  whereas in none of the articles 
examined is it possible to find details of what exactly has been 
done in each country. The point here is clearly that of showing how 
the party‟s political action takes into account the value of 
solidarity. A brief analysis of the latter, in relation to the concept of 
Christian charity, is useful in order to better understand how both 
the League‟s definition of (national) identity and the relationship 
with the Catholic Church have changed in the last decade and more 
precisely since the Muslim presence within the country has taken 
centre stage in the debate on immigration.  
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8. The League and the Catholic Church, selective and long-
distance solidarity 
Following Oneto, „La solidarietà e l‟amore per il prossimo 
rientrano sicuramente fra i doveri cristiani che sono parte della 
nostra cultura, ma che meritano alcune considerazioni: innanzittutto 
il prossimo (lo dice la parola) è chi ci è prossimo, vicino, parente, 
famigliare. Il nostro prossimo vero è chi appartiene alla nostra 
comunità antica e chi ha sottoscritto con noi un contratto sociale, 
anche istituzionale. Poi, se ne avanza, ci si dedica agli altri, ma 
questa estensione non può essere intesa come un dovere 
comunitario‟ (Oneto, 2004). Despite the fact that Oneto, to a 
certain extent, takes distance from the Christian idea of an 
indiscriminate universal solidarity, it is important here to remember 
that the Catholic Church itself has recently moved torwards a more 
restrictive idea of the concept, as proved by the CEI (Italian 
Episcopal Conference) guidelines to deal with the concession of 
churches, or other premises belonging to the Church, to non-
Catholic religious groups.  
   What is interesting in the Northern League‟s rhetoric on 
solidarity is the fact that it also stresses the need for a common 
Christian identity that needs to be protected from the Islamization 
of the country (Indini, 2007a). In this sense, the endangered 
identity which the party is committed to save from external threats 
becomes one primarily characterized by its Catholicism and, even 
more interestingly, a national one. In other words, when referring 
to a dying culture, threatened by the arrival of immigrants, the 
League has recently extended this identity to all Italians while 
using the terms „Italian‟ and „Catholic‟ or „Christian‟ as 
interchangeable. In this respect, by taking the streets of Padania to 
demonstrate against immigration in the attempt to protect Italian 
identity, the League is also „in piazza per salvare i cristiani‟ 
(Gibelli, 2007h). Another common enemy of both the Church and 
the political party is what this latter defines as „questo laicismo che 
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ci mortifica‟. Secularism is associated by the League with political 
correctness: both attitudes, used in the attempt not to offend 
cultures different from „ours‟, force Italians to deny or reject the 
historical Catholic traditions which informed Italian national 
identity (Gibelli, 2007c).  
   Solidarity, according to the Lega, has to be reciprocal and 
dialogue is only possible with those countries which show respect 
for this identity. In this sense, Italy and the West in general should 
fight for their rights not only at home but also abroad, in countries 
such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, where Catholics are 
discriminated against because of their religion and are not free to 
wear religious symbols or celebrate mass even in private spaces, 
and are losing their jobs for the same reason (Maroni et al., 2007). 
Intolerance towards Catholicism is considered as „intolleranza 
verso la nostra cultura‟ , „una ritrovata identità che non può certo 
essere barattata con il pacifismo a scapito della verità‟ (Ibid). While 
accusing Islam of being intolerant in its claim to be the only true 
religion, the League presents Catholicism in the same terms (Ibid.). 
The parallel with the attitude of the Catholic Church in this respect 
is too striking not to assume that the League is actually borrowing 
the Church‟s language to put forward its claims, occasionally even 
quoting Pope Benedict XVI, following a strategy aimed at turning 
Padania‟s war against immigration into a common battle for 
Christianity and Italian national identity, and therefore relevant for 
the whole country and for the West in general (Gibelli, 2007b). 
Both political actors put forward a definition of the concept of 
solidarity based on the idea of reciprocity and directed exclusively 
at selected groups, who are perceived as easier to assimilate, while 
considering the case of Muslim immigrants as the ultimate other, 
the enemy within, that needs to be fought rather than integrated.  
   Despite this common battle and the recurrent references to a new 
definition of Italian Catholic identity, the League has not entirely 
sorted its difficult relationship with the Church. The Church is after 
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all still the political actor most critical of the measures put forward 
by the party to deal with immigration, which it often describes as 
racist and unacceptable, as for instance after the recent approval of 
the so-called „pacchetto sicurezza‟ and the introduction of the 
crime of clandestinity (Anon., 2009f). However, this relationship 
has deeply changed in the last decade, and the two powers are 
today closer than ever before, as can be proven by looking at the 
first hostile exchange of views between the two in the early 1990s.  
   As Moia recalls, scholars were quite surprised when „a survey 
commissioned to the Department of Sociology of the Università 
Cattolica by the Christian Democratic Party revealed that the 
majority of the Northern League supporters were young, wealthy, 
self employed and had voted until then for the DC. The most 
worrying result of the investigation was, according to researchers, 
the fact that more than two thirds of the interviewed defined 
themselves as practising Catholics. A statement which indicated a 
belonging [to Catholicism] incompatible with the support given to 
an “autonomist utopia” characterised by a strong racist attitude, 
social egoism, lack of solidarity‟ (Moia, 1997: 5). Scholars‟ 
bewilderment was justified by years of difficult relationships 
between the Church and the Lega, during which the party had 
several times tried to win the Catholic support while at the same 
time provoking the Church and more or less directly challenging its 
power (Moia, 1997). The document Ripartire dal popolo, written 
by Pivetti in 1991 to prove that her party was committed to the 
values of family and solidarity, was aimed at overcoming the 
rejection on the part of the Church of what its representatives 
perceived as an intolerant political actor that they were not willing 
to engage in dialogue with (Moia, 1997). The League‟s second 
attempt to gain legitimacy came in December of the same year, 
when the Catholic hierarchy officially recognized the Republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia, a move based on the acknowledgement of 
people‟s right to self-determination. The news was immediately 
reported in Autonomia Lombarda, the Lega‟s newspaper, in an 
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article which underlined how the same opinion could apply to the 
Padanian case and how this position could be interpreted as a sign 
that after years of suspicion the Church‟s attitude towards the party 
and its idea of federalism, initially considered „parochial‟ and 
„xenophobic‟, was eventually changing (Moia, 1997: 131).  
   In 1992, the scandal of „mani pulite‟ played a double role in this 
relationship, contributing on the one hand to uniting the Church 
and the League to stand against the traditional political parties 
while, on the other hand, giving Bossi‟s party a pretext to attack the 
Catholic hierarchy for its connivance with the old DC, deeply 
involved in the scandals (Pivetti, 1992). At that time, Moia recalls, 
„i tempi dell‟apertura sono ancora lontani‟ (Moia, 1997: 42). The 
Church started recognising the party when it became relevant in 
terms of electoral results in the 1996 elections: since then many 
Catholic representatives, such as Cardinals Martini and Ruini and 
Como bishop Maggiolini, started reconsidering their previous 
judgment of the party and opening to the League (Moia, 1997). In 
general, what Moioli said in 1991 about this relationship can be 
still considered valid today: „l‟intransigente avversione della 
Chiesa al leghismo‟ is inversely proportional to the Church‟s 
participation in politics. In other words, the less the single 
representatives are active in the political arena, the more they 
criticize Bossi‟s party (Moioli, 1991: 131). This pattern seems to 
confirm an element which emerged in the previous chapter from 
the analysis of the role of the Church in the debate on immigration: 
the higher the position Catholic representatives occupy in Church‟s 
hierarchy, the more they show concern for the phenomenon. This is 
particularly true when the debate on immigration focuses on 
Muslim foreigners. On this theme the Church and the League seem 
to share today more than the Church would admit, as both this and 
the previous chapter have shown. To simplify, it could be said that 
the Church works on two different levels: on the one hand its 
hierarchy officially condemns anything the League expresses in 
politically incorrect terms and anything which can be seen by 
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public opinion as racist, insisting instead on the values of dialogue 
and mutual understanding. On the other hand, it takes part in 
controversial initiatives as long as they are justified by some sort of 
pseudo-intellectual premise, as happened for instance when priest 
Don Baget Bozzo and Cardinal Giacomo Biffi gave a speech 
during a demonstration against immigration organised by the 
League to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Poitiers as a 
definitive moment of victory over Islam on the part of Christianity 
(Guolo, 2004).  
   The presence of Catholic representatives at a demonstration 
which had the double aim of reaffirming the supremacy of 
Christianity and protecting its values from Muslim assault was not 
commented on neither by the Pope nor by any other member of the 
hierarchy. This is not the only occasion when representatives of the 
League and of the Church have stood united against Islam: another 
example is the participation of some of them at the demonstration 
against the project for the construction of a mosque in Lodi (Anon., 
2002a). Leaving aside the different reasons behind the League‟s 
and the Church‟s response to Muslim immigration, it can be said 
that what clearly emerges as their common concern is the threat it 
poses to a traditional and Catholic Italian national identity. In this 
sense, by turning the struggle for the North into a struggle for the 
nation and for Christianity, the League set out on a path already 
taken by the Church in its attempt to link its own decline with that 
of the nation. It is quite clear that this shift in the relationship 
between the two powers was purely instrumental and centred only 
on the identification of the enemy rather than in the strategies to 
defeat it. Finally, both powers are more concerned with achieving 
their own goals, whether it means (re)gaining a declining support 
or obtaining privileges in the allocation of resources, more than 
with immigration. Nevertheless, they cooperate to highlight the 
need for the state to develop stricter measures in dealing with 
immigration. In order to conclude the discussion on the League‟s 
response to immigration and the comparison with the Church‟s 
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reaction, it is now necessary to address the definition of the model 
put forward by the political party, as it emerges from the analysis 
carried out until this point.  
 
9. The immigrant as a homo sacer and the permanent state of 
exception 
The review of the articles recently published in La Padania showed 
how and to what extent the party‟s anti-immigration stance evolved 
in the last three years. This analysis has provided a fairly complete 
picture of the concerns and a general, albeit implicit, outline of the 
alternative idea of citizenship which emerges from such concerns. 
The debate on the concepts of identity and otherness in the 
League‟s public discourse contributed to putting forward an 
original and very exclusionary idea of coexistence of different life 
styles and ideas of the good life characterized by its attitude of 
closure towards the newly arrived. Many of the traits defined by 
scholars as typical of different racisms are evident in the Lega‟s 
political thought. As already mentioned, the party‟s attitude to 
foreigners is marked by a constant struggle justified by the need to 
„save‟ a threatened identity. Evident signs of territorial racism are 
linked to the battle to keep control of physical places, such as 
squares, streets and in general the idea of „territory‟, particularly 
when the places „won‟ to the locals were destined to be turned into 
mosques or when the concentration of foreigners belonging to the 
same ethnic group supposedly threatens the local economy or 
social life, as in the case of Milan‟s Chinatown. The latter case is 
emblematic of competitive racism on the part of the League and its 
supporters, as the hostility is triggered by the prejudice that 
immigrants are unfair competitors in the market place as well as in 
the allocation of resources, which should be granted to the 
Padanian/Italian population in the first place. Additional racism 
also features clearly in the party‟s political action and public 
discourse. Following Balbo and Manconi, this is characterised by 
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the need to provide intolerant attitudes with a rational justification 
and is articulated in three main phases: the constant comments on 
criminal facts and their exaggeration, the representation of 
immigrants‟ life as miserable and the complete neglect of their 
everyday life or the private dimension of their life, which are all 
factors that clearly inform the League discourse on immigration. As 
the review of the League‟s articles tried to show, the process 
through which foreigners acquire relevance in the national media 
merely in relation to their being „criminal‟ or a threat, is 
characterised by the vagueness of the information provided and by 
a language that relies on „assumptions‟ and „probabilities‟, which 
have as their first result that of triggering irrational and often 
unjustified fears among the public.  
 These worries of the local society, regardless of how distant from 
an objective interpretation of the situation, become then „reality‟, 
according to a mechanism described by scholars such as Dal Lago 
as „autopoietico‟. Until the end of the First Republic, the state and 
the different subcultures provided a coherent image of Italian 
society and contributed to putting forward a shared and 
unchallenged „definition‟ of a society which, despite internal 
tensions, could be perceived as unitary. This „sapere uniforme‟ 
typical of the 1990s was considered a means to distinguish what 
was moral/legal from what was not (Dal Lago, 2004: 77). Since the 
1990s however, the „canovaccio‟, the scheme followed by the 
newspapers when referring to immigration, was a fixed one, 
characterised by three phases: a direct threat to the locals on the 
part of immigrants, the protest of the locals, the arrival of the police 
and the (only temporary) relief for the locals, destined to last only 
the brief period of time between different „assaults‟ or crimes (Ibid: 
73). In the case of the League, it can be said that this last phase of 
relief does not feature in the discourse on immigration as the fear is 
exasperated to a level when the threat is presented as constant and 
the crimes committed as increasing in number and brutality. As Dal 
Lago explains, this mechanism is nothing more than an empty 
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tautology, since it is the very action of sending out an alarm which 
„proves‟ the fact it is denouncing (Ibid). In other words, the process 
of providing definitions of reality works according to a mechanism 
in which if citizens define a situation as real, then its consequences 
became real (Thomas, 1928).  
    As classic studies on the autopoietic construction of reality have 
shown, subjective definitions of a situation become real, and 
therefore objective, particularly when they are related to delicate 
aspects such as the fear of a perceived enemy (Dal Lago, 2004: 73; 
Goffman, 1981). This particular way of „manufacturing‟ reality is 
reinforced by the generally accepted idea that the victim has the 
right to be the first to provide a definition of the situation, which 
inevitably will influence the following definitions (Dal Lago, 2004: 
74). By exploiting the change in the paradigm used to provide these 
definitions, determined by the crisis of the 1990s, the Northern 
League has managed to turn „fear‟ into a means to shape public 
opinion and gain support (Ibid.: 77). Another classic mechanism 
which assumes particular relevance in the party‟s rhetoric consists 
in the „victimisation‟ of the aggressor and in transferring the blame 
onto the real victims (Ibid.: 63). In this sense, by presenting 
themselves as discriminated against in not being granted freedom 
of expression and in being sanctioned for their racism, the party‟s 
representatives can turn the immigrants into the perpetrators and 
portrait them as not only aggressive and not willing to accept 
„Italian‟ (Catholic) values but also as the direct cause of the 
leghisti‟s marginalisation in their own territory. Taking this process 
a step further, it then becomes clear that the status of victim and the 
frustration of the locals can be used, and indeed have been used, to 
justify episodes of violence against the immigrants, turned into the 
target of an „acceptable‟ or „understandable‟ intolerance.   
   By making the immigrant relevant to the political life of the 
country only in „virtue‟ of the crimes s/he commits or is „naturally 
inclined‟ to commit and preventing her/him from acquiring any 
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role but scapegoat in the public sphere, the League turns him into a 
„homo sacer,‟ as Agamben describes him. In his Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), the philosopher analyses 
the classical definitions of sovereignty and citizenship in the 
attempt to describe phenomena such as Fascism and the Holocaust. 
Through the categories of rule, example and exception, and 
inclusion and exclusion, Agamben defines the homo sacer as the 
„exception‟ (from the Latin ex capere, to take outside). The homo 
sacer represents an exception as he is banned from society and all 
his rights are revoked; his life is crystallised in a condition in which 
he can be killed without his killers being sanctioned but he cannot 
be sacrificed in a ritual. His is a „human life […] included in the 
juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its 
capacity to be killed)‟ (Agamben, 1998: 8). In this sense, his figure 
is symmetrical to that of the sovereign in his being inside and 
outside the law at the same time. Agamben distinguishes between 
human beings‟ „zoe‟ (bare life) and „bios‟ (qualified life and 
therefore also and mainly political life) and argues that the homo 
sacer is considered simply as bare life and is not recognised in the 
political sphere. To a certain extent, he represents the limit, indeed 
the exception, essential to set the rule: he is excluded from the good 
life only achievable though politics while existing as a body that 
cannot reach a „life worth being lived‟ in the only possible way, 
which is through the state and therefore through recognition by the 
sovereign (namely the law). This bare life that characterises the 
homo sacer, according to Agamben, is „a life that as such is 
exposed to a violence without precedent in the most profane and 
banal ways‟ (Ibid.: 114). The bare life „expresses precisely both 
life‟s subjection to a power over death and life's irreparable 
exposure in the relation of abandonment‟ (Agamben, 1998: 83). 
Here lies the paradox of the condition of the homo sacer: he can be 
recognised by society precisely and only for his being just bare life 
and precluded from acquiring political relevance. In this sense, the 
law that decides on the exclusion at the same time gives the 
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individual an identity. This identity consists in being the exception, 
outside the society and the law and for this reason „included in it‟ 
as what is different from the norm, what citizens can measure their 
inclusion against.   
   Immigrants, by occupying the bottom level in the work sector, 
have traditionally contributed to elevating the status of those locals 
who used to be „the last‟ in the social ladder and therefore  have 
also made it possible for Italians to acquire a new and more 
desirable role within society and to build a new confidence and 
feeling of achievement. In this sense, to a certain extent immigrants 
were included in the receiving society as their status was different 
in level but not in substance from that of the natives, as in the case 
of Southerners who had migrated to the North since the 1950s and 
who, despite an initial discrimination, found in the factories and in 
the workers‟ struggle a means to integrate. On the contrary, the 
homo sacer‟s presence is not considered to be of the same nature as 
that of citizens. Not only is he not relevant as a term of comparison 
in the judgement of what is to be successful or integrated, he 
simply is not part of that social ladder and therefore has no chance 
to move up and to be included or to integrate. As Agamben 
explains, the homo sacer can be included within society only by 
being identified as the outsider, the one who does not belong. This 
condition is permanent as it constitutes precisely the essence, the 
nature that characterises that human being and his category. The 
homo sacer cannot escape his destiny of exclusion as this does not 
depend on his actions or intentions/desires but is determined by 
birth.   
   Even though outlined for a different context, namely to account 
for the state of exception represented by Fascism and of the threat 
imposed by it onto the „sacred men‟, the victims, the character of 
the homo sacer resembles that of the immigrant as intended by the 
Northern League. In this sense, the immigrant, illegal and legal, is 
excluded from taking part in the political life and from access to 
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civil rights, while, at the same time, he becomes part of the society 
as „the exception‟, the bare life, and can be included into it only in 
virtue of this status as „other‟. This means that the concession to 
enter the country can be granted only as permanently temporary, 
precarious and subjected to a law that the immigrant cannot 
contribute to formulating nor can he challenge. Immigrants are 
allowed to interact with the community only as bare life, only as 
living signs of the boundary between the inside and the outside. 
Their life is in the hands of the sovereign as he can decide on their 
„life‟ and „death‟, which is their being temporarily accepted or 
permanently/temporarily excluded, whereas the option of being 
permanently accepted is not contemplated. As Agamben argues, we 
live in a society where the state of exception is increasingly 
common and can be extended indefinitely according to the will of 
the sovereign, or, in other words, of the law and of those who have 
the power of formulating and enforcing it. In this sense, the 
Northern League, with its influence in the state decision-making on 
the issue of immigration and for its actual „being‟ the state can be 
seen as the sovereign who has the power to decide on the life and 
death of the immigrant. Life here does not coincide with rights: the 
premise for this comparison between the immigrant and the homo 
sacer is that they have neither rights nor the chance to change their 
status. Life means instead the temporary concession/permission to 
live in the country until the circumstances, the laws created by the 
sovereign, change. What is important here is also the fact that in his 
being outside the law, the sovereign does not need to justify 
rationally or to explain the shifts or sudden turns in its strategy of 
government and therefore, applying this to the situation of 
immigrants, also in regulating their presence within the country. 
The practical implications of this mechanism, whereby immigrants 
can be granted a temporary and revocable right to live in the 
country or expelled from the territory on the basis of a new 
disposition or new laws (Agamben, 1998: 16), will be analysed in 
the following chapter, which will focus on the laws on immigration  
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   An example of arbitrary decisions on the part of the sovereign in 
this respect is the exploitation of an ambiguous presentation of the 
offer/demand ratio in the work sector, coupled with a stereotyped 
interpretation of immigrants‟ identities and incompatibility with the 
nationals. This is the case of the so-called „badanti‟, whose role has 
been often and again recently discussed with reference to their 
being much needed in an ageing society in which women‟s 
productive and reproductive roles have become difficult to 
reconcile. The League‟s position on the subject has been one of 
support for the regularisation of more female immigrants but 
strictly limited to those employed to look after the elderly. These 
new sanatorie have been presented by the party as una tantum, 
exceptional measures. In this sense, those who will be allowed to 
enter the country will benefit from an exception to the rule (no 
more immigrants) that can be revoked, extended or suspended at 
any time by the sovereign and in this sense represents a typical case 
of precariousness. In an opposite way, the party‟s rhetoric against 
the regularisation of male immigrants is justified by the idea of a 
saturated job market which does not take into account the real 
needs of the country and is based on the stereotyped idea that 
immigrants steal locals‟ jobs and make the economy weaker and 
less competitive. This position exposes the League‟s schizophrenia, 
the gap between the public discourse aimed at gaining electoral 
success and the real demand for an immigrant workforce on the 
part of the factories of the North. In its manifest contradiction, this 
purely strategic attitude can be labelled as „simulative politics‟ in 
the meaning given to the expression by Blühdorn (2007) and Cento 
Bull (2009) as the following chapter will argue.  
   In publicly denying both entry to a clearly much needed foreign 
labour force and the benefits it has brought and would bring to the 
local and national economy while portraying the immigrants as 
„parasites‟, the party seems to suffer from a manifest „spider flower 
syndrome‟. Arachnitis uniflora, vulgarly called „flor de la  arana‟ 
(spider flower) has been recently discovered in Chile by a group of 
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German scientists from Basel University, who realised that despite 
its external similarity with other plants, it is not capable of carrying 
out a photosynthesis. They analysed the plant in order to 
understand what alternative strategy it had developed in order not 
to die. As they explain, many species of plants generally grow 
close to fungi which they use to extract minerals from the soil, 
while giving back to them sugars that they are unable to find. This 
relationship between plants and fungi is commonly described by 
researchers as one of cooperation and mutual support in the giving 
and receiving balance, even though the fungi are usually perceived 
by a less informed public as archetypal parasites. What is 
interesting in the research of the German team is that the Arachnitis 
cannot produce the sugar through photosynthesis, and therefore is 
unable to provide the fungi with such sugars. Nonetheless, it 
manages to exploit them by taking the minerals they extract from 
the soil and at the same time using them as bridges to take the 
sugars from other plants near them. In this sense, while it takes 
both minerals and sugars by exploiting the fungi, it does not give 
anything back and therefore can be considered as the true parasite, 
which explains why it is commonly called „the cheater‟. Another 
element of interest in this discovery is the fact that from the outside 
it is not possible to see this difference between other plants and the 
spider flower and that its behaviour in the long term will determine 
the death of the fungi and an alteration of the system of which they 
are part (www.mycologia.org). The comparison, notwithstanding 
difference, with the relationship between the Lega/Arachnitis and 
the immigrants/fungi is clear enough and needs no further 
explanation. What should be remarked upon here are two main 
concepts: firstly, that the League‟s attitude in the long term could 
determine an implosion of a system where immigrants are needed 
but only partially/temporally recognised in the work sector, and do 
not have civil rights or visibility in the social sphere apart from 
being associated with episodes of criminality. Secondly, that 
despite the constant reference to immigrants as parasites seeking to 
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exploit resources that they did not contribute to create, a deeper 
analysis of the productive role of foreigners might prove this 
interpretation wrong, as shown by the Caritas/Migrantes document 
cited above, according to which immigrants‟ contribution to Italian 
internal revenue (gettito fiscale) (3,1 billion Euros) largely 
overcomes what the state spends for them (Caritas Migrantes, 
2008).  
   Leaving aside the links between the national economy and the 
immigrants‟ impact on it, this analysis helps to explain what model 
of state the League is implicitly or explicitly putting forward in 
reaction to the newly arrived. First of all, it can be said that the 
party is the only political actor which directly refers to classical 
models developed in other countries to deal with „otherness‟. Albeit 
mentioned in dismissive terms, multiculturalism and the experience 
of the UK in dealing with immigration are used as a term of 
comparison, a point of reference in order to outline an alternative 
model of state and a different definition of citizenship. The Church 
also referred to a vague and dangerous multiculturalism even 
though its rhetoric in this sense remains general and does not touch 
upon specific countries, a choice probably justified by its trans-
national interests and claimed universality, which require more 
attention to diplomacy. I define the model put forward by the 
League as an alternative to a multiculturalism destined to fail as an 
„institutionalised state of exception‟, which means a state under 
permanent „exceptional‟ circumstances related to an internal crisis 
and to an external threat. The expression clearly represents a 
contradiction in terms, since to make an exception means „to not 
treat someone or something according to the usual rules‟ 
(Cambridge advanced learners‟ dictionary, 3rd edition). Clearly if 
the exception is permanent, it becomes the rule, hence the logical 
gap: in this way the perceived internal and external challenges, 
turned into reality by the definition of them provided by political 
actors, media and public opinion, are exploited to turn exceptional, 
una tantum, reversible measures put forward to deal with 
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immigration into „normality‟. This model of state is based on a 
hybrid between an identitarian and a repressive/legalitarian 
approach to otherness. On the one hand, a „strong identitarianism‟ 
is based on the fear that „the presence of immigrants will alter the 
national culture and may consequently pursue a strategy of limiting 
and screening immigration flows and citizenship, with a strong 
preference for immigrants of national origins or […] culturally 
omogeneous‟, an attitude that often leads to xenophobic and racist 
positions (Zincone, 2006: 5). On the other hand, the legalitarian 
approach aims mainly to „suppress crime and terrorism by the 
immigrants‟, a position in theory shared by all parties, with 
different degrees of tolerance of crimes, and in the case of the 
League with a „zero tolerance‟ level (Ibid.). This model of state 
implies the subscription to a unidirectional social contract, which 
demands a complete fulfilment of requirements and commitment to 
determined values on the part of immigrants and a strict respect of 
a set of duties. At the same time immigrants have no access to civil 
rights and to resources, from visibility in the public sphere to 
freedom of religion and expression to the vote and down to 
accommodation, welfare system and safe work conditions.  
   In the classic definitions provided by thinkers such as Hobbes 
and Locke, the social contract is based on the balance between 
what the individual loses (part of his freedom) and what he gains 
(mainly protection). In the model outlined by Locke, the citizen has 
the right to withdraw from the contract (by killing the sovereign) 
when the state does not fulfil its role and cannot guarantee three 
main rights: property, freedom and security (Locke, 1651, 
ed.2009). The immigrant does not have such rights, because by 
signing the contract s/he is simply agreeing to fulfil a set of duties 
but is not being granted any right apart from being temporarily 
allowed to enter the country. The type of state developed by the 
League resembles more Hobbes‟ Leviathan (1690, ed.1988) in the 
principle that there cannot be any sort of rebellion against the 
sovereign: the „citizen‟ cannot be freed from his status of 
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subjection, since the king cannot do any wrong. He is the law and 
his actions set the rule: by acting he provides definitions of what is 
right and what is wrong. Applying this paradigm to the „state of 
exception‟ what is interesting is the fact that the permanent state of 
threat and emergency allows the sovereign to change the rules 
without warning and suddenly if necessary, whenever citizens‟ 
security is perceived as at risk. In this sense, the immigrant 
confirms his position as an outsider: since he is not a citizen, the 
state does not have the duty to protect him. 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
The analysis conducted until this point showed what model of state 
the Northern League has put forward in its attempts to react to 
immigration. It also explained how the position of the party on the 
matter has shifted since the invention of Padania and how 
increasingly strict is has become recently. Several interesting 
changes have occurred since the early days of the party. Firstly, the 
aggressive rhetoric directed at Southerners and the central state has 
faded leaving room for the invective against the new enemy: the 
„extracomunitario‟. Until the creation of the new nation, the so-
called „terroni‟ represented the main „problem‟ for the North in 
terms of allocation of resources that should be distributed to Padani 
in the first place, and in terms of a not desired „multiethnic state‟ in 
which they represented the „other‟. By exploiting the „difficult‟ 
coexistence of different ideas of the good life, crystallised in fixed 
dichotomies (clean-dirty, hard working-lazy, etc.), the League 
aimed at achieving independence or some degree of autonomy 
from Rome. Padanians were portraited as victims on whom Fascim 
had imposed a „fake‟ national identity, which did not respect their 
ethnic and cultural diversity. Europe was seen as a role model to 
whom the new nation aspired to belong and under which it hoped 
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to see its independence recognised and protected. In terms of 
shared values and economic perspectives Europe was much closer 
to Padania than Italy. Southern immigrants within the territory were 
confined to the lower rung of the social ladder, perceived as 
difficult to integrate and therefore isolated albeit somehow included 
de facto.  
   Since the invention of Padania and following the increasing 
relevance of foreign arrivals in the public debate, the League 
started using a catastrophist rhetoric in order to create the new 
enemy, a mechanism intensified by a feared Muslim „invasion‟. It 
can be said that the Southerners‟ integration (albeit not complete) 
has improved since this shift of focus on the part of the League, 
which brought about a new definition of national identity that for 
the first time referred to the old nation and shared Christian values. 
As shown in the section on the relationship between the League 
and the Church, this was quite a dramatic change in strategy. 
Immigrants who are allowed to enter the country are segregated in 
the bottom level of society and do not have guarantees that they 
will be able to remain „in‟. They have no civil rights and no voice 
in the public sphere but are necessary for two reasons: firstly 
because they are much needed in the work sector and secondly 
because the party still needs a „scapegoat‟ to fuel its political 
action. However, their presence, visible only in circumstances that 
link them to criminality, is a revocable concession rather than a 
right, a condition that turns them into „homines sacri‟. Illegal 
immigrants, but often also regular immigrants, are confined to an 
external orbit from which they can gain no access to the country: 
these are the generic „extracomunitari‟, Roma, Albanians, and 
mainly Muslims. There is no space for these foreigners, who are 
essentially portrayed as carrying a fixed identity attributed to all 
members of that particular ethnic or religious background. The 
most „revolutionary‟ change in this new model is that the borders 
of Padania have come to coincide with those of Italy: the old 
internal division seems to have been forgotten in the name of the 
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need to make the issue of immigration and the perceived threat 
relevant at a national level. In this sense the party takes a path 
already taken by the Church in presenting Italian national identity 
and Christian values as coinciding and, therefore, as both under 
attack. As a result, all Italians, no matter whether Northerners or 
Southerners, are supposed to share the same anxiety towards the 
new arrivals and are called to form a united front in order to „save‟ 
their common identity and a shared territory. In the case of the 
Northern League this strategy could also be justified by the attempt 
to gain support in areas of the country where it had not had 
electoral success.  
   The League, as much as the Catholic Church, uses as a means to 
convey its message, a rhetoric based on victimhood, following the 
process described above, according to which transferring the blame 
onto the victims contributes to legitimising and making more 
objective a subjective and arbitrary „definition‟ of the situation. The 
two political actors have developed original interpretations of the 
concept of solidarity that to a certain extent overlap: if the Church 
puts forward a „selective solidarity‟, only directed at those 
perceived as holding similar values or as easier to assimilate, thus 
excluding mainly the Muslims, the League‟s approach invokes a 
long-distance solidarity aimed at helping people as long as they 
stay in their own country. Both powers consider helping first their 
own people as the more adequate criterion to discriminate between 
those who can be „saved‟ or granted temporary entrance and those 
who will be „condemned‟  or „permanently excluded‟ (in both cases 
represented by Muslims). Emphasising the main difference 
between the Church‟s and the League‟s attitude in this respect can 
help to explain better the models they outline. If in the paternalistic 
theocratic state developed by the Church everybody can 
theoretically and potentially become „a member of the family‟ as 
long as they give up their religious identity and embrace 
Catholicism, in the case of the League such access does not depend 
on the willingness of the immigrants to accept and recognise 
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different values, including the mainstream religion. On the one 
hand, by erasing their past and accepting to be enlightened by the 
truth, immigrants can be recognised by the Church as equal and 
become automatically Italian. On the other hand, in the case of the 
Lega, as mentioned above, immigrants‟ will to integrate, to 
subscribe to a different set of values and forget their origins, is not 
enough for them to be granted access. Their exclusion is decided at 
birth, particularly if they come from countries or religious 
backgrounds perceived as intrinsically adverse to the West. 
Moreover, while it can be said that, albeit extremely strict, the 
assimilation rule imposed by the Church is crystal clear, the same 
cannot be said of the political party, since, as already stated, the 
complete lack of regulation is the result of a permanent state of 
exception, which means chaos and impossibility for the outsider to 
take action in order to integrate.  
   This thesis argues that the Northern League‟s political discourse 
on immigration and the position of the Church have a dramatically 
strong  influence both in legitimising the state‟s exclusionary and 
restrictive policing making and in shaping a public opinion which 
welcomes and demands such measures. Despite their being moved 
by different concerns and aiming at different goals, the similar 
strategy and the common rhetoric used by these political actors and 
the united front they create contribute to reinforcing their position 
vis-à-vis a state which cannot ignore their requests, particularly 
when they have shaped an interpretation of the situation accepted 
by the public as „real‟.  
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Chapter IV 
The Italian legislation on immigration 
1. Introduction  
Public debates on immigration have emerged in many Western 
European countries since the 1950s and have influenced domestic 
policies and integration models. Italy has been affected by similar 
debates considerably later, for historical and political reasons 
addressed in the introduction and in the second chapter of this 
thesis. The development of the legislation aimed at regulating the 
phenomenon followed a similar path, being formulated at different 
stages only since the late 1980s. Before then, given the general 
attitude towards immigration, perceived as somewhat non-
problematic by both the political class and public opinion, Italy 
relied on pre-existent Fascist laws to regulate the phenomenon. At 
the same time, the on-going discussion on national identity among 
intellectuals and in the media, based on a reinterpretation of the 
history of the country, ignored the growing number of arrivals until 
as late as the early 1990s or at least did not consider them as an 
issue linked to the need for a renewed sense of belonging.  
   Until the late 1980s, Italian legislation on immigration was 
mainly characterised by occasional ad hoc measures aimed at 
regulating the job market in a protectionist way. From the 1960s to 
the late 1980s, when Italy began to become aware of its 
transformation from a country of emigration into a country of 
immigration, the country lacked a long term vision and a 
unidirectional and coherent approach to the phenomenon. Through 
the analysis of the history and the development of the Italian 
legislation on immigration, this chapter will argue that to a certain 
extent this is still the case today. It will show how the discussion 
shifted from the perception of the other as „picturesque‟ and in 
need of help towards an interpretation of the foreigner as a threat 
for the culture and security of the nation and how this turn is 
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reflected in the state‟s reaction to the phenomenon. At a time when 
immigration is increasingly portrayed as causing clash of 
civilisations, symbols such as the crucifix have become emblematic 
of a war of values, and there is growing talk of an „invasion‟ of 
foreign people intentioned to conquer Italy, this chapter will 
provide an account of the transition from a generic disposition to 
welcome the newcomers to an institutionalised and often bipartisan 
emphasis upon exclusion. Taking into account the economic and 
social changes which have occurred in the last three decades, as 
well as the political discourse on immigration, this chapter will 
analyse the Italian legislation, the institutions and political actors 
responsible for the various laws and finally the more restrictive 
policies put forward by parties such as the Northern League, as part 
of what will be defined as a „simulative‟ type of politics. The 
constraints imposed by the European Union and communitarian 
laws as well as the open criticism of supranational institutions 
towards the Italian approach to the issue will also be considered.  
   Starting with the polemics on the subject between centre-right 
and centre-left coalitions, broadly illustrated in the previous 
chapter, this chapter will also aim to explain the role of many social 
groups, which have contributed to containing and limiting the 
impact of strong ideological positions on the actual making of the 
laws. It will account for the apparent lack of noticeable differences 
in the measures passed by different governments until 2008 and the 
consequent general tendency to focus on protecting the borders 
rather than promoting integration. In addressing the question of 
whether Italy is following any existing model in dealing with 
immigration or whether it is on the contrary elaborating an original 
interpretation and solution, this chapter will argue that the 
legislation to date reflects the same lack of long term-strategy and 
strong ideological orientation already encountered in the analysis of 
the positions adopted by different political actors. The formulation 
and enforcement of the selected measures will be contextualised by 
addressing the various social, economic and cultural changes as 
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well as the different migratory waves that have occurred in the 
period of time under scrutiny. Finally, the chapter will assess the 
influence of the solutions put forward by the Church and the 
League upon the policies introduced and implemented by the 
various governments. The analysis will take into account four 
possible hypothesis: 1) the laws increasingly reflect the model of 
integration put forward by the Northern League; 2) the laws fit into 
the model suggested by the Church;  3) the laws represent a 
combination of the two models or, rather, 4) they express a 
complete lack of strategic vision and do not form a coherent model 
but are on the contrary ad hoc measures emerging as responses to 
specific and temporary emergencies.  
 
2. The pre-1990s  legislation: ‘immigration without politics’ 
The first significant, albeit limited in numbers, migratory wave to 
Italy started in the aftermath of WWII, when groups of foreign 
students reached the main university cities in search of a better 
education. Until the late 1960s however, they arrived mainly from 
richer European countries such as France, Britain, Switzerland and 
Germany, while, after 1967, the year of the Greek colonels‟ coup 
d‟etàt, the number of Greek and Iranian students started to grow, 
reaching its peak in 1981-2, when foreign students registered at 
Italian universities amounted to 113,000. The following two 
decades were characterised by a steady decline in the foreign 
presence, with 30,790 permits to study in Italy in 2001-2. Such 
downturn is mainly due to the recurrent regularisation of irregular 
immigrants from the late 1980s, which provided an alternative to 
the requests for study visas. Moreover, in 1990 the Martelli law 
made it possible to convert a study permit into a work permit and 
allowed students aged 14 to 18 to join their parents who worked in 
Italy (Einaudi, 2007:85). 
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   The second migratory wave consisted in the arrival  in the 1960s 
of women employed in the domestic sector, mainly emigrating 
from the ex-colonies and from Catholic countries. Recruited by 
Catholic associations or agencies which acted as mediators, they 
tended to arrive with regular permits or with tourism visas and seek 
regularisation once in the country. Perceived as less visible than the 
men and somehow less dangerous, they represented the „invisible‟ 
immigrants and faced difficult working conditions due to a lack of 
regulation of the domestic sector. The economic boom of those 
years and the weakness of the welfare state contributed to an 
increase in the request for this type of work as well as in the 
applications to regularise those already employed but still irregular 
(Einaudi, 2007: 86; Andall, 2000). 
   If the presence of the „badanti‟ never raised concern (and even 
today is considered deeply different from the arrival of male 
immigrants) and went almost unnoticed, a different reaction was 
directed towards Tunisian workers who, since the 1970s, have 
travelled to Eastern Sicily to work as fishermen, farmers and 
builders, and immediately accused of being dangerous for the 
public order and targeted by spontaneous anti-immigrant groups 
who demanded their expulsion (Einaudi, 2007: 86-87). The fourth 
and last pre-1990s migratory wave took place between 1961 and 
1989 and was mainly directed at the industrial sector. It became 
„recognised‟ or problematic (albeit not systematically addressed) in 
the late 1970s, when growing unemployment (with peaks of 10.3% 
in the South) started causing a general resentment towards the 
newly arrived. This particular wave of arrivals triggered the debate 
on „competition‟ and „complementarity‟ in the work sector: for the 
first time the discussion revolved around whether these immigrants 
were stealing the jobs of the locals or were rather taking up jobs 
that the locals refused to do, as can be proved by an analysis of the 
newspapers of the time (Einaudi, 2007: 87-89).  
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   If until 1989 it was still possible to monitor the numbers and 
identify the nationalities of the newly arrived, since the early 1990s 
this has become rather difficult if not impossible, as illegal 
immigration grew while the presence of foreign workers increased 
in almost all sectors of the Italian economy, following events such 
as the fall of the Berlin wall, the conflict in Yugoslavia and the 
Albanian crises. The number of visas increased dramatically in 
concomitance with the so-called „sanatorie‟, una tantum measures 
employed to regularise illegal migrants in 1986, 1990 and later in 
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2008, determining a lower presence of 
irregular stays. By then the rise of the Northern League and the 
exacerbation of the discussion on the issue had contributed to place 
immigration at centre stage in the political debate.  
   Interestingly, the first measure to regulate the incoming flux was 
put forward by the Ministero del Lavoro (Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security), which, acting as the Ministry of Interior (Home 
Office), indirectly established the first guidelines of a migratory 
policy. The ministerial memorandum No. 51 of 4
 
December 1963 
introduced for the first time the link between legal entry into the 
country and possession of a valid work contract, stating that only 
those previously authorised by the Upl (Ufficio provinciale del 
lavoro) to work in Italy could apply for a visa. Such employment 
could only be granted to foreigners after ascertaining that there 
were no Italians ready or qualified to take that job. These job 
permits could be renewed for a maximum of twelve months while 
the right to live in the country could be revoked if the contract 
expired or ceased (Bonini, 1987: 105; Einaudi, 2007: 99).  This 
„circolare‟, regularly neglected in the debates on the legislation on 
immigration, is particularly interesting when compared to the so-
called Bossi-Fini law of 2000, bitterly criticised by the Left and 
often perceived as a dramatic U-turn in policy-making. A 
comparison between the two laws, which will be analysed in due 
course together with the most recent one, will highlight the fact that 
the „protectionist‟ approach, centred on the regulation of the work 
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sector, has always featured in the Italian response to immigration. 
The main consequence of this particular law was that of confining 
an important part of the labour force to a situation of illegality, 
whether that means workers entering the country illegally, finding a 
job and then pretending to apply for one from abroad or simply 
immigrants being recruited to work in the black economy.   
   The formulation and implementation of this 1963 measure was 
not preceded or accompanied by a political or cultural debate on 
immigration, but rather represented an attempt to control the job 
market as well as a response to the first manifestations of 
intolerance on the part of Italian workers. Often such tensions 
resulted in the expulsion of the so-called „falso turista‟ (fake 
tourist) which reached an average of 50 per week in 1972 (Einaudi, 
2007:102).  Soon after this first partial measure, immigration began 
to be tackled (yet again indirectly) through a series of measures 
discussed and passed between 1973 and 1990 aimed at making it 
more and more difficult for foreign students to apply to Italian 
universities, a trend broken only in 1998 with the Turco-Napolitano 
law, which removed some of the obstacles erected by the previous 
laws (Musaragno, 2001; Einaudi, 2007:105). The main 
consequence of this repressive trend (with the only exception of the 
women working in the domestic sector who regularly benefitted 
from ad hoc measures since the first sanatoria of 17
 
December 
1979) was that the new waves of immigrants were destined to 
remain illegal, particularly after the block of entries in 1982 
(Einaudi, 2007: 108; Horniziel, 1990: 110).  
   In this first phase characterised by attempted reforms, mainly 
aimed at protecting the internal job market while strengthening the 
economy, immigration was somehow depoliticised or not yet seen 
as relevant at a national level: it was, following Einaudi‟s 
definition, an „immigration without politics‟ (Einaudi, 2007). 
During this period, trade unions and Catholic associations, such as 
Caritas, acted as an emergency replacement for an inexistent 
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welfare state and provided immigrants with both material aid and 
moral support. Leaving aside the specific interests behind the role 
played by the unions, what matters here is the fact the these two 
actors contributed to highlight the need for a Parliamentary 
discussion on immigration and for a more consistent normative 
approach on the issue. Following this pressure, in 1978, Andreotti‟s 
government commissioned an inquiry into the state of immigration, 
which resulted in the first official data collection carried out by the 
„Comitato interministeriale per l‟emigrazione‟ (Interministerial 
Committee for Emigration). The first practical outcome of the 
investigation was law No. 943 of 30
 
December 1986, authored by 
Christian Democratic MP Franco Foschi, at the time also secretary 
of the Committee. In the eight years which passed between the 
publication of the report and the approval of the law, many 
measures were discussed in Parliament although none of them ever 
made it onto the statute books. It can be said that these, generally 
restrictive, laws by decree proposed during this period were 
formulated mainly in order to foster the economy, a mechanism 
that makes sense only when considering that at that point 
immigration was seen as dangerous for economic growth, whereas 
feelings of anxiety in relation to a supposed clash of values had not 
yet emerged. This interpretation appears paradoxical, considering 
that nowadays immigration, albeit much needed to make the Italian 
economy more competitive, is considered a threat mainly in 
„cultural‟ terms (Cento Bull, 2009; Andall, 2009). The following 
two quotations are representative of the pre-1990s occasional 
debate on the issue, showing, on the one hand, a concern with the 
impact of new arrivals in the job market and, on the other hand, a 
much stronger solidarity with the immigrants as human beings: 
     L‟Italia non ha alcuna intenzione di diventare  un paese di 
immigrazione. In quest‟ottica e non essendo in grado di sopportare 
i costi economici e sociali che comporta nel lungo periodo 
l‟accoglimento di un numero elevato di lavoratori stranieri, l‟Italia 
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non intende basare il proprio sviluppo economico 
sull‟importazione di manodopera straniera  
 
     L‟Italia ha una tradizione umanitaria degna della sua civiltà: porte 
spalancate a chi viene da noi per cercare libertà e sfuggire a 
persecuzioni o a costretta clandestinità, e uguale comprensione per 
chi, malgrado queste stagioni povere di lavoro e di attività, viene 
per lavorare onestamente e inserirsi in una realtà sociale che ritiene 
valida (Statement  by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs,1983, 
cited in Bonini, 1987: 81; Einaudi, 2007: 119). 
These quotations are illustrative of the attitude of considering 
immigration as problematic only with regards to the job market 
(„queste stagioni povere di lavoro‟) and helps to explain why the 
first measures dealing with the subject were mainly if not 
exclusively directed towards the protection of Italian workers, 
while at the same time showing a high degree of sympathy for the 
immigrants as human beings.  
The international agreements on immigration subscribed to by Italy 
were also centered on the treatment and the rights of the foreign 
labour force, as outlined for instance in the ILO convention (No. 
143) signed in Geneva on 4 June 1970. This was the last of a series 
of international agreements establishing the basic human rights and 
working conditions for foreigners employed in Italy. Article 10 
contains the most relevant principle, which reads:  
              Ogni Membro per il quale la convenzione sia in vigore s‟impegna a 
formulare e ad attuare una politica nazionale diretta a promuovere 
e garantire, con metodi adatti alle circostanze ed agli usi nazionali, 
la parità di opportunità e di trattamento in materia di occupazione e 
di professione, di sicurezza sociale, di diritti sindacali e culturali, 
nonché di libertà individuali e collettive per le persone che, in 
quanto lavoratori migranti o familiari degli stessi, si trovino 
legalmente sul suo territorio. 
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The convention also provided a definition of  the term „migrant 
worker‟ as: „una persona che emigra o è emigrata da un paese 
all‟altro, in vista di occupazione altrimenti che in proprio conto: 
esso ammette qualsiasi persona ammessa regolarmente in qualità di 
lavoratore migrante‟ (Article 11).  
   The definition of the migrant exclusively as a worker, dominant 
in the pre-1990s Italian debate, somehow derived from the Marxist 
idea, previously discussed in this work, according to which 
immigrants are part of the international proletariat, whose members 
are citizens of the world, united by their common condition as 
workers. Similar in its conclusion was the interpretation of the 
Catholic subculture, expressed by the slogan „Nessuno è straniero 
nel mio Paese‟, which looked at the phenomenon from the 
perspective of the receiving countries. Two are the interesting 
factors here: firstly the Church‟s position, at least for what emerged 
from the analysis carried out in the previous chapter, has shifted to 
such an extent that the more recent position is summarised in the 
recurrent motto according to which „Nessuno è straniero nella 
Chiesa‟. Secondly, that despite their deep antagonism, the Marxist 
and the Catholic subcultures shared at that point a similar will to 
welcome immigrants, a position based upon the idea that being 
workers in the first instance and simply human beings in the second 
instance were the essential and only requirements to be fulfilled in 
order to be integrated. 
   The fact that until the late 1980s the main political actors 
involved in a new born discussion on immigration were 
international organisations (as the „Organizzazione internazionale 
dei lavoratori‟) and national interests groups, such as the unions 
and the Catholic voluntary associations, sheds some light on the 
reason why, until the Martelli law (1990), the proposed measures 
did not contain any reference to security, law and order or any 
reference to restrictions and sanctions for illegal immigrants. 
Before asking what had changed in the late 1990s and what 
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therefore determined the development of an increasingly „punitive‟ 
legislation, it is worth looking briefly at the 1986 law (No. 943) 
mentioned earlier. Its first article confirms the principles of the ILO 
convention, stating that the Italian Republic grants all 
„extracomunitari‟ (this is the first time the word appears in an 
official document) an equal treatment and the same opportunities 
given to Italian workers. Moreover, it guarantees access to social 
services, education and housing while remarking also upon the 
immigrants‟ „diritto di mantenere la propria identità culturale‟. 
However, more than a sign of openness and good will, this first 
article has to be read as an acceptance of the international 
agreements as well as a sign that immigration was not yet 
perceived as a threat, whereas the focus of the law is once again the 
labour sector. Indeed, the main corpus of the law is centered on the 
formulation of even more detailed rules regulating the relationship 
between employers and foreign workers: monthly updated lists of 
workers, the impossibility for employers to employ a worker who 
is not at the top of such lists and, even more importantly, monthly 
investigations to ascertain the lack of availability of Italians for 
those jobs. The main clause in favour of immigrants is the 
possibility to join a family member regularly employed in the 
country and the permission for their relatives arriving in Italy to 
start work themselves after a year of residence. Moreover, the law 
considers the case of female immigrants working in the domestic 
sector with greater flexibility since the employers are allowed to 
put forward a „richiesta nominativa‟, that is to say, to indicate a 
specific person rather than having to give employment to the first 
person on the official list. However, as Einaudi puts it, 
                   La legge era […] basata su una concezione semplicistica del 
mercato del lavoro degli immigrati ma anche su meccanismi troppo 
complessi. Ignorava il lavoro autonomo e ambulante, come pure la 
richiesta di assumere con richieste nominative individui conosciuti 
personalmente e non con numeri e facce pescate a caso. Si 
scontrava anche con il grande problema dell‟economia italiana 
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delle migrazioni, che né la legge 943/1986 né alcuna delle leggi 
successive riuscirono a risolvere: quello del ruolo determinante 
dell‟economia sommersa nel fornire occupazione agli stranieri 
senza fornire le basi legali per ottenere il permesso di soggiorno 
(Einaudi, 2007: 130). 
 
As stated above, at the time of the implementation of the first law 
on immigration the phenomenon was still perceived by the political 
system and public opinion as temporary and the newly arrived were 
believed to be aiming at reaching other countries (Melotti, 1996). 
However, in 1973, with the oil crisis, it became clear that the 
expansion of the service sector and the more restrictive policies 
adopted by European countries that had traditionally encouraged 
immigration had determined a considerable rise in the numbers of 
migrants who had chosen Italy. This new trend turned the 
migratory balance within the country to positive for the first time: 
Italy was at that point more a country of immigration that one of 
emigration, as it had traditionally been since Unification. Not only 
were European migrants oriented towards Italy as their definitive 
destination,  but for the first time they arrived in considerable 
numbers from developing countries, pushed by demographic, 
economical and political factors (Golini and Bonifazi, 1987). This 
new typology of arrivals was following a general tide of migrants 
travelling from the East to the West and from the South to North of 
the world (Ferrera, 1996). Nonetheless, Italians did not react openly 
to immigration, despite the fact that the arrivals grew constantly, an 
attitude of openness or probably denial that later triggered internal 
contradictions or unexpected turns, such as episodes of racism 
(Paci, 1987) that will be analysed later on in this chapter.  
   The change in the migration pattern, from a situation in which all 
arrivals could be interpreted as linked to a search for a job, to one 
in which immigrants arrived in Italy for all sorts of different 
reasons, moved not only by push factors but also by pull factors, 
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was not addressed through new legislation and nor were its 
consequences addressed in terms of the role of illegal immigrants 
in the black economy (Bonifazi, 1992; Mughini, 2002).  Even 
though the pressure from independent pro-immigrant associations 
contributed to the development of a relatively welcoming 
legislation, at least in the intentions of those who proposed such 
measures, the fact that the issue of immigration was approached 
exclusively from the perspective of the employers and immigrants 
considered merely as workers set a fertile ground for the approval, 
years later, of restrictive measures which did not encourage a 
process of integration and on the contrary justified exclusionary 
social attitudes (Zincone, 2003).  
 
3. The 1990s 
Until the late 1980s, Italy went through a phase of economical and 
political stability and even though the crisis („mani pulite‟ 
investigation, the end of the First Republic, institutional collapse 
and social unrest) was around the corner, it had not yet manifested 
itself. It is in this still pacified political climate, occasionally 
shaken by sporadic yet unexpected racist attacks, that a new law 
was formulated by the Minister of Justice Claudio Martelli. Law 
39/1990 represents the first structural measure to deal with the 
phenomenon in a broader sense than just in terms of its impact on 
the economy and on the job market.  The episode which catapulted 
the issue of immigration onto the newspapers‟ front pages was the 
assassination of Jerry Masslo in Villa Literno during the summer of 
1989. South-African refugee Masslo and his fellow co-workers 
were allegedly assaulted by robbers intentioned to steal the money 
they  had saved and that they used to keep at home (Magni, 1995: 
41, Einaudi, 2007: 141).  The death of the refugee, which followed 
some other similar episodes in the Neapolitan area, was interpreted 
as a racist raid and immediately became the symbol of a political 
world incapable of dealing with immigration. Anti-racist mass 
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demonstrations were organised during the following days while 
public opinion, led by non-political organizations, started to 
demand a Parliamentary discussion of a new law (Einaudi, 2007: 
142).   
   The struggle against racism dominated the 1980s, reaching such 
an intensity in the political rhetoric that it was defined by scholars 
and opinion makers as „anti-razzismo facile‟, or „conformismo 
culturale e politico‟ as Balbo defined it, resulting from dogmatism 
and a refusal to understand in depth the phenomenon on the part of 
political parties and Catholic associations, accused of turning the 
leftist traditional solidarity towards immigrants into an intolerant 
refusal to address the issue in rational terms (Einaudi, 2007, 
Sciortino, 1998). The criticism according to which such an anti-
racist stance was the product of dogmatic ideologies, to a certain 
extent contributed to delegitimize the position of the pro-immigrant 
groups, making them less influential while creating a conflict 
within the centre-left political coalition. This became particularly 
acute when criticisms were expressed by intellectuals such as 
Balbo and Manconi, who had previously founded the first anti-
racist groups in Italy. By being criticised for their unconditional 
will to open the doors to all immigrants, non-political actors lost 
legitimacy and therefore influence on the process of decision-
making in the following years, as their position was discarded for 
being inapplicable or simply unrealistic.  
   The aims of the Martelli law were the following: the 
regularisation of illegal immigrants through a new „sanatoria‟; the 
refusal to consider the country of origin as a criterion to grant a 
visa; the need for equal treatment and access to housing, jobs, 
healthcare, education for the immigrants; stronger support for the 
professional development of immigrants willing to work in the 
industry sector; the approval of new guidelines for the census of 
foreigners and migrant communities within the country; the 
creation of an „osservatorio sull‟immigrazione‟ (at the time Italy 
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only had an „osservatorio dell‟emigrazione‟). The proposal, 
supported by the PCI (Italian Communist Party) and Verdi (Green 
Party), seemed to many quite unbalanced insofar as it  responded 
only to the requests of the immigrants and the associations behind 
them (Melotti, 2004). The unconditional solidarity underlying 
Martelli‟s approach was not only justified by the general will of the 
Left to integrate immigrants and by the anti-racist stance mentioned 
above, but also resulted from a comparison with other European 
countries such as France, seen as the epicentre of the new 
immigration. Looking at France led to an underestimation of the 
phenomenon by a considerably large part of the political world, not 
only on the Left but also important representatives of the DC, such 
as the Minister of Labour Carlo Donat-Cattin, who supported 
Martelli and actually demanded the opening of Italian borders and 
the possibility for immigrants holding only tourists visas to work in 
the country (Zincone, 2003; Einaudi, 2007: 144).  
   The 1990s, however, were also the years in which a debate on 
security and growing concerns linked to law and order started to 
emerge. New political parties and in particular the Northern League 
were rising to power and becoming recognised at a national level. 
Albeit not primarily concerned with immigration, at least not to the 
extent it is today, Bossi‟s party was certainly not in favour of an 
unregulated immigration. Other more traditional parties were 
undertaking structural changes which influenced their attitude 
towards immigration, as for instance in the case of the MSI 
(Movimento Sociale Italiano). In 1993 Gianfranco Fini founded 
Alleanza Nazionale: the party had a relatively flexible position on 
immigration but it also drew a clear distinction between legal and 
illegal immigrants. While it agreed on the need to guarantee to the 
first group basic human rights, it adopted a much firmer line with 
the illegal migrants who, according to the leader‟s speech given at 
the 1995 Fiuggi Congress, had to be expelled immediately (Fini, 
1995). According to political commentators, in choosing to be 
„garantista‟ for those who had entered the country with a regular 
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visa, Fini was publicly trying to take a distance from the extreme 
position held by the MSI, so as  to avoid being perceived as racist 
and losing the legitimisation and credibility so much needed by his 
new-born party (Einaudi, 2007). However, all the smaller parties of 
the extreme Right opposed the draft of the law presented by 
Martelli or tried to modify a substantial number of its articles. The 
amendments put forward by the MSI and the Northern League  
were generally considered racist and therefore rejected, while those 
suggested by the PRI (Partito Repubblicano Italiano) (in the first 
instance also hostile to the law) were implemented. In particular, 
the Republicans managed to add to the text the need for a rational 
planning of the arrivals, whereas the original law was more 
generous in not setting quotas (Campani, 1993). Moreover, they 
insisted on the need for work permits and rejected the idea of 
allowing foreigners in possession of tourist visas to be employed. 
After various negotiations, the law that was approved was quite 
different from the original proposal, especially as far as the 
measures of „accompagnamento‟ to the borders or expulsion. 
Despite the fact that the rules on expulsion were hard to implement 
and indeed immigrants were rarely sent back to their countries (due 
to lack of resources and the impossibility to identify them), 
Martelli‟s position shifted during this process of negotiation to the 
extent that towards the end he openly invoked the help of the police 
force in order to deal with the new (unexpected?) migratory waves 
(Einaudi, 2007: 161).  Eventually, the law left unsatisfied all the 
actors that had tried to influence its formulation: it created internal 
conflict within the Left, with the more radical groups arguing that it 
was too restrictive, as it limited the number of residence permits 
(Pugliese, 2002) and neglected the concept of integration entirely 
(Einaudi, 2007). The opposition was also very critical of the law 
particularly since the Northern League‟s suggestion of introducing 
the „reato di clandestinità‟ was not taken on board. It will take the 
party almost two decades to turn such a measure into part of an 
official law, the so-called „pacchetto sicurezza‟ (security package) 
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passed in 2008. Nonetheless, albeit contradictory and limited by 
internal divisions and by the external pressure of international 
agreements such as Schengen, which Italy joined in 1990, the 
Martelli law represents the first structured attempt to regulate 
immigration without considering migrants solely as workers. 
   Immediately after the law was approved, Italy faced the 
consequences of the Albanian crisis, which manifested itself with 
two unprecedented waves of arrivals in 1990 and 1991. The 
inadequacy of Italian institutions to respond to a situation of 
„emergency‟ led to the appointment of the first (and last in Italian 
history) Minister for Immigration. Socialist MP Margherita 
Boniver was nominated by the Andreotti government  on 12 April 
1991. While many Albanians were sent back to their country and 
others were rejected when still in international waters, the arrival in 
Bari of the ship Bora in August 1991 was destined to feature in 
national and international newspapers and to remain as an example 
of Italian xenophobia. The Bora had transported 10-12,000 people 
turning the image of the crowded boat into an icon of the „invasion‟ 
of the country by foreigners. For the first time the nature of the 
phenomenon appeared in its dramatic reality. The common reaction 
was one of incredulity: the arrival of the Bora can be considered the 
watershed which divides the era of solidarity from the era of fear. 
The images linked to this particular group of immigrants and the 
boats which transported them became iconic in the Northern 
League‟s representation of „an unsustainable and threatening 
invasion‟, a concern shared by most Centre-Right parties. That fact 
that this „landing‟ was so unexpected (or so it was portrayed) 
contributed to shock public opinion, a feeling explained by 
Palomba and Righi (1992: 1) in their „Quel giorno che gli Albanesi 
invasero l‟Italia‟, where the expression „quel giorno‟ (that day) 
conveys both the suddenness and the irreversibility of an 
unforeseen event. The arrival of the Bora to the Italian coast 
became symbolic not only of the sudden mass-arrival but also of 
Italian‟s xenophobia, while the pictures of the immigrants left for 
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days in Bari‟s football stadium were being published in 
international newspapers around the world.  
   In the following years, the number of arrivals dropped 
consistently, while Italy tried to negotiate an agreement with 
Albania, training its police force to patrol the coasts while building 
infrastructures in and around Tirana and sending aid to the local 
population. However the so-called „sindrome da assedio‟, 
reinforced by the mass-media and the political discourse of the 
Right, had already spread across the country and awakened an until 
then disinterested public opinion (Macioti and Pugliese, 1993: 203; 
Einaudi, 2007: 181).  
   After the political turmoil of 1992 and the disappearance of the 
traditional parties, the Ministry of Immigration was closed. 
However, several proposals for new measures were put forward, 
although many of them were never passed. These proposals were 
mainly focused on fighting racism, as in the case of Mancini‟s law 
205/1993, entitled „Misure urgenti in materia di discriminazione 
razziale, etnica e religiosa‟. This measure, aimed at fighting crimes 
linked to racial, ethnic and religious hatred, established that „chi 
diffonde in qualsiasi modo idee fondate sulla superiorità o sull'odio 
razziale o etnico, ovvero incita a commettere o commette atti di 
discriminazione per motivi razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi‟ can 
be sentenced to up to three years in custody, a period that can be 
increased to four years for anyone who „in qualsiasi modo incita a 
commettere o commette violenza o atti di provocazione alla 
violenza per motivi razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi‟. (Article 1, 
comma 1a and1b). It also forbids the creation of groups or 
organisations which have among their aims that of incitement to 
racial discrimination or violence, punishable with disciplinary 
actions that range from the exclusion from electoral competition to 
up to six years in jail (Article 1, comma 2d).  This law, albeit very 
much needed to contrast a growing number of racist attacks, shows 
how the focus of the debate was once again the racism of Italians, 
 216 
whereas immigration per se  had not yet become relevant in the 
political rhetoric of that time.  
   This law was bitterly opposed by the Northern League, which 
saw it as a limit to its members‟ freedom of expression and 
therefore fought to abolish it, achieving this goal in 2006. Many of 
the decrees formulated between 1991 and 1998 never became laws 
since the political instability of that time made most governments 
fall before the texts had been approved (Einaudi, 2007: 183). 
Berlusconi‟s government did not have enough time to approve a 
reform but it did express itself with regard to immigration with a 
draft proposal heavily influenced by AN. The proposal advocated 
giving more power to the police and introducing the crime of 
illegal entry as well as punishing illegal immigrants with several 
years in jail. The fact that associations and lobbies involved in the 
discussion managed once again to boycott the law, should be 
interpreted as a lack of interest in the subject on the part of political 
parties, which tended not to hold a clear position on the matter, 
rather than a sign of strength on the part of these organisations 
(Ibid.). The Northern League itself did not get particularly involved 
in the discussion: not only was immigration not its first interest 
until the late 1990s, but it was also still trying to gain national 
visibility and legitimisation. Berlusconi expressed a negative 
opinion on the idea of punishing the immigrants for illegal 
permanence in the country, since at that time it was a shared 
opinion that somebody should be sent to jail only if s/he had 
committed a crime or represented a danger for society (Einaudi, 
2007: 185, 201). 
   In 1995, the approach adopted by the technocratic government 
led by Lamberto Dini to of immigration was aimed instead at 
giving clandestines a legal status, so as to reduce the number of 
undocumented workers and break the link with the black economy 
(Reyneri, 1999).  The results of the „sanatoria‟(the una tantum 
measure to regularise those residing in the country illegally) in the 
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Martelli law were also the object of a controversy: the limited 
number of illegal immigrants who decided to come forward and be 
regularised was interpreted by some political actors (usually 
supporters of the measure) as a sign that there were not many 
illegal foreigners in the country, an interpretation that clearly 
neglected the fact that many could not afford the cost of social 
contributions needed to become official, while staying illegally 
employed was more convenient and often the only choice 
(Katrougalos and Lazaridis, 2003: 167-190). The fact that the 
necessary procedures for regularisation were not very clear (a 
constant factor in the Italian legislation on immigration) and that 
official information was not made easily accessible to applicants by 
the institutions in charge also contributed to this failure. A failure 
that, according to various commentators, originated not only from 
the inability to discourage illegal entry in the country, but also from 
the lack of attention paid to promoting integration (Zincone, 2003). 
   Since 1995 the political debate on immigration became more and 
more heated, although the two coalitions were not homogeneous in 
their responses: while the position of the Northern League started 
to become clear and exacerbate the debate with provocative 
statements and claims, Berlusconi was far less supportive of 
punitive policies. At the same time the Left was also divided 
between the most radical pro-immigrant interventionists (Radicals 
and PRC) and leaders such as D‟Alema (DS) who seemed more 
worried about the reaction of the workers living in the big cities, 
who, in his view, were more exposed to security issues and 
therefore more in need of protection. Citizens‟ fears featured in the 
front page of newspapers and magazines, which arguably 
contributed to consolidate and increase the same fears with a series 
of recurrent references to crimes committed by immigrants 
(Colombo, 1997).  
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4. The Turco-Napolitano law: a humanitarian and solidarist 
perspective 
After winning the 1996 elections Prodi‟s government seemed to be 
oriented towards the introduction of an encompassing and more 
articulated legislation that would replace the previous partial laws. 
This will to revise the legislation came from an acknowledged need 
for a law that would not simply solve problems of times of 
emergencies, but would also reflect the fact that the arrivals were 
not going to diminish in the foreseeable future. Moreover, a 
modification of the previous law was seen as necessary in order to 
reassure other EU countries, such as France and Germany, that 
Italy would meet the Schengen criteria for border control (to be 
achieved by 1997) and would not become the open gate to Europe 
(Zincone, 2003: 352-353; Einaudi, 2007). With this in mind MP 
Livia Turco and Minister of the Interior Giorgio Napolitano were 
called to formulate a new proposal, which became law on 6 March 
1998 (law n. 40). 
   In presenting the proposal for public discussion, Turco insisted 
on three aspects: strict planning of incoming flows of immigrants; 
new measures against organised crime linked to the smuggling of 
people across the borders; citizenship and integration policies for 
the immigrants (Einaudi, 2007: 211; Zincone, 2003). During the 
development of the new law, it became clear that the approach to 
the reform adopted by Turco and Napolitano was deeply different 
from that of their predecessors. The various phases of the 
negotiations followed a bottom-up style, based on a constant 
dialogue with the advocacy coalition: unions, religious 
associations, scout groups, feminist groups, evangelical 
representatives, political opponents and magistrates of the juvenile 
court. The clear will to start a „concertazione‟ led to an awakening 
of the interlocutors and a reconfirmation of the central role played 
in the past by interest groups and charities, after years of silence 
and weak participation on their part. These were not necessarily 
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only Catholic associations, even though Turco was traditionally 
close to the Catholic world, but were also interfaith associations or 
groups linked to political parties such as ARCI („Associazione 
Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana‟, formerly a recreational association 
of the PCI).  Academics, civil servants and experts were also 
directly asked to contribute to the discussion bringing their specific 
expertise into the debate (Zincone, 2003: 353; Einaudi, 2007: 213). 
The same propensity towards policy-learning was also confirmed 
by the attempt to compare the Italian situation with that of other 
countries (and particularly those which had opted for 
multiculturalism) in order to incorporate „good practice‟ into social 
activities and legislative proposals.     
   However, this inclination towards an open dialogue during the 
preparation of the first draft of the law declined as it approached 
the stage of the final debate: once the Bill was made non-
amendable and its responsibility went to technical committees, the 
role of the advocacy coalition could only have a weak and indirect 
influence on the final text (Zincone, 2003: 354).  Looking closer at 
the content of the reform, the first innovation introduced was the 
compulsory annual entry flow planning as well as the possibility to 
establish quotas of arrivals from countries which had signed 
bilateral agreements with Italy. Moreover, in order to fight the 
illegal employment of migrants, the law made available a new type 
of work visa for those who did not have a work contract but 
intended to enter the country and find a job once there. Foreigners 
were given twelve months to find a job: if they were still 
unemployed at the end of the period of time they had to leave Italy. 
The Turco-Napolitano law also introduced the „permesso di lavoro 
stagionale‟, a temporary visa for those employed in seasonal jobs, 
which could be extended to a maximum of nine months. The 
incentive to leave the country when the visa expired consisted in 
the possibility for those who left to re-enter legally a second time. 
Moreover,  immigrants with a permanent job could apply for a two 
years visa, which could be extended for two more years and then, 
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after five years of residence, could become a „carta di soggiorno‟, 
„un titolo di soggiorno di durata indeterminata che attribuisce ai 
cittadini stranieri che la ottengono diritti aggiuntivi rispetto a quelli 
deteminati dal normale permesso di soggiorno‟ (Einaudi, 2007: 
216; Melotti, 2004).  
   In this way Italy was for the first time acknowledging the 
difference between temporary and permanent immigrants, already 
recognised in many other European countries.  Following the 
„humanitarian and solidaristic approach‟ to the issue, the law also 
introduced a „social protection‟ permit for victims who collaborated 
with the authorities to fight prostitution and human trafficking 
(Zincone, 2006: 357). To defeat human trafficking, the measure 
established that those caught exploiting illegal immigrants would 
serve up to fifteen years in jail. As for the most restrictive parts of 
the reform, the rejection of migrants at the borders, repatriation and 
the prohibition to re-enter the country for the following five years 
became an important part of the strategy to defeat illegal 
entry/residence: repatriation could also be imposed on those who 
had committed a crime and had to serve a certain period of time in 
prison or those who did not have valid IDs. However, children 
under sixteen, pregnant women, permit holders and relatives of 
Italian citizens could not be expelled (Einaudi, 2007: 217).  
   Another new measure, bitterly criticised by the advocacy 
coalition, was the creation of the so-called CTP („centri di 
permanenza temporanea‟ – centres for temporary detention) where 
illegal immigrants could be kept for twenty days (extendible to 30), 
the time supposedly needed to identify them and to obtain the 
authorisation from their countries of origin to receive them back.  
The committee in charge of writing the law, and particularly Livia 
Turco, never managed to reform the citizenship system as they 
were planning to do, since this would have necessarily entailed a  
change in the constitution, which could only be done with a 
separate law. In 1999, Livia Turco and Minister of the Interior 
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Rosa Russo Jervolino presented a proposal for such a law, with the 
aim of allowing migrants to apply for Italian citizenship after five 
years of residence in the country as well as giving children of 
immigrants born in Italy the same rights by the time they enrolled 
in primary school, as long as one of the parents was Italian or both 
of them had lived in Italy for five years (Zuccolini, 11/02/99). Not 
only was this reform not approved then, but the issue of citizenship 
is still at the centre of a cross-party (polemical) debate today. On 
that occasion, the most bitter criticism of the proposal to grant 
migrants citizenship and the right to vote came from AN‟s leader 
Gianfranco Fini, who instead supported Forza Italia in its 
suggestion to make it easier for foreign citizens of Italian origins to 
acquire an Italian passport and vote in political elections 
(Constitutional amendment n.1 of 17 January 2000 and Statute n. 
459/2001; Tintori, 2009). Interestingly, Fini‟s position has radically 
changed in the last year, as will be shown later.  
   Despite the fact that the Turco-Napolitano law was generally 
defined by members of the opposition (included representatives of 
AN and FI) as reasonable, well-structured and coherent, it had to 
face the enraged criticism of the Northern League, which, having 
consolidated its electoral support at a national level, started turning 
its attention towards immigration, raising its voice in the public 
debate and very often embracing controversial and „politically 
incorrect‟ stances. The Turco and Napolitano proposal, however, 
encountered various criticisms also within the Left, with PRC and 
the Greens closer to the advocacy coalition in demanding more 
rights for the immigrants (such as making expulsion illegal even for 
those immigrants who had committed a crime). 
 
 
 
 222 
5. The years of transition: from a solidatist to an identitarian 
approach 
The 1990s represent a transitional phase in the national debate on 
immigration, leading to the changes in public opinion on the 
subject, a new role of the mass media in echoing the concerns of 
the political system, and a constantly increasing number of arrivals, 
following events such as the second Albanian crisis in 1997 and  
rising cases of intolerance.  It is indeed at this point that the Lega 
starts formulating that anti-immigrants rhetoric analysed in the 
previous chapter, although in this escalating intolerance it was still 
relatively isolated and criticised by its allies and even perceived as 
racist by the almost entire „Polo delle Libertà‟. (Zincone, 2003; 
Melotti, 2004; Balbo and Manconi, 2004). However, it did not take 
much longer before the League‟s position prevailed and became the 
trademark of an increasingly common (electoral) strategy on the 
part of a more united Right, responsible for pushing the debate to a 
new level of intolerance (Guolo, 2003).  Statement such those of 
Borghezio and Maroni on the need to use plastic bullets against the 
immigrants or to send them back to their countries on military 
planes to avoid the risk of them raping the hostesses marked the 
beginning of a new season of provocations and controversies. Bossi 
himself took part in this escalation of verbal violence, for instance 
calling immigrants of African origins „bingo bongo‟ or suggesting 
bombing the ships and shooting to prevent new arrivals (Stella, 
1996).  
   The rhetoric of the Northern League has been broadly examined 
in the previous chapter. What matters here is to try and explain 
what determined this shift from an inefficient response to 
immigration, which was nonetheless „solidaristic‟ in its intentions, 
to a dramatically more exclusionary attitude towards the 
phenomenon. The spreading of institutional and social xenophobia 
since the mid 1990s invested not only Italy but Southern European 
countries in general (Daly and Barot, 1999). This growing hostility 
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can be attributed to a number of factors, first of all the concern of 
poor suburban areas where immigration tended to concentrate at 
the beginning and where competition for social services (such as 
access to housing) was higher (Zinn, 1996). Moreover, the failure 
of the reforms mentioned above in achieving their goal of 
integration/regularisation and, more than anything else, the 
inability to address the issue of illegal employment in the black 
economy, had contributed to consolidating the links between 
immigration and criminality in the public perception of the 
phenomenon (Colombo, 1997; Bonifazi, 1992). The mechanism 
described in the previous chapter according to which the perception 
of a threat and its recognition/legitimisation on the part of the 
political system contributes to make that danger real, sheds some 
light on the process of increasing suspicion on the part of Italians 
towards the foreign presence. Moreover, while the Right exploited 
the situation (and reinforced public anxiety) for electoral purposes, 
that part of the Left interested in discussing the possibility of a 
multicultural society focused exclusively on denouncing the racist 
attitudes of Italians, therefore blaming the latter for the intolerant 
turn taken by the debate. Intellectuals were part of this mechanism, 
since, as Melotti recalls, influential opinion makers such as Lerner, 
Bocca and many others never engaged with the need for structural 
reforms or more in general with the issue of immigration but rather 
blamed an „abstract racism‟ as the only evil (Melotti, 2004: 162). It 
can be said that such an attitude in identifying the problem only in 
the citizens‟ innate racism probably favoured the emerging populist 
parties, which took such supposed intolerance on board and 
transformed it into a legitimate shared feeling on the basis of which 
citizens could (and indeed were encouraged to) reassert their own 
national and cultural identity (Campani, 1993: 507-535).  
   These populist political actors, in contrast to many intellectuals, 
successfully established a link between national belonging and 
immigration and started to exploit it for electoral purposes, arguing 
for the need to defend a threatened national and Catholic identity 
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and to fight against immigration. While the „war between the poor‟ 
was escalating, the government seemed to neglect both the claims 
of Italian citizens demanding security and preferential access to 
resources and the rights of the newly arrived (Ibid.: 3).  
   The political discourse of populist parties and their criticism of 
the Martelli and the Turco-Napolitano laws contributed to 
strengthening the idea that „too much had been done for the 
immigrants‟ (Campani, 1993: 507-535). The influence of this 
rhetoric, amplified by the media, can be better understood in light 
of the studies on the effect of political elites on public opinion, 
which argue that the attitude of party leaders and representatives 
are determinant in shaping public reaction, as it frees it from the 
stigma of being labelled as „intolerant‟ or „unacceptable‟ 
(McLaren, 2001:81-108).  After the turmoil of Tangentopoli and 
the contradictory responses to sudden emergencies linked to mass 
inward migration, the Italians‟ traditionally weak sense of national 
identity (Putnam, 1993) found in this populist rhetoric a means to 
legitimise identification of an in-group and an out-group. 
Identifying the „other‟ became synonymous with marginalisation 
(of the immigrants) (Dal Lago, 2004).  The progressive shift in the 
position of high representatives of the Church, consisting in finding 
a common ground with the Northern League in defence of 
Catholicism as the traditional religion, contributed to legitimising 
the political action of the Lega, when not directly supporting it, as 
for instance in the joint demonstrations against the building of new 
mosques in 2002 (Melotti, 2004). 
   The (widespread by the late 1990s) social and political attitude of 
intolerance towards immigrants represents the pre-condition for a 
new season of exclusionary responses to immigration marked by 
the latest two measures on immigration: the Bossi-Fini law and the 
so-called „pacchetto sicurezza‟ (security package).  
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6. Moving towards the Bossi-Fini law: the identitarian-
legaritarian turn 
In December 1998, the event that seemed to signal the legalistic 
identitarian turn in the Right‟s position on immigration was the 
collection, organised by the League with the support of the MSI 
and Forza Nuova (the extreme Right-wing movement funded by 
Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello), of 700,000 signatures of 
citizens demanding a referendum to abrogate the Turco-Napolitano 
law. For the first time the proposal for a new law came from 
common citizens and seemingly appeared to respond to shared 
needs and concerns as well as detached from that elitarian attitude 
that had characterised the previous debates on the theme. This does 
not necessarily mean that political parties were not the main agent 
behind this social mobilisation.    
   Despite the recurrent demonstrations and the mobilisation of a 
considerable number of citizens, the initiative was dismissed by the 
Constitutional Court in February 2000 as it contravened the 
conditions of the Schengen agreement (Einaudi, 2007: 294). The 
National Alliance and Forza Italia, concerned about the fact that the 
League was at that point the only party responding to the growing 
fears of the citizens, decided not to let it benefit from that strategy 
and started themselves moving towards similar positions, even 
before they formed a coalition and while the Left was still in power 
(Zincone, 2003: 369). In March 1999, Fini, presenting his position 
as motivated by the fear that „citizens would seek private justice‟ 
and as aimed at preventing racist episodes from taking place, 
presented a proposal for a new law on immigration, also authored 
by MP Landi di Chiavenna and backed by MPs Maurizio Gasparri 
and Ignazio La Russa among others (law proposal 5808/ 25 Luglio 
1998). Officially put forward as a reaction to the League‟s 
xenophobic position, the proposal was based on a distinction 
between legal and illegal immigration and it aimed at fighting the 
latter without being hostile to the former. However, the proposal 
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did share Bossi‟s suggestion of introducing the crime of illegal 
entry/stay and collecting the immigrants‟ fingerprints. Furthermore, 
it backed Bossi‟s idea of assigning specific quotas of immigrants to 
single regions in order to avoid concentration of people of the same 
ethnic and/or religious belonging, „in quanto ciò può facilmente 
comportare l‟insorgenza e la recrudescenza di consorterie, bande o 
cupole del crimine [...]  così da assecondare la ricettività locale del 
mercato del lavoro, ove essa esiste, a tutto favore del processo di 
integrazione‟ (Landi di Chiavenna, cited in Einaudi, 2007: 295).  
This proposal, opposed by coalition allies such as CCD‟s (centrist 
party Centro Cristiano Democratico) representatives Marco Follini 
and Pierferdinando Casini, was never approved. However, this 
move contributed to pushing the League closer to Forza Italia. At 
the beginning of 2000, Bossi reached an agreement with his newly 
found ally Berlusconi based on a two-point programme: 
implementation of „devolution‟ and a stricter control of 
immigration.  
   Following the collection of 50,000 signatures, another „legge di 
iniziativa popolare‟ was presented in 2000. It was clearly informed 
by a combination of functionalist and identitarian approaches. On 
the one hand, functionalism was intended as an approach that „aims 
to make entry and residence permits for immigrants dependent on 
the economic financial and demographic needs of the host country 
and consequently seeks to regulate immigration flows on the basis 
of present and future demand for labour‟, preventing immigrants 
from „becoming a social security burden‟ (Zincone 2003: 351).  On 
the other hand, the identitarian perspective „fears that the presence 
of immigrants will alter the national culture, and may consequently 
pursue a strategy of limiting and screening immigration flows and 
citizenship, with a strong preference for immigrants of national 
origin or originating from areas considered culturally 
homogeneous‟ (Ibid.: 352). 
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   As Enaudi put it,  „La legge era tesa a contrastare l‟immigrazione 
in tutte le sue forme‟ (Einaudi, 2007: 296). The introductory 
statements of the text, formulated by representatives of the 
Northern League, was a direct attack against the Left and its 
presumed intention to use a „falso buonismo‟ in order to gain 
electoral support from the immigrants, an argument since then 
regularly put forward by the party in order to „prove‟ the supposed 
hypocrisy of its political opponents.  Its programmatic declaration 
talked of contrasting the „Jacobin‟ model of society with a 
„Christian‟ one, a model which would take into account not only 
the impact of globalisation but also the history and tradition of the 
country. What is striking here is the fact that such a goal 
reproduced  the same rhetoric and the same language used by the 
Catholic Church, characterised by the recurrent use of the terms 
Catholic and Italian as synonymous. The League had been clearly 
looking at the Church as an important ally, given its legacy on the 
sense of national identity, while at the same time exploiting its new 
views on issues related to immigration. 
   On a more practical level, the Bossi-Fini law aimed at replacing 
the „logica delle sanatorie‟ with a logic of prevention, by rejecting 
new immigrants and refusing re-entry to those already expelled, 
according to a  „zero tolerance‟ approach presented by the League 
as the only adequate response to the phenomenon: „La chiave 
dell‟ingresso doveva essere il lavoro e l‟adempimento dei doveri 
fiscali‟ (Einaudi, 2007:297). The strict link between work and visa 
was confirmed by the fact that, in order to enter Italy legally, 
immigrants had to have a valid work contract, stipulated before 
leaving the country of origin, and could no longer reach Italy first 
and then be allowed a short period of time to find employment. In 
this sense, the Bossi-Fini recalls the first decrees on immigration 
analysed above and therefore is not as „revolutionary‟ as sometimes 
it has been defined: what changed was the rhetoric, as the focus 
was on the immigrants‟ threat to national identity, whereas 
previously it was on the job market and the protection of Italian 
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workers. Looking at the other norms put forward by the law, more 
power was given to the regions, whose mayors had to form a 
„confederation‟ in order to establish different quotas to be 
calculated according to the needs of the local economy and the 
direct requests of councils or factories. Moreover, illegal entry or 
permanence in the country would become a penal crime to be 
punished by immediate expulsion (the immigrant was to be 
accompanied to the border by the police). This most extreme article 
of the law was never approved, mainly because of the opposition of 
centre parties CCD (Centro Cristiano Democratico) and CDU 
(Cristiani Democratici Uniti) (later merged together to form the 
UDC, Unione Democratici Cristiani) and that of Catholic 
associations such as Caritas, which appealed to Catholic MPs 
sitting on the benches of Forza Italia as well as to international 
organisations such as Amnesty International.  
   The main outcome of the measure was the introduction of a new 
residence permit, once again strictly linked to a work contract, only 
renewable for the same period, in this way turning the „permesso di 
soggiorno‟ into a private contract between employer and employee. 
The measure of verifying whether a particular job could be done by 
an Italian before employing an immigrant was reintroduced. At the 
same time, following a proposal by MP Mirco Tremaglia, citizens 
of Italian origins were given priority, with the introduction of 
protected special quota of permits reserved to them. Despite the 
fact that European guidelines had fixed in five years the maximum 
period of time, regular immigrants had to wait before applying for 
the „carta di soggiorno‟: in the first draft of the law it was raised to 
eight years, reduced to six in the final version. Notwithstanding the 
will to restrict immigration and prevent new arrivals, the measure 
had to include a new „sanatoria‟, to mitigate the opposition of the 
industrialists lobbying with the Left and Catholic institutions.  
   Finally, the definitive bill established that the fingerprints of 
those applying for a visa (or renewing it) had to be collected and 
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that illegal immigrants could be kept in the CTPs (now renamed 
CIE, Centri di identificazione ed espulsione) for up to sixty days 
(previously it was 20 extendible to 30). If the identification of the 
immigrant was not completed within 60 days, the individual was 
given five days to leave Italy: if the illegal migrant did not leave 
the country and if s/he re-entered the country within 12 years from 
the expulsion, s/he risked being punished with up to 4 years in 
prison (Articles 12g and 13a; b). The measure, entitled Modifica 
alla normativa in materia di immigrazione, was finally approved 
on 11 July 2002 (law 30 Luglio 2002/189).  Once again, the official 
law was somewhat far from the original draft, although this time 
the need to find a compromise was not due to the intervention of 
the advocacy coalition, excluded from the negotiations, but mainly 
linked to the action of the Constitutional Court, which rejected a 
number of norms contradicting international agreements or not 
complying with international law and violating human rights. As 
for internal criticism, while AN and the League formed a fairly 
united front, Forza Italia, and particularly its leader as well as its 
Catholic component, tended to keep a low profile and to distance 
themselves from the more intolerant statements and in general from 
the aggressive political discourse of its allies (Zincone, 2006: 363; 
Anon,, 2002b; Anon., 2002c).  
   The Bossi-Fini law has often been described as an empty box, 
given its inability to mark a real break with previous legislation 
(which it actually reconfirmed). At the same time it was defended 
by commentators such as Melotti (2004) who claimed he did not 
understand the strong criticism and charges of intolerance on the 
part of scholars such as Cavazzani (2002), De Giorgi (2002), Dal 
Lago (2004). What Melotti was neglecting in considering the 
outcomes of the law is the fact that these cannot be measured 
merely in terms of articles passed and rejected, and that the balance 
between confirming the previous measures and breaking away from 
them needs to be judged also on the basis of the political discourse 
underlying the discussion of the law. Scholars such as Zincone 
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(2003) and Einaudi (2007) seem to agree with Turco‟s definition  
of the Bossi-Fini as „un manifesto politico, soprattutto voluto per 
sostenere una retorica contro gli immigrati, che il ministro Bossi è 
solito sintetizzare nell‟espressione: “immigrati pochi, solo per 
lavoro, solo per il tempo strettamente necessario e poi ritornino a 
casa”‟ (Turco, 2002, cited in Einaudi, 2007: 321).  Nonetheless, 
this manifesto, „which had a purely demagogic propaganda purpose 
and no operational capacity‟ (Zincone, 2003:364), clearly 
contributed to turn immigration into a political issue of central 
importance in the electoral discourse of the Right as well as that of 
the Left. Indeed, the latter was forced to adapt and to an extent 
follow a similar path when reacting to crimes committed by 
immigrants in areas where it was in power, such as in Rome at the 
time of the Reggiani killing (October 2007). In these 
circumstances, driven by the need to respond to citizens‟ fear and 
anger, mayor Veltroni  opted for a zero tolerance policy, turning 
security into the priority of his coalition. (Anon., 2007; Battistelli 
and Lucianetti, 2010). 
   Despite the antagonistic rhetoric informing the political discourse 
of the Centre-Right and, increasingly, the Centre-Left, a 
comparison between the laws passed by the two coalitions reveals 
that the final drafts of the bills passed are not dramatically 
different. According to scholars such as Colombo and Sciortino 
(2004), Zincone and Di Gregorio (2002), there is clear continuity 
between the immigration policies of the two governments, despite 
their radically different ideological positions, and despite a 
discrepancy in the decision-making style of the two reforms, with 
the centre left bargaining between government and opposition and 
the Centre-Right acting unilaterally. This chapter argues that, in 
this sense, the Bossi-Fini goes back to a position that, when 
considered in its practical goals rather than in terms of the language 
used, is fairly similar to the first law on the labour marked passed 
in 1963, which for the first time linked entry in the country to a job 
contract.  
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   This is not the only paradox: a high level of contradiction can be 
found within each coalition, in the discrepancy between the rhetoric 
and the actual legislation: on the one hand, albeit supporting a 
multicultural approach based on the immigrants‟ right to maintain 
their cultural identity and to access resources, the Left did not take 
concrete steps to integrate migrants or just left implementation of 
the measures to be carried out at a local level, depending on the 
amount of resources, the involvement of different associations and 
the councils‟ own initiatives. On the other hand, the Right‟s public 
discourse tended to stigmatise immigrants, while at the same time 
periodically regularising many of them in response to economic 
needs (and particularly in those areas of the North where the 
League is the first party). In the case of the Left, the apparent 
discrepancy is due to the fact that at times of „emergencies‟ or 
when the citizens express their fears, it has to be seen to respond by 
adopting more severe measures. When the Right turned 
immigration into a propaganda tool, the Left could only ignore the 
voters‟ requests at the risk of alienating them, therefore it had to 
compete with the Right on similar ground. Finally, some of the 
reasons for the inefficiency of the legislation are its 
implementation, its internal contradictions (i.e. block of new entries 
versus recurrent „sanatorie‟), the need to meet the expectations of 
the electorate and the seemingly growing demand for „security‟.   
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7. The ‘security package’  
Measures such as the Bossi-Fini set fertile ground for more 
restrictive laws, by raising the bar of what is acceptable and what is 
not in dealing with immigration through an aggressive and 
occasionally violent rhetoric constantly reiterated through the 
years.  The so-called security package represents a dramatic turn in 
the state‟s reaction to immigration, which interrupted that process 
of continuity described above. Passed in May 2008, it is referred to 
as a „package‟ as it includes several measures: a decree law 
(decreto legge), three legislative decrees (decreti legislativi), a draft 
law and a decree of the Council of Ministers.  The different 
measures will now be analysed separately to explain more in depth 
the matters they deal with, whereas an analysis of the „package‟ as 
a whole will follow in order to make sense of the changes 
introduced, the reactions in the public sphere and in civil society 
and finally their consequences.  
   A law by decree is a temporary law that has the immediate force 
of law (once it is published in the official bulletin). It needs to be 
converted into law by Parliament within sixty days from its 
adoption (Merlino, 2009: 7). The law decree n. 92 „recante misure 
urgenti in materia di sicurezza pubblica‟ focuses, as implied in its 
title, on „urgent‟ measures related to public security. It establishes 
that non-EU citizens have to be expelled and EU citizens 
„removed‟ from the Italian territory if they are sentenced to more 
than two years in prison. Until 2008, according to article 235 of the 
Italian penal code, only non-EU citizens could be expelled and only 
when sentenced to more than ten years‟ imprisonment. Moreover, 
being an illegal immigrant became an „aggravating circumstance‟ 
to be added  to those already listed in article 61 of the penal code, 
which  means that „an individual who has been convicted for 
having committed a crime and whose administrative status of stay 
in the country is irregular will now face jail sentences that are a 
third longer than those applicable to Italians‟ (Merlino, 2009:8). 
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The measure also included a deterrent for landlords: those who let 
properties to illegal immigrants can spend from 6 months to 4 years 
in prison and have their property confiscated. The money coming 
from the sale of the confiscated properties is destined to preventing 
and contrasting offences linked to illegal immigration.  
   A particularly important change was introduced for what 
concerns local administrations: mayors can adopt special measures 
for urgent security reasons, which means they finally have that 
discretionary power the League had fought long and hard to obtain, 
as it emerged from the analysis of articles on the topic published in 
La Padania analysed in the previous chapter of this thesis. Finally, 
article 7 establishes that in circumstances of emergency, when 
citizens‟ security is believed to be at risk, the army can be 
employed in areas that need to be kept under control. This 
particular measure, resulting from an agreement between the 
Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence, can be 
authorized for a maximum period of six months during which the 
highest number of soldiers used at any point cannot exceed 3,000 
units. The government planned to use 1,000 soldiers to monitor the 
Centers of Identification and Expulsion, and to concentrate the 
others in metropolitan areas, particularly Milan, Rome and Naples, 
as well as in other provinces when requested by the local prefects 
(Merlino, 2009: 9; Naletto, 2009).  
   The three legislative decrees (5/2007; 30/2007 and 25/2008) deal 
with matters related to family reunification, EU citizens‟ residence 
and asylum seekers. They establish respectively that: family 
reunion is allowed in case of wives, minors, and disabled parents, 
although a DNA test can be required and this has to be paid for by 
the immigrant; EU citizens intending to stay in the country for 
more than three months need to prove they have an adequate 
income to support themselves and their families as well as to 
register with the right authorities within 10 days from the end of the 
three months, while the state has the right to deny entry for reasons 
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linked to public security. Finally, the last decree  introduces limits 
in the asylum seekers‟ right of free movement and establishes that 
those who enter or stay irregularly can be kept in the Centers for 
Identification and Expulsion for up to 180 days (Naletto, 2009).  
   The draft law on public security (Act of Senate No. 733) is 
strictly connected to the decree law No. 92: it establishes that the 
acquisition of citizenship by marriage, previously obtainable in six 
months can only be requested after two years of marriage. 
However, its main aim is to make illegal entry in the country a 
crime: this particular measure, which had been suggested by the 
League and AN for a decade and never passed, becomes official 
with this draft law, punishing „illegal immigration‟ with a prison 
sentence from six months to two years. The immigrant caught in a 
situation of illegality faces a short trial and immediate arrest. In 
order to make illegality more difficult to sustain and force irregular 
immigrants to leave, the measure also establishes that agencies 
which deal with remittances need to request and photocopy the 
residence permits of those sending money back to their countries 
(Naletto, 2009). The owners of money transfer agencies are not the 
only ones requested to denounce illegal immigrants: doctors and 
school teachers were also among the civil servants from whom the 
government expected collaboration. While the security package 
was still being discussed, many commentators looked at the idea of 
considering clandestinity as a crime per se just as another 
provocative boutade on the part of the Right (Ludovico, 2007; 
Cottone, 2008).   Both the idea of applying sanctions to illegal 
immigration and that of demanding citizens to report on individual 
cases, represent „an open violation of the constitutional principle of 
equality of all before the law‟ as well as a clear contravention of 
the international agreements on basic human rights (Naletto, 2009: 
2).  
   The final and equally controversial measure introduced with the 
security package is included in the decree signed by the Council of 
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Ministers at a meeting in Bari in May 2008, when they declared a 
„state of emergency‟ in relation to the presence of nomadic 
communities in the regions of Latium, Lombardy and Campania. In 
case of states of emergency, defined by law 225/92 (article 5) as 
„natural calamities, catastrophes, or other events that according to 
their intensity and reach need to be faced by extraordinary powers 
and means‟, the Council of Ministers is allowed to put forward ad 
hoc „ordinances‟ (ordinanze) to deal with the situation. The powers 
given in these circumstances to the Council of Ministers can be 
delegated to „commissioners‟. In 2008, such powers were 
transferred to the prefects, who became responsible for monitoring 
the camps, identifying and registering the individuals living in each 
settlement, mobilising the police against those illegal immigrants 
who therefore had to be expelled, evicting those not legally entitled 
to live there and „fostering integration‟, which usually means 
dealing with the fears and protests of local residents. To carry on 
these duties and implement the changes, the prefects had at their 
disposal selected units of the military force (Merlino, 2009: 13; 
Naletto, 2009: 2). Moreover, unarmed citizens registered in specific 
associations can be used by mayors and prefects to patrol the 
streets and inform the police of security threats they encounter in 
supposedly socially degraded areas.  The so-called „ronde‟, made 
official by this law, already existed and were carried out 
spontaneously by citizens organised in neighbourhood associations 
before the measure was passed. As Naletto recalls, many members 
of the „ronde‟ groups are also members of Right-wing 
organisations or individuals „involved in acts of apology of fascism 
‟ such as Gaetano Salva, leader of these „ronde‟, prosecuted for 
racist propaganda and arrested in 2005 (Naletto, 2009: 2). 
   The first reactions to the measures contained in the security 
package began to arrive while the laws where still under 
parliamentary scrutiny. Unlike the responses to the previous 
legislation on immigration, these reactions were not only 
immediate but also transversal to the political spectrum and 
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including different sectors of civil society as well as involving 
foreign countries, particularly those whose citizens were targeted in 
the laws, such as Romania.  Within the Centre-Right coalition, 
while the Northern League claimed the paternity of the security 
package, AN leader Gianfranco Fini was the first to bitterly 
criticise some specific articles included in the draft version of the 
laws and particularly those on the so-called „presidi-spia‟, which 
established the need on the part of teachers and doctors to 
denounce illegal immigrants. In a letter sent to Minister of the 
Interior Maroni, Fini expressed concern over the unconstitutionality 
of a measure which would inevitably lead to an open violation of 
migrants‟ human rights as defined by the EU: 
                    La disposizione, infatti, subordinando la fruizione di pubblici 
servizi alla presentazione di documenti inerenti al soggiorno presso 
gli uffici della nostra amministrazione, impedisce che di questi 
servizi possano godere gli stranieri privi dei predetti documenti. 
Ciò fa sorgere, soprattutto a livello applicativo, un problema di 
compatibilità con altre norme. Un solo esempio delle conseguenze 
che ne deriverebbero: ai minori stranieri verrebbe negata 
l'iscrizione alla scuola dell'obbligo ed il conseguente diritto 
all'istruzione che è attualmente tutelato, indipendentemente dalla 
regolarità della posizione in ordine al loro soggiorno, nelle forme e 
nei modi previsti per i cittadini italiani‟ (Anon., 2009b). 
 Fini‟s intervention on the matter was welcomed and praised by 
representatives of the opposition such as PD (Democratic Party) 
MP Giuseppe Fioroni and IdV (Italia dei Valori) MP Vittorio 
Borghese, according to whom the measures would have the 
paradoxical effect of promoting integration by segregating 
foreigners („il nostro modo di integrare i bambini e gli studenti 
sarebbe quello di farli passare dal carcere‟) (Ibid.). Centre-Left 
parties, particularly PD and its leader Franceschini, attributed the 
responsibility for the law entirely to the Northern League, accused 
of blackmailing the government by guaranteeingits loyalty to the 
majority coalition only when given full powers to pursue its 
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federalist project and to introduce „zero tolerance‟ policies on 
immigration. However, Berlusconi himself often remarked upon 
the fact that this was „Una legge fatta per la serenità dei cittadini, 
da me fortemente voluta‟ (Anon., 2009a). Equally satisfied by the 
approval of the draft were representatives of AN such as Gasparri 
who, taking the distance from party secretary Fini, supported 
Maroni and fellow Northern League politicians in their claim that 
the law was not racist while defining the measure as „una legge per 
gli Italiani‟ (Ibid.). In responding to the accusation of bringing back 
fascist racial laws, the Minister of the Interior issued an official 
statement, in which he argued that the security package did not 
forbid mixed marriages or legal status for those who entered the 
country legally. Such statement was also a reaction to a petition 
against the law promoted by Italian intellectuals, including 
Camilleri, Ovadia, Fo, Maraini and Tabucchi, in the pages of 
magazine MicroMega (Ibid.,; „Anon., 2009e).  
   An immediate reaction from civil society came from the national 
associations of doctors and teachers, particularly those represented 
by the Cgil (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), who 
took a clear stance against their supposed duty to denounce illegal 
immigrants. The main reasons for their protest were summarised in 
the slogans used for their demonstration outside Montecitorio on 29 
April 2009: „1. Diritto alla sicurezza per tutti; 2. No al ddl 
sicurezza; 3. No alle ronde; 4. No al razzismo; 5. Libertà di cura 
per i medici e gli immigrati‟ (CGL, 2009).  As stated in their 
manifesto:  
                    tutto l‟impianto del ddl sulla sicurezza […] configura una 
restrizione intollerabile dei diritti umani e delle persone con un 
segno di forte discriminazione e vessazione razziale, in più 
cercando di arruolare, in questa guerra agli immigrati, intere 
categorie sociali (medici, infermieri, insegnanti, operatori pubblici, 
affittuari, datori di lavoro e comuni cittadini) spingendoli alla 
delazione ed all‟accanimento discriminatorio e razzista.  
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                     Mentre il Parlamento discute di questi provvedimenti il clima e gli 
episodi di razzismo e di violenza si moltiplicano nel paese con un 
atteggiamento gravissimo e irresponsabile di certa stampa che 
istiga alla violenza razzista. (Ibid.) 
 Similar claims of unconstitutionality and racism came from 
international organisations such as Amnesty International and 
Mèdecins Sans Frontiéres as well as from the European Union. 
Several representatives of the latter argued that the new package 
and particularly its approach towards „the Roma and Sinti 
emergency‟ leads to the social stigmatisation of foreign citizens 
and determines an increase in violence and racism towards them 
(Naletto, 2009: 2; Hammarberg, 2009 ): 
                             The choice to intervene in the legal condition of foreigners only 
through safety laws and measures sends an important symbolic 
message: that so-called „insecurity‟ is due to the presence of 
foreigners, who, as they were born in another country, are inclined 
to criminality by nature. It is exactly this rhetoric, deliberately 
based on fear and the perception of foreigners as a threat, that 
allows such laws, so explicitly detrimental to the rights of 
migrants, to exist. (Naletto, 2009: 2)  
Moreover, as mentioned above, concern started to emerge in those 
foreign countries whose citizens were targeted by the new laws, 
and particularly in Romania. The reaction of the then PM Calin 
Popescu Tariceanu arrived when the law was still under 
parliamentary scrutiny: while confirming his will to cooperate with 
Italian authorities to reduce crime and monitor the movement of 
Romanian citizens, Tariceanu remarked upon the need to prevent 
and fight a spreading xenophobic attitude towards an entire 
population that was being discriminated against despite it 
contributing to the development of the Italian economy and society 
(Tariceanu, 2009). Regarding the reaction to the law on the part of 
the Catholic Church, the main opposition came again from 
individual parish priests working for voluntary associations, 
following a mechanism described in Chapter II, according to which 
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opposition to exclusionary attitudes towards immigration is 
inversely proportional to the position held in the Catholic 
hierarchy. Members of Catholic charities and associations 
traditionally close to the migrants, such as Caritas, took a very anti-
security package stance from the beginning and without hesitation.  
   Other representatives of institutions with a more theoretical 
interest in immigration were slightly more ambiguous in their 
reactions. Among others, this was the case of the secretary for the 
„Pastorale per i Migranti‟, archbishop Agostino Marchetto, who 
intervened to remark upon the need to avoid conflict with the 
newly arrived and to respect human rights. He openly criticised 
specific articles of the law (such as denying illegal immigrants 
education and healthcare) while praising others, such as expulsion 
if used only as the „extrema ratio‟ (www.migrantitorino.it). The 
archbishop strongly remarked that criticising the aspect of the law 
which openly violated migrants‟rights was his duty as a Catholic, a 
statement which has been interpreted as a reply to the official 
rejection of that position on the part of the Vatican expressed by 
Benedict XVI‟s spokesman don Federico Lombardi (Adista, 
n.76/09).   Several more cardinals intervened to criticise the law, 
often taking a clearer stance, as in the case of archbishop of Milan 
Dionigi Tettamanzi who, during the G8 in 2009,  reminded world 
leaders attending mass in Milan Cathedral that „i diritti dei deboli 
non sono diritti deboli‟. Tettamanzi also argued that this position 
generally tends to fade away when the  immigrants can be 
exploited for personal and economic interests (Tettamanzi, 2008) 
statement, seemingly addressing the internal contradiction of the 
Northern League, divided between the need for immigrants in the 
factories of the North and its xenophobic rhetoric, triggered a series 
of reactions on the part of „leghisti‟, such as MP Calderoli, 
according to whom Tettamanzi and his supporters had to be 
considered as a member of the opposition parties (and therefore of 
the „communists‟) (Ibid.). 
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   As support for Tettamanzi started to grow and more cardinals, 
such as the archbishops of Lombardy and Sicily, joined the 
discussion, the Vatican retreated from the debate, and no more 
official reproaches of representatives critical of the law were made 
public. On the contrary, even newspapers close to the Vatican 
seemed to reconsider their initial positions, as was the case for 
Avvenire. Having defined the security package as „una legge senza 
infamia e senza lode‟ on 3 July 2009, Pietro Chinellato rectified his 
statement the following day by writing that it was important not to 
neglect the signals of a „deriva xenofoba‟ and that „la sicurezza è 
un‟esigenza imprescindibile, ma che non si afferma a scapito 
dell‟accoglienza‟ (Chinellato, 2009). Leaving aside a more detailed 
analysis of the Church‟s reaction to the new measure, what is 
interesting to note is that once again the Church did not hold a 
uniform position on the matter but rather reproduced the same 
internal division previously shown in Chapter II, with the only 
exception of several bishops who in these circumstances put 
forward their personal view in support of immigrants. To a certain 
extent, it can be said that the security package was considered by 
some of them too radical not to require their intervention on it. The 
Vatican, however, limited its official intervention to taking a 
distance from those among its representatives who were critical of 
the new law. 
   The internal division within the Catholic hierarchy, confirmed on 
this occasion, has been interpreted by some commentators as a new 
challenge faced by the Church today: „quella compattezza che con 
grande lucidità era stata individuata quale elemento fondamentale 
della sua forza e capacità di radicamento sembra venire 
progressivamente meno nel cuore stesso del suo impero globale: 
l‟Italia‟ (Carnevale and Gigante, 2009). On the contrary, the 
Waldensian Church seemed to reach a unitary front in launching a 
campaign in protest against the security package. Such a campaign 
also involved a call for a national day of fastening to express 
solidarity with immigrants, defined as the victims of the law. The 
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initiative was supported by several representative of Centre-Left 
parties, such as Paolo Ferrero (RC), Emma Bonino (PR), and Sonia 
Alfano (IdV) (Naso, 2009).  
   Finally, a last reaction came from the CSM (Consiglio Superiore 
della Magistratura), which judged the law to be inefficient and 
actually counterproductive as it would obstruct judicial activity as 
well as violate the Constitution (Anon., 2009c). Several jurists 
noticed how the new law also creates practical problems such as 
overcrowded prisons, with more people going to jail and being kept 
there for a longer time. According to them, given the impossibility 
of putting into practice some key measures such as the expulsion of 
illegal immigrants, the security package rather represents a 
symbolic statement („norma-manifesto‟) inadequate to work as a 
deterrent. The law‟s repressive rhetoric, according to which jailing 
illegal immigrants solves the problem of criminality, becomes 
therefore a „strumento extrapenale, nel quadro di una strategia 
globale di tutela‟. Furthermore, it denies immigrants their basic 
human rights and particularly „la libertà personale‟, „il diritto 
storicamente più tutelato dalle Costituzioni di ogni epoca […] 
viene così azzerato per periodi tutt‟altro che brevi, sulla base del 
provvedimento di un‟autorità amministrativa (il questore)‟ 
(Viganò, 2008: 820). 
   The first general datum which emerges from the analysis of this 
new package of measures is the fact that it represents a clear 
moment of rupture with the previous legislation. After years of bills 
that in their final draft were not dramatically different from one 
another, where the most radical views on the most adequate 
response to a growing number of arrivals were blunted by the 
several modifications and amendments necessary for their 
approval, the latest measure exposed openly the paradoxical 
position of the Northern League. Its strategy was indeed aimed at 
reconciling an increasingly exclusionary attitude towards the newly 
arrived with the growing demand for more immigrants coming 
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from the industrial areas of the North, where its anti-immigrant 
rhetoric contributed to secure it electoral consensus. This paradox 
can be explained and understood in light of Cento Bull‟s definition 
of the League‟s political action as „simulative politics‟. Such a 
contradiction emerges when considering the centrality of identity 
politics in the party‟s ideology, typical of parties which focus on 
pre-material and non-economic issues (Bets, 1993). Starting from 
the premise that identity and interests are not necessarily 
antithetical and that in fact they can be „mutually reinforcing‟, she 
claims that the success of right-wing parties like the Northern 
League can be ascribed to „their ability to reconcile apparently 
irreconcilable phenomena of both a material and pre-material 
nature‟ (Cento Bull, 2009: 3) The Northern League, in fact, aims to 
respond to the economic aspirations of strong global competitors 
while responding to their fears and anxieties regarding the impact 
of globalisation. In this sense, simulation has to be intended as „the 
use of symbols, signs and images which do not represent or refer to 
anything that is authentic, but which themselves produce or 
perform reality, and present themselves as evidence for this 
authenticity‟ (Blühdorn, 2007: 267). According to Cento Bull, 
Bossi‟s party can be best understood within a framework of 
simulation, given the fact that competitive industrial areas can also 
be exposed to a widespread sense of anxiety and distress (Cento 
Bull, 2010:5). „In this context […] the Lega has developed a 
politics that „simulates‟ being able to reconcile irreconcilable 
material and cultural trends, for instance, by treating immigration 
as a „temporary‟ phenomenon‟, or providing „a vision of a return to 
an idealized communitarian society which is both crime-free and 
(almost) immigrant-free (Ibid; Cento Bull, 2009: 143).  
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8. Conclusion          
The analysis conducted until this point shows that the Italian 
legislation on immigration reflects the same lack of consistency 
and long-term strategy which has characterised the cultural and 
political debate on the issue. The main trait of the laws passed until 
the early 1990s is their attempt to solve a series of unforeseen 
crises while regulating the internal job market following a 
protectionist approach. Until 1990, there is no reference to any of 
the models put forward by other European countries to deal with 
the phenomenon. References to multiculturalism as a fallacious 
model will appear a decade later and will become typical of the 
rhetoric of Right-wing parties. Turco and Napolitano were the first 
politicians to look at multiculturalism as a point of reference that 
could be applied to the Italian situation as well, even though the 
implementation of policies inspired by this model did not go 
beyond an informal stage. Until the late 1990s, the approval of new 
measures was not accompanied by a general discussion on the most 
adequate means to foster integration, an attitude which contributes 
to explain the sudden concern that invested the political world and 
civil society when immigration manifested itself at an 
unprecedented scale in terms of waves of arrivals and clashes with 
the local population.  Even when, at the turn of the new century, 
immigration became a hot topic in political discourse and the two 
coalitions turned it into a decisive element in electoral campaigns 
characterised by heated polemics, the individual laws passed were 
all similar in their final drafts, showing mainly a degree of 
continuity.  
   The fact that, despite the deeply antagonistic views expressed by 
the different parties on the subject, these laws were overall similar 
in what they established as well as in their consequences, can be 
explained by looking at a numbers of factors. First of all, the 
position of the Left shifted from a general will to welcome 
immigrants to an attitude much closer to that of the Right, with 
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whom it chose to compete in reassuring the citizens, who 
seemingly demanded greater security. This change was triggered 
not only by the requests of public opinion but also by specific 
episodes of violence such as the Reggiani killing in October 2007, 
when the Left reacted to the anger on the part of Italian citizens by 
closing various nomadic camps and threatening a mass expulsion 
of all illegal immigrants. The second reason why the laws passed 
until 2008 were similar in many respects is due to the tensions 
which emerged during the process of negotiation and parliamentary 
scrutiny, when the more radical changes suggested by both 
extremes of the political spectrum were rejected by the 
Constitutional Court or simply balanced each other out. Moreover, 
international organisations and of the EU also contributed to 
minimising or erasing the most controversial aspects of the laws.  
   By the end of the 1990s, immigration had become an important 
tool exploited by both coalitions to gain support and in this sense it 
started to represent the ground on which political parties would 
compete, sometimes almost blackmailing their allies, as in the case 
of the conditions posed by the Northern League to Forza Italia in 
order to remain part of the coalition. The language used by the 
different political actors shows some similarities: from the word 
„sanatoria‟ („sanare‟ means to heal) which implies an interpretation 
of immigration as an illness or a plague, to the term 
„extracomunitario‟ and its inward-looking perspective focused on 
the inside, the community. The main difference in the terminology 
used to formulate the laws until 2008 can be noticed in the 
transformation of the „centri di permanenza temporanea‟ into 
„centri di identificazione e espulsione‟, where clearly the focus 
shifted from the fact that immigrants would only be temporarily 
deprived of their freedom to the idea that expulsion was the only 
expectation they could have after identification.  As stated earlier, 
the Bossi-Fini law can be considered as the last measure in this 
cycle as it almost coincided with the measure passed in 1963, 
which made entry dependent on the possession of a valid work 
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contract. It can be said that the 1963 measure was even stricter, 
since it established that before employing a foreigner an employer 
had to verify that no Italians were available for that job. However, 
it is also the case that the Bossi-Fini law opened a new season of 
political discourses openly aimed at discouraging immigration and 
linking it to all the challenges Italy was facing, from pollution to 
crime and to economic decline.   
   The 2008 law represents a clear turn and clear departure from two 
decades of measures that, albeit lacking a long-term strategy, were 
the result of constant negotiations. The security package put the 
definitive word on a trend that had already started to outline an 
exclusionary attitude towards immigrants, considered first 
exclusively as workers and eventually as a threat. With the 
introduction of  the „crime of clandestinity‟ immigrants clearly 
become homines sacri, invisible in the public arena and exploited 
as scapegoats, the target of popular anger as well as the reassuring 
„other‟, fundamental to place any blame outside the community. 
   The influence of the Northern League in this turn is self-evident. 
If it can be said that until 2008 Italy did not seem to follow any 
model in reacting to immigration, and therefore the last hypothesis 
listed in the introduction to this chapter has to be considered true, it 
is also possible to argue that since 2008 the model put forward by 
the League has been adopted by the state, a state in which the party 
represents the strongest voice among those debating immigration. 
The influence of the Church is much more difficult to assess: on the 
one hand, it cannot be said that it contributed to the affirmation of 
an exclusionary model of state and citizenship, on the other hand, 
its rhetoric, based on victimhood, and its call to protect a threatened 
Italian Catholic identity had definitely inspired and legitimized the 
discourse of the Northern League, which borrowed it and made it 
its own.   
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Conclusion 
„Un napoletano dell‟antico Regno o un piemontese del regno 
subalpino si fecero italiani non rinnegando l‟esser loro anteriore ma 
innalzandolo e risolvendolo in quel nuovo essere‟ (Benedetto 
Croce, Storia d’Europa, 1932, ed.1993: 314-315). 
It is with these words that Benedetto Croce described the Italian 
national identity which emerged after Unification (1861-1870), an 
identity that was more inclusive than previous regional and 
municipal affiliations. Looking back at the creation of the nation 
state and its first challenge of constructing a feeling of shared 
belonging, the philosopher argued that now an even broader shared 
identity as Europeans was required. This, he argued, could not be 
of any danger to national identity as it was not challenging but 
rather reinforcing it,  since „le nazioni non sono dati naturali, ma 
stati di coscienza e formazioni storiche‟ (Croce, 1993: 15). Since 
that time, the challenges Italy has had to face in terms of 
redefinition of national identity have been mainly twofold: the 
divided memory of fascism/anti-fascism, and globalisation. The 
first, which involved opposing interpretations of the regime, the 
war and the Resistance, has been at the centre of the public debate 
since the late 1980s, and represents the main perspective from 
which the idea of national belonging has been reconsidered. As this 
work has tried to show, this divided conception of Italianness has 
been held partially responsible for the country‟s weak sense of 
national belonging. 
   As the 150
th
 anniversary of the birth of the new nation 
approaches (1861-2011), official celebrations, exhibitions, 
conferences, talks in schools across the country have been 
announced by government and opposition 
(www.governo.it/150_italia_unita/anniversario/centro_espositivo.h
tml). The anniversary could represent an occasion to (re)open a 
dialogue on the meaning of Italianness, on whether such a shared 
common belonging has ever been successfully achieved, and on its 
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role in today‟s global village. In preparation for the celebrations of 
2011, national newspapers and journals have launched a series of 
opinion polls aimed at outlining a picture of how Italians interpret 
national belonging and at measuring the levels of „patriottismo‟ 
within Italian civil society. According to a recent Istat survey, when 
asked what national unity is, 52 per cent of respondents said „un 
bene irrinunciabile‟ and 22 per cent  „una realtà storica che si può 
anche modificare‟. When asked whether patriotism as a value still 
exists today, 75 per cent of interviewees answered positively. 
According to those interviewed, Italianness is based on the values 
of the constitution (37 per cent), the language (25 per cent), the 
concept of homeland (24 per cent), and the Catholic Church (14 per 
cent). Among the traits typical of Italianness, the respondents 
identified hospitality (11 per cent) and solidarity (8 per cent). When 
asked about negative values, only 4 per cent mentioned racism, 
whereas the majority saw the mafia and a low level of „senso 
civico‟ as the main issues. Despite the fact that patriotism is still 
acknowledged as an important value, and that national unity is 
described in positive terms, Italians are also aware of the 
challenges that national identity has had to face during the last 150 
years. They perceive as key issues a persisting divided memory on 
controversial historical events, the impact of globalization and the 
emergence of federalist/separatist ideas put forward by new 
political parties and in particular by the Northern League. 
Immigration features among the external threats to which Italian 
identity is seemingly exposed today (www.fondazioneitaliani.it).  
   The debate on immigration exploded in the public sphere in the 
early 1990s, when for the first time Italian citizens as well as their 
political representatives became aware that the transition from 
being a country of emigration to becoming a country of 
immigration had been completed and was irreversible. The debates 
on national identity and on immigration began more or less at the 
same time, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Despite the 
fact that the two debates took place simultaneously, they ran 
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without intersecting until national identity and the foreign presence 
within the country became linked  when the latter was perceived as 
a threat to the former. This was the main overlap between two 
debates that have otherwise been kept separate. In recent 
discussions there has been a tendency to respond to the perceived 
challenges to Italianness by focusing on national pride. 
Commenting on the debate on national identity in France, 
journalists and intellectuals such as Ida Magli and Giordano Bruno 
Guerra argued that „l‟unico modo per mantenere la nostra identità è 
[…] volerne  una, rispettarla, proteggerla‟ (Anon., 2010). Their 
argument is that it is typically Italian to denigrate the homeland. 
According to Guerra, Italy should follow the example of France, 
where a Ministry of National Identity was created in 2007 to open a 
discussion on French identity and the challenges posed to it by 
immigration. However, as the 2009 international survey 
„Transatlantic Trends on Immigration‟ showed, Italy is the country 
where the perception of immigration is more distorted, as Italians 
believed there to be four times as many immigrants than is actually 
the case: 6.5 per cent according to Istat and 23 per cent according 
to the interviewees (www.affarinternazionali.it): „Questo alto senso 
di insicurezza da un lato evidenzia la scarsa fiducia verso le  
politiche fino ad oggi adottate per affrontare il fenomeno, dall‟altro 
è probabilmente conseguenza dell‟alto livello di politicizzazione 
che caratterizza il dibattito sul problema, che ostacola sia la 
comprensione del problema che l‟individuazione degli strumenti 
per affrontarlo‟ (Matarazzo, 2009).  
   Many opinion makers have argued that the anniversary of 
Unification could be an occasion to re-open a discussion on the 
meaning of Italianness. While this would clearly be a step forward, 
since the need for a reinterpretation of the meaning of national 
identity has been the main subject of this work, the findings of this 
thesis suggest that it is highly optimistic. The thesis began by 
questioning whether Italy in reacting to immigration has been 
following any classic model of integration or whether it is putting 
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forward its own unique long term strategy to deal with the 
increasing number of arrivals. More importantly, it tried to 
establish whether the discussion on immigration had opened a 
debate on the need to re-define the meaning of Italian national 
identity in order to make it more inclusive of alternative/minority 
identities. In order to answer these questions, it looked at the 
different (often unrelated) debates on national identity and 
immigration as they emerged and acquired national relevance in the 
public sphere, identifying the main participants in such debates, 
rather than following a strict chronological approach or a 
systematic media analysis. Various actors (Italian intellectuals, the 
Catholic Church and the Northern League) were included because 
of their participation in one or more of the debates, and because  
they emerged as leading voices in such debates. While not an actor 
per se, successive laws on immigration, which have been informed 
by the debates analysed in this thesis, are the subject of the last 
chapter.  
    This thesis investigated when, how and why the discussion on 
national identity and that on immigration became relevant in the 
public discourse, and aimed at accounting for mainstream positions 
as well as for dissent within single groups. Finally it looked at the 
relationship between the different political actors and their 
influence on public opinion as well as on state policies. At all times 
the analysis focused not only on what was said but also on what 
was not discussed.  
   The discussion on the need for a renewed sense of national 
belonging began in the 1980s and reached its peak in the mid 
1990s. Following a gradual process of political and social change, 
triggered by internal and external factors, a group of intellectuals, 
mainly historians, opened a discussion on the weakness of Italian 
identity, which they attributed to a divided memory of historical 
events such as Fascism, WWII and the Resistance. The discussion 
appears to have been dominated by the so-called revisionist, right-
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wing historians writing in established broadsheets and non 
academic literary and political journals across the political 
spectrum. Dissent was voiced by only a minority of intellectuals, 
yet these had authoritative positions on the Left, for example 
philosopher Norberto Bobbio. In this context, national identity was 
analysed mainly by looking at the lack of shared „myths‟ and 
narratives, which had supposedly prevented national identity from 
being unitary and inclusive of all Italian citizens. Few Italian 
intellectuals engaged with the question of immigration and those 
who did put forward isolated views never developed into a proper 
debate. Moreover, immigration was not linked to the discussion on 
Italianness nor was it considered relevant to a process of re-
negotiation of a more inclusive (vis-à-vis both Italians and 
foreigners) national belonging. Moreover, despite the intensity of 
the debate on national belonging, it was never defined by 
intellectuals in positive terms. On the contrary it has been debated 
exclusively in terms of its weakness and failures and its contested 
nature. Thus, the implicit definition of identity which emerges from 
these exchanges seems to be characterised by those features that are 
judged to be missing in the Italian case: military success, a strong 
common historical legacy and political consensus. This thesis does 
not intend to suggest that there are no intellectuals putting forward 
more open and inclusive ideas of Italian identity. There may be any 
number of Italian scholars, journalists and opinion makers who 
have engaged with different interpretations of Italianness, but their 
voices have not featured in the national public debate on the theme. 
   Italian identity has also been at the centre of a discussion on 
immigration opened by the Catholic Church in 2000, a year which 
represents a watershed in the Church‟s rhetoric on the foreign 
presence within the country. Immigration in this case was not 
discussed per se, but in relation to an openly recognised decline of 
Catholicism. The main actors involved in this debate were 
influential members of the Catholic hierarchy, who expressed their 
views in official speeches and documents written mainly for 
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professional clericals and intended for dissemination primarily 
among religious representatives. The documents addressed a 
specialist audience at a national level and worked according to a 
mechanism of mutual reinforcement. The debate was triggered not 
only by the recognition on the part of the Church of its own decline 
in terms of support and power, but also by the preparation for the 
Jubilee (2000) and by the discussion on a new law on freedom of 
religion. The Church adopted a double strategy to make its claims 
relevant for the nation: on the one hand it insisted upon the 
superiority of Catholicism while identifying religious belonging as 
the essence of Italian national identity; on the other hand it 
presented itself as a victim demanding more freedom of speech and 
protection on the part of the state.  In this way it turned the 
perceived threats to Catholicism, such as the „different cultures and 
ways of living of foreigners‟ into threats to Italianness. Following 
the idea that „nobody is a foreigner within the Church‟, Catholicism 
has been presented as a necessary condition in order to acquire 
citizenship. Dissent from this position only came occasionally from 
influential religious figures, and was mainly voiced by individual 
parish priests working with Catholic associations, which had first 
hand contact with immigrants. Dissent was also voiced by 
representatives of other religions, particularly from the Muslim 
communities, but was mostly carefully formulated and without 
much impact on the public sphere.  
   Immigration as a threat posed to national identity has been 
discussed in the public sphere by another actor: the Northern 
League. The party opened a discussion on (Northern) identity in the 
early 1990s, although its position changed quite dramatically more 
recently. In 2008, with the approval of the law known as the 
„security package‟, the debate reached its peak and the League‟s 
position became more extreme. The rhetoric used by the party‟s 
leader Umberto Bossi and fellow „leghisti‟ was articulated through 
speeches, interviews, articles and editorials published in the party‟s 
newspaper La Padania, particularly in recent times. The 
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interventions were addressed to a non-specialised general public 
and Northern League‟s supporters, but more recently the League 
has broadened its target and has started addressing the whole 
nation. This new strategy is justified by the party‟s dual aim: that of 
acquiring political consensus in the rest of the country and that of 
making certain issues relevant at the national level. Thus the Lega 
has moved from claims to represent only a part of the citizens, to a 
new nationalistic rhetoric addressing all Italians. The key concepts 
of this new rhetoric are represented by a set of dichotomies used to 
portray what the party calls „us‟ („la nostra gente‟), as threatened by 
„them‟ (the immigrants). Such fears are expressed through the use 
of military metaphors and alarmist calls for action. Internal dissent 
within the party and the centre-right coalition is largely absent, 
instead criticism comes from the Church, whose representatives 
have often spoken out against intolerance, usually condemning 
racism in general terms, and only rarely referring directly to the 
positions put forward by the Northern League.  
   While at first Catholic representatives expressed their rejection of 
the intolerant positions of the new party and Bossi was very critical 
of what he perceived at times as a corrupt Roman Church, today 
the relationship between the two actors has become more 
ambiguous. This thesis showed how, to a certain extent, the 
Church, through its silent acquiescence, has legitimised the 
League‟s discourse on immigration, particularly since the party has 
begun to borrow the Catholic rhetoric on the issue and started 
fighting its battle in the name of a Catholic national identity.    
   While the position of intellectuals is isolated and fragmented, the 
Lega and the Church seem to pursue their deeply different goals by 
putting forward compatible (indeed often common) strategies and 
claims. They both present themselves as victims asking the state for 
protection and for a right to freedom of expression allegedly denied 
to them. Their discourses also converge around some central key 
concepts such as the right to preserve traditional identities and to 
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direct their solidarity towards those who are closer to them, as well 
as their identification of Muslim immigrants as the main threat to 
an endangered Christian tradition. As a result, despite the different 
register used and their different agendas, the Church and the Lega 
contribute to legitimise and reinforce citizens‟ anxieties and fears 
in relation to immigration, while providing the state with support 
for its increasingly restrictive measures. While the Church has in 
this sense only an indirect responsibility, the League, as a member 
of the governing coalition, has actively participated in the creation 
of an exclusionary Italian identity. Furthermore one could argue 
that the silence of intellectuals in this discussion has indirectly 
contributed to the consolidation of such an exclusionary attitude. 
The impact of these positions on state policy-making has became 
clearer in the last few years, particularly since the „security 
package‟ was passed and illegal entry/residence in the country 
became a crime.  
   In conclusion, until 2008 Italy seemed to be reacting to 
immigration with ad hoc measures put forward from time to time to 
deal with single unexpected emergencies. All the laws passed until 
then, with the exception of the Turco-Napolitano, seem to have 
been aimed at regulating the job market in a protectionist way, with 
the result that they considered immigrants primarily as a workforce, 
rather than as human beings or possible future citizens. When 
taking into account only the measures passed before 2008, it can be 
said that Italy was not following any traditional model of 
integration, nor was it formulating its own long-term response to 
the phenomenon. Legislation on immigration appeared to be a 
confused mixture of temporary reactions and inefficient practical 
solutions (such as the recurrent „sanatorie‟). The difference 
between the measures suggested by the Centre-Right and those 
formulated by the Centre-Left is only noticeable when considering 
the early steps of their formulation, while they tended to converge 
after the first parliamentary discussions.  
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   As showed in the last chapter of this work, since 2008 Italy has 
started adopting a clearer strategy to respond to the new arrivals. 
Such a strategy does not imply any discussion of integration, it is 
rather mainly aimed at making the Italian borders impenetrable. In 
this sense, if this turn is too recent to allow us to talk about a new 
model, it can be said that the country has definitely taken a clear 
direction, and is moving fast towards the creation of a highly 
exclusionary identity, in which a discussion of alternative ideas of 
Italianness does not feature at all.   
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